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  The purpose of this textual analysis is to ascertain the most fundamental 
principles that govern education conceived of as the perfection of the faculty of reason.  
Considered as such, education is ordered to happiness. This purpose determines the arts 
and sciences that constitute education and dictates the role of teacher.  Because all 
education presupposes self-evident principles, the role of the teacher is to aid students in 
their progress from these principles to conclusions that they can support and defend on 
their own.  This consideration of the nature and purpose of education is necessary for 
educational leaders who design curricula and formulate policy for instructional practice. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this study is to determine the most fundamental principles of 
education according to Aquinas, how these principles relate to the proper relationship of 
the teacher to the student, and how this purpose and this relationship is important and 
useful for educational leaders.  The way that one understands the nature and purpose of 
education as a whole influences the understanding of the teacher-student relationship, 
which in turn influences the decisions of educational leaders concerning curriculum 
design and instructional practice.  Because all of the work of educational leaders is 
directed to the final end of learning, determining the purpose of this learning and how this 
purpose is attained is the primary concern of all educational leaders whose role is to 
coordinate the  
 To accomplish this goal, however, it will first be necessary to relate what is now 
referred to as mastery orientation to what Aquinas identifies as the purpose of education.  
According to Aquinas, all of education is ordered to human happiness (eudaimonia).  The 
foundation for this conception of education is twofold: first, the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
understanding of the arts and sciences, and second, the treatment of human happiness in 
the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Aristotle, trans. 1984, 1097a15-1099b8). 
 Therefore, after treating the philosophical origins of the arts and sciences that 
constitute the most fundamental principles of education and the conception of human 
happiness as the purpose of education, the significance of this conception for the role of 
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the teacher and educational leaders will be examined.  Finally, the connection between 
these considerations and educational leadership will be made. 
Background/Problem 
 In contemporary education, policies and practices are invariably formulated and 
implemented on the basis of some understanding of the purpose of education in general, 
and of each discipline in particular.  However, while these purposes are seldom examined 
or articulated beyond their applicability to practical ends, educational leaders are 
expected to articulate, defend, and accomplish them.   
 In general, the role and instructional practice of the teacher in relation to the 
student is considered of paramount importance in raising student achievement.  However, 
the nature of this role is elusive. "Student achievement" tends to be axiomatically defined 
in terms of standardized test scores–a definition that is often not questioned, let alone 
discussed, in the context of instruction in the classroom.  Also educational leaders are 
responsible for the support and professional development of teachers.  This responsibility 
is based on conceptions of what teachers should know and be able to do that are broadly 
accepted but not necessarily examined or articulated in relation to the most fundamental 
principles. 
 Whether common knowledge or not, the nature and purpose of education, the role 
of the teacher, the definition of student achievement, and the question of how educational 
leaders should shape and support these areas are all based on foundational principles of 
epistemology grounded in specific traditions of philosophy.  It is important that these 
principles be articulated and defended.   
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 A further difficulty is that there is widespread disagreement about the place of the 
philosophy of education in educational leadership programs ordered to understanding and 
advancing education. Views widely diverge.  For example, some claim that because we 
live in a culture that embraces individualism and the Romantic expression of self, there 
simply is no such thing as the philosophy of education (Case, French, & Simpson, 2011).  
Another point of contention is the place of the philosophy of education in the university.  
Some maintain that it belongs in the philosophy department, while others hold that it is an 
essential element of an education curriculum (Biesta, 2014).   
 Complicating this further, there is practically no body of work focused on the 
philosophy of educational leadership (Pryor, Sloane, & Amobi, 2007). Thus, this is an 
area ripe for exploration and analysis. 
 Of those who insist on the treatment of educational foundations and the 
philosophy of education in educational leadership programs, many claim that they are 
essential for leaders to make sound judgments and efficacious decisions in a variety of 
challenging situations.  Despite this, some have observed that isolated courses in the 
philosophy of education have in many cases been entirely omitted from educational 
leadership curricula (Pryor, 2007). 
 In light of these considerations, it is necessary and useful to challenge this 
tendency to overlook the foundations of education, take a step back, and more closely 
examine core philosophical and epistemological principles upon which education in the 
United States is based.  This is particularly important for educational leaders who shape 
curriculum and instruction. To this end, the researcher proposes to contribute to the 
discussion by examining one of the most historically influential thinkers on the subject of 
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the philosophy of education: St. Thomas Aquinas.  By the investigation of his works, the 
hope is to determine the purpose of education and to raise fundamental concerns that will 
encourage educators to consider more deeply the most important questions of what we 
are doing in education and why.   
 The purpose, then, of this dissertation is to explore the foundations upon which 
education is built.  In so doing, the goal is to address a gap that exists in contemporary 
scholarship: the absence of clearly articulated and fundamental principles on the basis of 
which educational decisions are made at the highest levels, such as which disciplines will 
be taught and for what purpose, how these disciplines will be approached, and how 
curricula will be planned and instructional practice determined in accord with the overall 
purpose of education.  The failure to consider these principles is a serious omission; for 
without them, there is no way to judge the overall quality of education or to measure 
progress in a way that assesses outcomes in reference to intended goals.  While it is true 
that there is a system of standardized testing in place at state and national levels, there 
exists no common understanding and consensus concerning what the overall goal of 
education is and how each discipline is related to this goal.  As a case in point, former 
Princeton University president Shapiro argues in his book, A Larger Sense of Purpose: 
Higher Education and Society (2005) that American Universities lack a sense of purpose.   
To address this problem, the following questions will be investigated. 
Research Questions 
1) What is the nature and purpose of education according to Aquinas? 
2) How does Aquinas define the purpose and role of the teacher? 
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3) What is the relevance of Aquinas’s philosophy of education for teachers and 
for educational leaders who design curricula? 
Overview of Framework and Methodology 
 This dissertation will proceed according to an Aristotelian-Thomistic conceptual 
framework.  This framework is derived from the following works of Aristotle, together 
with the commentaries of St. Thomas Aquinas on these same works:  1) The Organon  
2)The Physics 3)  The De Anima  3) The Nicomachean Ethics and 4) The Metaphysics. 
Taken in this order, these works lay out the path to wisdom, which is knowledge in the 
fullest sense and an essential element of happiness, which is the principal goal of 
education according to Aristotle and Aquinas.   
 The methodology used in this exploratory qualitative analysis is composed of 
three parts: dialectic, definition, and demonstration.  "Dialectic" refers to reasoning from 
opinions that are generally accepted.  "Definition" refers to words that signify distinctly 
the nature of the thing.  "Demonstration" refers to a syllogism whose premises are 
statements which are either self-evident principles derived from these principles 
(Aristotle, trans. 1984, 100a20-101a3).   
The Significance of This Study 
 An honest assessment of the purpose of contemporary education is that it has a 
tendency to be career-oriented.  In other words, our curricula are finally directed to 
forming students who will attain economic success and live as "productive" citizens.  As 
important as it is to be economically successful, it is necessary to take up the question of 
whether this kind of education is the most humanizing. A humanizing education in 
Aristotelian-Thomistic terms is ordered to attaining a knowledge that is perfective of 
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human nature. This knowledge is attained principally in the disciplines of logic, 
mathematics, natural philosophy, ethics, and metaphysics.  The reason that these 
disciplines are considered to be the most humanizing is that they are directed to the 
perfection of reason, which is the highest faculty of human nature.  For Aristotle and St. 
Thomas, one who has the most universal knowledge and uses this knowledge to order 
human acts has attained happiness, which is the greatest excellence of life (Aristotle, 
trans. 1984, 1098a1-17;  Aquinas, trans. 1995). 
  Might it be that our society as a whole has a tendency toward a narrative and 
banking style of education?  Might it be that we are, with the best of intentions, 
cultivating a pedagogy of the oppressed (Freire, 1970)? Might it be that the "goal 
orientation" of economic success is dehumanizing in ways that we do not realize or take 
precautions against? If so, it is crucial to discuss the purpose of education and whether 
this purpose is being accomplished by teachers and educational leaders. This dissertation 
will investigate these questions by examining the historical and philosophical foundations 
of the kind of education that is ordered to perfection and happiness, which is facilitated 
by teachers and guided and supported by educational leaders. In so doing, this 
dissertation proposes to fill a gap in the literature concerning the relation of a sound 
philosophy of education to the area of educational leadership that concerns curriculum 
design. 
Definition of Terms 
1) goal-oriented education: Goal-oriented education is directed to achieving a practical 
goal beyond the knowledge itself.  For example, saying that the primary goal of education 
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is to turn out students who are "college and career ready" characterizes goal-oriented 
education  (Strambler & McKown, 2013). 
2) mastery-oriented education: Mastery-oriented education is directed to mastery of the 
subject matter.  It is not directed to a goal beyond the knowledge itself.  Rather, 
knowledge is the purpose of this kind of education in the sense that this knowledge 
perfects human nature. This kind of knowledge is considered to have a humanizing effect 
on the student (Strambler et al., 2013). 
3) eudaimonia:  This term is used by Noddings in her work Happiness in Education 
(2003) and originates from the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle.  Though it is usually 
translated "happiness," it has the connotation of the highest good for human nature.  For 
Aristotle, this activity in accord with perfect virtue, both moral and intellectual.  Because 
the intellect is the highest human faculty, the perfection of this faculty is the highest 
human good.  Eudaimonia, then, consists in human flourishing or perfection.  Aristotle 
puts it this way in the Nicomachean Ethics, speaking of happiness as the highest human 
good:  "human good turns out to be activity of soul in conformity with excellence, and if 
there are more than one excellence, in conformity with the best and most complete" 
(Aristotle, trans. 1984, 1098a16-18). 
4) self-actualization:  This term refers to a process of realizing or fulfilling one's 
potential.  Interestingly, Aristotle defined change as the actualization of the potential as 
such.  So, self-actualization is rooted in Aristotle's notion of nature.  What makes us more 
human is a process of bringing into actualization those faculties of knowledge within us 
(Aristotle, trans 1984, 201a9-11). 
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5) narrative or banking education: In this form of education, the teacher deposits facts 
or narrates information that the student is expected to return or display through some 
means of assessment.  The criticism of this process is that it fails to perfect the human 
faculties of critical thought and instead focuses on getting an answer or achieving high 
scores as an end in itself. The criticism is that assessment is treated as not only the 
terminus or last consideration of instruction, but the telos or final end for which education 
ultimately exists.   The defense of this form of education is that the knowledge of core 
disciplines requires inevitable memorization of facts and standardized tests afford both an 
incentive to memorize these facts and an objective means of assessing progress (Freire, 
1970). 
6) the dialogical process:  In contrast to narrative or banking education, this term 
describes a method of education that is based on dialogue between the student and 
teacher.  It centers on the development of mental faculties by inducing students to take an 
active role in exercising logical skills in reaching substantive and worthwhile knowledge 
for themselves.  In this understanding, students are not passive recipients of a narrative 
but take the lead role in actualizing themselves, taking possession of knowledge that they 
have arrived at on their own (Freire, 1970). The dialogical process is often called "The 
Socratic Maieutic" because Socrates was the earliest known practitioner of this method 
(Neumayr, 2015). 
7) Aristotle: Aristotle was an ancient Greek philosopher.  He was born in Stagira, 
Chalcidice, Greece in 384 B.C. and died in Chalcis, Euboea in 322 B.C.  He was "one of 
the greatest intellectual figures of Western history. He was the author of a philosophical 
and scientific system that became the framework and vehicle for both Christian 
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scholasticism and medieval Islamic philosophy.  Even after the intellectual revolutions of 
the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment, Aristotelian concepts remained 
embedded in Western thinking"  (Amadio, 2015, p.1). 
8) St. Thomas Aquinas:  Aquinas was an Italian medieval philosopher and theologian 
who lived from 1225-1274 A.D.  He was the foremost medieval Scholastic.  He was a 
philosophical disciple of Aristotle and wrote commentaries on all of Aristotle's major 
works.  He is widely respected for his contributions to both philosophy and theology 
(Chenu, 1964). Along with Aristotle, Aquinas is one of the most influential thinkers on 
the subject of the philosophy of education. 
9) purpose of education: this term refers to the aim or goal of education as a whole.  
Determining the purpose of education is particularly important because the nature of 
education and all of the individual components of an educational institution are directed 
by and ordered to the purpose of the whole. 
10) aims talk:  this expression was coined by Noddings (2003) in her book Happiness in 
Education and refers to the discussion of and inquiry into the aims or purposes of 
education as a whole. 
11) educational leader:  and educational leader is one who is responsible for organizing 
the parts of a whole and directing the whole to a purpose.  In this dissertation, the parts 
being organized are the specific arts and sciences treated and chapter three.  These arts 
and sciences form a whole that is directed to the purpose of happiness.  Thus, the specific 
kind of educational leadership that this dissertation concerns is curriculum design and 
implementation.  Throughout this dissertation, then, "educational leader" refers to 
someone who is responsible for designing curricula and influencing instructional 
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practice.  Though the dissertation is most relevant to curriculum designers, it is also 
applicable to administrators such as college deans and presidents who play a role in the 
implementation of policies concerning curriculum, policymakers under whose purview 
the design and implementation of curriculum falls, and teachers in the classroom who are 
most closely associated with the findings of this research. 
Delimitations 
 The principal delimitation of this exploratory qualitative analysis is that the 
philosophy of two thinkers, Aristotle and Aquinas, will be investigated.  No attempt will 
be made to represent the entire contribution of either philosopher or the contributions of 
other authors.  Rather, their thought on the nature and purpose of education and how this 
applies to leaders who shape curricula and instructional practice will be the subject of 
research.  Also, the discussion will focus on higher education.  Though many of the 
principles discussed will be applicable to education at all levels, whenever the term 
"education" is used, the meaning intended is "higher education" unless otherwise noted.   
Also, though one can speak of both moral and intellectual education, the focus here will 
be on the cultivation of the intellect or mind, rather than on the development of the moral 
virtues. 
 Also, primarily because education in the United States is dominated by the 
influence of almost exclusively western works, this dissertation will be concern itself 
with those works.  This western purview notwithstanding, the arguments made herein are 
not intended to apply exclusively to education in the west.  Since the scope and treatment 
of disciplines is based on human nature, the findings are applicable in non-western 
traditions as well. 
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Limitations 
 Because this research is philosophical at its core, it is limited to universal 
conclusions about the nature and purpose of education.  This methodology does not 
extend in its applicability to a particular implementation of the conclusion of the findings 
in a particular setting the way an empirical study might.  Therefore, given the limitations 
of this approach, the focus is on principles universally applicable rather than very specific 
practices that may be utilized in a particular setting. 
 Further, because the focus of this dissertation is the most fundamental principles 
guiding the method of the arts and sciences, it will be concerned specifically with how 
these principles concern those educational leaders responsible for designing curricula and 
setting standards for instructional practice in conjunction with curricula. The 
consideration of leadership in general or administration in particular is outside the scope 
of the research.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Relevance of the Philosophy of Education to Educational Leadership 
 The subject of the importance of the philosophy of education for educational 
leaders is certainly not among the most frequently discussed topics in the field of 
educational leadership.  Dominating the conversation are such considerations as 
formative and summative assessments, closing the achievement gap, the self-efficacy of 
leaders, distributed leadership, policy studies, and organizational change.  Even in the 
current literature, there seems to be a dearth of articles that treat of the philosophy of 
educational leadership and the significance of the role that the philosophy of education 
plays in the duties of educational leaders (Pryor et al., 2007). 
 Some go so far as to assert that there is no such thing as the philosophy of 
leadership, let alone a philosophy of educational leadership in particular.  Case et al. 
(2011) make the following claim: "In a significant sense, there is no philosophy of 
leadership" (p. 1). These authors supply the following reason for their assertion:  "In the 
first place, it would be foolish to claim there to be but one, singular, philosophy of 
leadership.  Common sense dictates that there are, at the very least, multiple philosophies 
of leadership populating, and coexisting in, the contemporary world (p. 1).  
 The authors seem to be saying here that something called "the philosophy of 
leadership" means that there is a right way and a wrong way of viewing leadership that 
does not account for each person's individual philosophy: "We live in an epoch where 
there are strong Romantic and heroic imperatives to be one's own person, to make one's 
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mark in one's job or career and thus to give expression to one's individual philosophy 
(Case et al., 2011, p. 1). 
 Perhaps this viewpoint helps explain why the philosophy of education is not more 
common in the literature and in academic programs focusing on educational leadership.  
Despite the relative paucity of literature on the subject, however, there is a quiet 
conversation taking place in the corner of the room. 
 Part of this conversation is that ancient philosophers offer help in meeting the 
current demands of education. Grint (2007), for example, writes in the journal, 
Leadership, that Aristotle teaches how to lead by helping to find the road to wisdom.  
Others argue similarly that Aristotle's theory of learning is crucial to leadership (Morrell, 
2007). 
 Related to this point, there are others who maintain that the philosophical 
disciplines of ethics and epistemology are necessary fundamentals in the practice of 
organizational management and change (Knights, 2008).  
 Going even further, some say that current curricula in educational and 
organizational leadership are inefficacious because of the failure to attend to foundational 
ethical principles of leadership and decision-making (Pfeffer & Fong, 2004). 
 Taking a fresh look at the philosophy of education, Biesta (2014) suggests that the 
field of education suffers because it is insufficiently informed in the field of philosophy.  
He observes that there is a serious chasm between the fields of philosophy and education 
and that what is called the "philosophy of education" has largely been the only way that 
these two disciplines relate to each other.  While it is common that the philosophy of 
education is studied in philosophy departments, Biesta's view is that it really belongs in 
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departments of education.  "With White, I believe that this kind of scholarship should 
indeed be located in departments, schools, or institutions of education" (p. 2). 
 One of the most formidable obstacles to the inclusion of philosophy of education 
courses in educational leadership programs, however, is the conception that they lack 
practical application.  As a result of this, "many have noticed that foundational courses 
(in particular philosophy of education courses) have become either less a staple or have 
entirely disappeared as stand alone courses" (Pryor et al. 2007, p. 77). 
 Lamenting this failure to consider educational foundations and principles covered 
in the philosophy of education, others have noticed significant deficiencies in key areas 
of leadership and pedagogy or instructional practice.  Perhaps the most crucial of these is 
a lack of clarity about the goals of education (Feinberg & Soltis, 2004).  Noddings (2003) 
makes this very point in her book, Happiness and Education: "Looking at contemporary 
policymaking, we'll see that talk of aims might be considered a missing dimension in the 
educational conversation" (p. 74).  It has been observed that one of the effects of this lack 
of clarity is an inability to make prudential and efficacious decisions in school settings.  
The connection between the philosophy of education and decision-making is precisely 
this.  If there is a lack of understanding about the goals to be attained in the classroom, 
one lacks the necessary capacity to direct efforts toward these goals and to address 
difficulties that prevent the objectives from being attained.   
 Another possible danger in omitting educational theory is that teachers will be 
impaired in their ability to exercise reflection and judgment.    
 The ability of these practitioner-trained teachers to make judgments about 
effective educational practices could be seriously impaired by their lack of understanding 
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of educational theory and probably will not produce the type of reflective practitioners 
that many believe are essential for the improvement of today's schools (Morey, 2001, pp. 
309-310). 
 One additional benefit of taking a philosophical approach in educational 
leadership programs is that it develops leadership skills that are universally applicable.  
Because every leader in the field of education enters into a variety of unpredictable tasks 
and challenges, these kinds of skills, such as "substantive inquiry, intellectual debate, and 
deep reflection" (Butin, 2004, p. 7) are indispensable. 
 Yet the challenge remains to implement the philosophy of education in the 
courses of leadership programs in such a way that its practical application is manifest and 
adaptable.  To meet this challenge, one possibility is to implement practical exercises in 
the curriculum that draw from philosophy in its application to educational decisions, 
especially those regarding curriculum design (Petress, 2003).   
 Also important is the understanding of coherence and consistency in the 
philosophical tradition of learning. It is for this reason that this study seeks to explore key 
philosophical notions of Aristotle and Aquinas relating to educational leadership in the 
area of curriculum design.  This exploration will begin by considering some of the most 
relevant original ancient and medieval sources at the foundations of the philosophy of 
education and educational leadership.  
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What the Philosophy of Education is and Why it is Necessary 
"There is nothing so practical as a good theory"  (Lewin, 1951). 
 Given the pressing practical considerations of education, one may justifiably 
question the relevance and importance of what seems to be a theoretical concern such as 
the philosophy of education (Flewelling, 2005).  
 The objection against a focused and thorough treatment of educational philosophy 
may be formulated as follows.  At a time when test scores are falling, the drop-out rate is 
staggering, and the achievement gap is widening, our sole concern should be addressing 
these urgent issues that demand immediate attention.  While students are suffering, it 
seems irresponsible for educational leaders to spin their wheels in esoteric discussions 
that do not address the needs at hand.  We ought to be serving our scholars rather than 
entering into feckless debates that fail to address practical problems (Thomson, 2012). 
 This objection certainly carries weight and ought to be carefully considered.  To 
be sure, the most necessary and time-sensitive problems should be first on the agenda.  
To address the objection that the philosophy of education should not be the immediate 
concern of educational leaders, it is first necessary to explain what the philosophy of 
education is.  For, if there is no common understanding of what the philosophy of 
education is, it would make no sense to enter into a discussion of whether it is important 
or relevant (Hayden, 2011). 
 Philosophy, by its etymology, is the love of wisdom (Burnyeat, 2011). It pertains 
to wisdom to determine the nature and purpose of things.  The word "nature" in this 
context refers to the essence of a thing or what it is and the word "purpose" refers to what 
a thing is for.  Applying this to education, the primary subject matter of the philosophy of 
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education concerns what education is and what it is for (Barrow & Woods, 2006). In 
other words, the first and most important questions that pertain to the philosophy of 
education are "What are we doing?" and "Why are we doing it?" (Griffiths, 2014).   
 That these questions should be the paramount concern of educational leaders is 
made clear by the following examples.  In all human endeavors, purpose commands and 
dictates all other activities and procedures.  To begin with a simple example, everything 
that goes into the production of an axe, such as the long, light, smooth handle and the 
heavy, sharp, durable blade, is determined by the axe's purpose of chopping wood.  To 
cite another example, the purpose of an internet service provider is to deliver the highest 
quality internet service at a reasonable price.  Everything that goes into the operation of 
the company is directed to this one goal (Lewis, 2005). 
 Likewise, in the realm of education, everything is, or at least ought to be, directed 
by the purpose. Supposing that the purpose of higher education is to prepare students for 
careers, everything should be directed to this one purpose.  Supposing that the purpose is 
wisdom, everything would likewise be directed to this purpose (Angioni, 2014).  One of 
the difficulties facing leaders in higher education today is the lack of clarity concerning 
the unifying purpose of institutions.  While it is very clear what the purpose of an axe or 
an internet service provider is, the purpose of education is more nebulous and more of a 
matter of contention. It is the hope that this dissertation will provide some clarity on the 
issue of the purpose of education (Barrow & Woods, 2006). 
 Therefore, because the purpose of education ought to dictate every element of 
education, the philosophy of education, which examines and determines this purpose, is 
far from being outside the due consideration of educational leaders.  On the contrary, the 
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philosophy of education, whose principal objects are the nature and purpose of education, 
ought to be their principal concern. For it is the role of a leader to ensure that the parts of 
an endeavor are properly arranged in relation to the whole and that the purpose or design 
intended be accomplished by the most advantageous means.  It is for this reason that 
Elmore (2004) contends that the primary concern of educational leaders is instructional 
practice.  (Though Elmore's focus was on K-12 education, his general principles can also 
be applied to higher education, where the interaction of teachers and students in the 
presence of content is still the primary concern.)  It pertains to educational leaders, then, 
to secure a situation in which others cooperating in leadership know and can articulate the 
nature and purpose of the institution: "what we are doing," and "why we are doing it." 
Because the nature and purpose of education fall under the consideration of the 
philosophy of education, educational leaders must concern themselves with this in order 
to be efficacious (Noddings, 2012).  
Why Aristotle and Aquinas? 
 Granting this, one may well wonder why anyone should consider the thought of 
ancient and medieval authors in the context of contemporary education.  It seems that 
recent advancements in our understanding of education have displaced ancient and 
medieval thought altogether (Rose, 2015).  Surely, the argument goes, we have advanced 
far beyond what these thinkers have contributed.  Aren't the best thinkers on the subject 
of education the most current ones, who have the benefit of the most recent 
advancements (Davies, 2014)? To address this concern, we should first examine the 
reasons why one should consider old works at all.   
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 Because of the customs of our day that no one chooses and into which everyone is 
born, we are necessarily inclined to certain lines of thinking.  These habits of thought that 
come from our culture and customs cannot be adequately understood without considering 
the origins upon which they are based.  For example, the legal system of the United 
States cannot be fully understood without a consideration of the Greek, Roman, and 
British legal systems that form the foundation of American legal practice (Kohli, 2014). 
To cite another example, current military strategy necessarily examines military history 
for the purpose of minimizing errors and ensuring the best possible outcome.  In short, 
the examination of the historical foundations of our era is a great aid in avoiding the 
mistakes of the past. Lewis (1970) puts it this way: “Every age has its own outlook.  It is 
specially good at seeing certain truths and specially liable to make certain mistakes.  We 
all, therefore, need the books that will correct the characteristic mistakes of our own 
period.  And that means the old books" (p. 32).  
 Certain ways of thinking permeate our modern world and habituate us to biases 
that can influence our judgment. For example, in the United States, some have observed 
an emphasis on individualism. Tocqueville (1990) remarked that along with the social 
condition of democratic equality comes the Cartesian tendency to appeal only to the 
individual effort of one’s own understanding in the resolution of difficult quandaries: "I 
discover that in most operations of the mind each American appeals only to the individual 
effort of his own understanding.  America is therefore one of the countries where the 
precepts of Descartes are least studied and are best applied" (p. 3). This tendency to 
appeal to our own understanding and not to seek out the positions of others in history is 
nowhere more prevalent than in contemporary education. One way to escape this 
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tendency is to study older traditions of learning and compare them with our own (Bailey, 
2014). In this way, we appeal to more than just the individual effort of our own 
understanding: we are able to compare our ideas with those of others as a means of 
testing their veracity. 
 Currently, when it comes to settling a question or resolving a topic of controversy, 
the latest opinion, like the latest piece of technology, is at times thought to be necessarily 
an improvement over earlier ones.  Against this error, Lewis (1970) says, “The only 
palliative is to keep the clean sea breeze of the centuries blowing through our minds, and 
this can be done only by reading old books" (p. 202).  
 Further, in the reading of only modern works there arises a danger to which the 
scholar of the ancients is immune.  It consists of donning the fleeting fashions of the hour 
that will pass away as quickly as they came (Hayden, 2011). It may be that an idea 
currently in vogue will stand the test of time.  Yet, whether it will last is difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine:  “A new book is still on trial and the amateur is not in a 
position to judge it.  It has to be tested . . . and all its hidden implications (often 
unsuspected by the author himself) have to be brought to light" (Lewis, 1970, p. 201). 
 To be sure, it would be a grave mistake to ignore current contributions to the 
discussion of education.  Even still, one should at least begin with a study of older works 
(Schofield, 2012).  An additional reason for this is that the best recent works are most 
often a reply to, or founded upon, earlier ones.  Without an appreciation for the context of 
a work in this progression, one misses the importance of the work as a whole and the 
relevance of particular points being made:  “If you join at eleven o’clock a conversation 
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which began at eight you will often not see the real bearing of what is said" (Lewis, 1970, 
p. 201). 
 Another important consideration is that human beings are still human, now as 
they were in ancient and medieval times.  So, what was dehumanizing long ago is still 
dehumanizing today. In the search for what is what is most humanizing in education, one 
who ignores the perennial wisdom of the past is at a great disadvantage: without 
considering the knowledge that history bequeaths to us, we are forced to re-invent the 
wheel in each generation. 
 In light of this consideration, the study of educational foundations informs us of 
the origin of our current situation.  A study of the roots of how and why our 
contemporary practices are enacted will place educators and educational leaders in a 
much better position to judge instructional practices and to make improvements in 
curriculum. For example, current educational research is divided into two kinds: 
qualitative and quantitative (Roberts, 2010).  Interestingly, the origin of the use of these 
terms is the distinction between quality and quantity is the Categories of Aristotle 
(Aristotle, trans. 1984).  Understanding and evaluating this division in its origins, then, 
would require an examination of Aristotle (Angioni, 2014).  
 To cite another example, verbal and mathematical reasoning in contemporary 
education are considered to be among the most fundamental habits of universal 
knowledge required for competency in both undergraduate and graduate education.   
Evidence for this is that the general test for both the SAT and GRE are devised by the 
College Board to test these two forms of reasoning: verbal and mathematical.  This 
distinction, in turn, is based on the traditional distinction between the trivium and 
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quadrivium, which are the two categories of disciplines that form the traditional liberal 
arts.  To understand how our current understanding of what is most fundamental in 
education is rooted in the philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas, it is necessary to 
discuss the historical foundation of the liberal arts and how these arts were understood by 
St. Thomas (Rose, 2015). 
   Now that the question of why ancient and medieval works are relevant in the 
discussion of contemporary education has been discussed, it remains to address why 
Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas are being treated together. 
Why Aristotle is Necessary to Understand Aquinas on Education 
 It is no exaggeration to say that without Aristotle, the works of Aquinas would not 
exist.  Thomistic philosophy is based almost entirely on the thought of Aristotle, whom 
he repeatedly refers to with the respectful title, "the Philosopher" (Ashley, 2006).  
Aquinas adopts the worldview of Aristotle and incorporates his principles into almost all 
of his works (Koslicki, 2012).  Even in his theological treatises, Aquinas hardly draws a 
single conclusion without paying tribute to Aristotle.  For Aquinas, all advanced 
knowledge presupposes fundamental axioms rooted in sense experience, as observed by 
Aristotle.  Because Aquinas deemed the ancient Greek philosopher to be a master of what 
the human mind can attain in the arena of natural knowledge, Aquinas became his 
intellectual disciple and never waivered in his adherence to his principles.  
 Largely, the philosophical assertions of Aquinas can be found in Aristotle more 
fully explained and defended. The works of Aquinas presuppose, therefore, a study of the 
works of Aristotle, without which they cannot be fully understood (Davies, 2015). In fact, 
to aid his students in the study of philosophy, Aquinas wrote extensive commentaries on 
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the principal works of Aristotle. In addition, he composed his own philosophical treatises 
expounding on the subtler points first asserted in Aristotle's treatises (Chenu, 1964). 
 Because so much of Aquinas's thought on education, then, is rooted in Aristotle, it 
presupposes an understanding of his work: no complete treatment of the principles of 
education according to Aquinas can ignore his chief mentor on this subject.  It is for this 
reason that the thought of Aquinas is often called Aristotelian-Thomistic.  The following 
examination, therefore, will incorporate a treatment of the chief works of Aristotle as a 
necessary prerequisite for the exposition of Aquinas on the role of the teacher.   
 One may still wonder why Aquinas is being considered at all.  If the focus is the 
foundational epistemological principles of education, why not confine the treatment to 
Aristotle? The answer to this question is twofold.  First of all, the works of Aristotle and 
Aquinas illumine each other.  Because the commentaries of Aquinas on Aristotle's works 
are so clear and accessible, they clarify the meaning of his words and are a great aid in 
textual analysis.  Second, the works of Aquinas go beyond those of Aristotle and apply 
his principles to the practical application of the role of the teacher and instructional 
practice, which Aristotle does not discuss.   
 Along these lines, it is also important to address the distinction between Aristotle 
and Aquinas regarding happiness conceived of as human perfection.  Perhaps the most 
telling point of reference is that concerning Aristotle's conception of happiness, Aquinas 
does not take issue with Aristotle in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics.  So, in 
the fundamentals concerning Aristotle's treatment of happiness, Aquinas is in perfect 
agreement.   Aquinas, however, does apply what Aristotle says to what he believes by 
faith and considers the perfect fruition of happiness to be realized in life after death in 
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heaven.  Yet this is outside the concern of this dissertation, which focuses on the 
perfection of reason apart from the consideration of faith. 
Philosophy and Education in Aristotle and Aquinas 
 In common speech, the word "philosophy" tends to have a very particular 
meaning denoting an isolated area of study.  For example, most universities have a 
philosophy department and students can choose to major in philosophy and graduate with 
a degree in the subject.  When one studies philosophy, particular areas such as logic, 
natural philosophy, ethics, and metaphysics are treated (Feser, 2013). Interestingly 
enough, the division of these areas of philosophy follows the division according to which 
Aristotle delineated the subject matter of each of his works (Aristotle, trans. 1984).   
Other subjects, however, such as mathematics, literary criticism, and education are 
commonly considered to be areas distinct from philosophy and therefore are studied in 
separate departments. 
 In contrast, for Aristotle and Aquinas, "philosophy" meant something much more 
universal.  By its etymology, "philosophy" means "the love of wisdom."  This wisdom 
was considered to be the goal of all of education.  Everything necessary for wisdom was 
thought to be part of philosophy (Augros, 2007). 
 So, the subjects of mathematics, literary criticism, and education, far from being 
isolated disciplines, are all branches of philosophy (Ashley, 2006).  The consideration of 
the philosophical disciplines according to the Aristotelian-Thomistic schema, therefore, is 
synonymous with the consideration of education itself.  For example, for Greeks, 
mathematics was the first discipline of philosophy and a prerequisite for any higher 
learning.  Above the door of Plato's academy was inscribed the words, "Let no one 
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ignorant of geometry enter here."    Literary criticism was a subject taken up by Aristotle 
in his Poetics (Aristotle, trans. 1984), which Aquinas considers to be part of logic 
because one can use poetry as a teaching tool (Davies, 2014).   Finally, education is a 
subject considered throughout the works of Aristotle, but principally in his Metaphysics 
because it belongs to metaphysics to divide and order the disciplines that lead up to it.  
Therefore, to consider the philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas is nothing other than to 
consider their thought on education.  Education was for them a way of life (Rose, 2015). 
Education was not for the sake of making a living, but making a living was for the sake 
of education. Being a lifelong learner was for the sake of attaining the highest human 
good, which is the perfection of reason. Nothing was more important or more crucial to 
one's happiness.  Happiness or eudaimonia, which for Aristotle is synonymous with the 
highest goods that human beings can possibly attain, is secured by perfecting the power 
of reason (Neumayr, 2015).   
 In fact, until the industrial revolution, education was thought to be coextensive 
with a study of philosophy as Aristotle conceived it.  It is for this reason that those who 
were granted a terminal degree were given the title of philosophiae doctor, or doctor of 
philosophy, the initials of which we still retain in the conferral of the vast majority of 
doctoral degrees: Ph.D.  In the Greek tradition of Aristotle adopted by Aquinas, therefore, 
the study of education necessarily requires a treatment of the philosophical disciplines 
(Ashley, 2006).   
The Relevance of Aristotle and Aquinas for Educational Leadership 
 Such a practical concern as the duties of a leader in the field of education seems at 
first to have nothing to do with the speculative and erudite works of ancient and medieval 
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thinkers. Could the works of Aristotle and Aquinas really be relevant to the current 
debates in education? 
 In order to bring about change for the better, effective leadership in the field of 
education necessitates an investigation of and adherence to the most fundamental 
principles (Standish, 2014).  The best leadership demands a clear articulation of the 
purpose of education as a whole and a cogent understanding of how specific measures 
such as the choice of a curriculum or the instructional practice of a teacher are related to 
this purpose.   
 As a case in point, the principle of articulating a clear end or purpose and then 
proceeding to enact measures to attain that end is in current parlance referred to as 
"backward mapping" or "backward design" (Buehl, 2000).   This principle has historical 
foundations in Aquinas, who articulates it as follows Question 1, Article 1 in the Prima 
Secundae of the Summa Theologiae : "Although the end be last in the order of execution, 
yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention" (Aquinas, 1947, p. 583 ).  Explaining 
and defending this practice of backward mapping, therefore, is greatly aided by an 
examination of its origins in the thinkers who first articulated it clearly (Buehl, 2000). 
 It is of the utmost importance in educational leadership, then, to establish as a 
guiding principle the end or purpose of education and the role of the curriculum and 
instructional practice in attaining this end.  Without this, attempts at curriculum reform 
run the risk of being endless and aimless, beginning anywhere and ending nowhere.  It is 
this in particular that necessitates a return to the consideration of the educational 
foundations (Bailey, 2014). Therefore, though it may be criticized as abstract and 
theoretical, an examination of St. Thomas Aquinas is quite concrete and practical: 
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nothing is more useful for understanding and guiding the concepts and practices of 
effective curriculum design than the foundation upon which everything is built (Mooney 
& Nowacki, 2014). 
Educational Leadership and the Role of the Teacher 
 It pertains to the role of leaders not only to design curricula but also to influence 
the instructional practice that necessarily goes along with it. Elmore (2004) contends that 
instructional practice is the primary concern of educational leaders. Also, the culture and 
practices of an institution are largely shaped by the leaders who establish and act in 
accord with the principles, goals, and practices that define and characterize a school.  For 
example, the stated goal of Great Hearts charter schools, which is to form critical 
thinkers, dictates the teaching method used in the classroom. "Classical education forms 
critical thinkers. The Socratic method we use in our classrooms and our insistence on 
logic, reason, and evidence forges a student who can think deeply, see opposing 
viewpoints, change position when merited, and solve problems with flexibility" (Scoggin, 
2015). This Socratic method is being used in many other public and private schools 
across the country.  Some examples are The Lyceum in South Euclid, Ohio, and St. 
John's College at its two campuses in Santa Fe, New Mexico and Annapolis, Maryland.  
All of these schools implement the discussion method as an official policy. Also, the 
ReadWriteThink organization encourages the use of the Socratic method as explained by 
Israel (2002):  
 The Socratic method is a formal discussion, based on a text in which the leader 
 asks open-ended questions. Within the context of the discussion, students listen 
 closely to the  comments of others, thinking critically for themselves, and 
  
 
28 
 articulate their own thoughts  and their responses to the thoughts of others.  They 
 learn to work cooperatively and to question intelligently and civilly (p. 89) 
The role that the teacher plays in the use of the Socratic method is clearly determined by 
the school leadership.  This is tangible evidence that there is a strong connection between 
educational leadership and the instructional practice and role of the teacher.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS 
The Method of This Dissertation 
 This method this dissertation will utilize is an exploratory qualitative textual 
analysis that uses a philosophical framework and methodology.  In other words, texts on 
the principles of education will be examined on the basis of a qualitatively critical 
analysis.  This method is used to study existing theory on the basis of which further 
empirical research may be conducted (McKinnon, 2015).   
The Relevance of a Philosophical Methodology to Educational Theory 
 Considering the relative paucity of philosophy of education classes in education 
and educational leadership programs, one may be inclined to think that its relevance in 
the realm of educational theory is limited or wholly unnecessary.  Alsaleh (2015) argues 
to the contrary: "The importance of educational philosophy is made clear by the 
following points: it helps to understand and to modify the educational process.  It helps to 
identify conflicts and contradictions in any theory.  It develops the human capacity to 
raise questions about theory.  Also, it clarifies concepts and assumptions that are 
underlying educational theories" (p. 1). So, according to Alsaleh, it belongs to 
educational philosophy to spot possible conflicts in a theory and to hone in on concepts 
assumptions that underlie educational theories.  These concepts that underlie theories are 
of dire importance in the realm of education. 
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Why This Research Methodology Must be Pre-scientific 
 Every inquiry that involves data collection and research methods determining the 
gathering and analysis of data necessarily requires governing principles which are not and 
cannot be established by those same research methods.  These governing principles or 
axioms form the basis and grounds upon which all subsequent research is based.  For 
example, in the psychological and social sciences, there exists the general consensus that 
one should proceed according to quantitative methods, qualitative methods, or a mix of 
the two.  However, there is no data gathered by either of these methods to support this 
threefold distinction of methods.  In other words, the methods according to which 
scientific research is conducted are not established by scientific research.  No empirical 
scientific method has drawn the conclusion that certain methods be followed.  Rather, it 
is an axiom largely unquestioned that research be conducted in these methods.   
 To be clear, there is no attempt here to present an argument that one should 
support and verify scientific methods by previous scientific methods.  The point is rather 
that one should not expect that the foundational principles upon which further inquiry is 
based be established by data collection and analysis.  Because this dissertation concerns 
foundational principles that are most fundamental in the field of education, the 
conclusions drawn will not be based on results discovered by empirical research.  Rather, 
the present concern is the foundation upon which empirical research proceeds.  This 
foundation consists of first principles, which all other scientific methods presuppose but 
do not establish or substantiate by their own methods.  In this sense, the subject matter is 
pre-scientific (Alsaleh, 2015). 
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 At this point, one may legitimately raise the objection that all educational 
decisions and every proposal for change at the level of the organization or the classroom 
should be data-driven and scientifically verified.  There are two principal problems with 
this approach.   
 First, the dictum, "all educational decisions should be data-driven and 
scientifically verified" is not itself data-driven or scientifically verified.  Yet it is certainly 
an educational decision that all educational decisions be supported in this way.  In fact, 
there is no data to support the conclusion that we should always be using data and there is 
no scientific research that verifies the insistence that scientific research must always be 
used.  The premise, then, that all educational decisions should be data-driven and 
scientifically verified is illogical because the statement is inconsistent with itself.   
 Second, it would in fact be impossible to insist that every educational decision be 
supported by scientific research.  The reason for this is that every component of the 
research process itself, such as the selection of the sample and the instrument, would 
require scientific research to verify.  But this research would in turn depend on other 
components that would require scientific research to verify.  Following this line of 
reasoning to its logical conclusion, one would be caught in an infinite regress of research 
that would be impossible to complete.   
 Therefore, there must be some first principles in the field of education that are not 
verifiable by scientific research but must be verified and supported in other ways.  The 
attempt here is not in any way to deny or derogate either the importance of scientific 
research in education or in the psychological or social sciences.  The point is rather that 
the subject matter of this dissertation concerns the fundamental basis upon which further 
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scientific research may be conducted, and that this fundamental basis cannot rely on 
empirical methods to verify it.   
 To support the point that not all educational decisions can be supported by 
scientific research, it may be helpful to cite a few parallel examples to support this claim.   
 First, within the realm of education itself, the common practice is to conduct 
research within a theoretical or conceptual framework.  This framework may take many 
forms and be constructed according to a variety of models.  The framework itself, 
however, is not the result of scientific research.  Rather, it forms the basis of that 
research.  It functions as a guiding and ruling principle of inquiry and affords a vantage 
point from which further research may be conducted.  The fundamental epistemological 
principles of learning are similar to this (Alsahleh 2015). 
 Second, in the realm of mathematics, not all mathematical truths can be supported 
by proof.  There must be first principles that are known immediately and without proof.  
The reason for this is that each proof involves a minimum of two steps or premises to 
establish a conclusion.  If it were true that every premise required proof, it would follow 
that each of the two premises would require two more premises for them to be known as 
true.  Now there are four statements in need of proof.  But then each of these statements 
would require two more statements to substantiate them.  Now eight premises would be 
required.  So if every premise or statement required proof for someone to know it, one 
would find oneself in an infinite regress of proofs that in the end would be impossible to 
know.  The inescapable conclusion, then, is that the most fundamental principles must be 
established and verified by some other process than argument. This process is precisely 
the method of philosophical inquiry that will be followed in this dissertation. 
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The Area of Educational Leadership to Which this Research Pertains 
 Regarding the relevance of this dissertation for educational leaders, the question 
arises concerning whose purview curriculum design falls under.  Putting it another way, 
"Who are the leaders that this dissertation is addressing?"  The answer to this question 
will vary widely depending on the particular setting.  The ones who are responsible for 
curriculum design depend on whether the institution is public or private, how large it is, 
the degree of shared governance, and the responsibilities assigned to those in leadership 
positions. 
 Because of the nature of this research, which is at the level of establishing 
universal principles, the manner and extent to which it is applicable in a given setting is 
outside the scope of this dissertation.  On the other hand, because the principles are 
universal, they can be brought to bear on all aspects of learning, though to a greater or 
lesser extent depending upon the limitations in place.   
 Granting this, recent research concerning curriculum design and development has 
yielded findings that may be helpful for implementing curricular changes.  Oliver and 
Hyun (2011), for example, conducted a study concluding that the collaboration between 
faculty and administration promotes widespread participation and promotes 
organizational change.  Yet, because widespread participation is required, radical 
curriculum reform is difficult (Cohen et al., 2005).  An additional factor that may affect 
the applicability of his dissertation, therefore, is the level of collaboration in place 
between faculty and administration and the degree to which the institutional culture 
permits this collaboration to grow. 
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 Another important concern regarding implementation of curricula is the notion 
that postmodern curriculum development, "is a nonlinear process with no master plan or 
rationale for curriculum (Oliver and Hyun, 2011, p. 3).  Because this dissertation presents 
principles for designing curricula, the postmodern view would certainly present obstacles 
to implementation. 
 Also affecting the practical application of philosophical principles governing 
curriculum design is the adherence to academic freedom and autonomy among 
professionals in higher education (Innes, 2004).  As Oliver and Hyun indicate, 
"comprehensive curricular change where the focus is on how the parts fit together is less 
common" (2011, p. 3).  Because this dissertation certainly concerns comprehensive 
curricular change centering on the parts of a curriculum that form a whole, institutions 
that place a high value on autonomy would present challenges to implementation. 
 Burgess (2004) points out that a significant difficulty forestalling the adoption of 
instructional practices are "the competing and contradictory forces in curriculum design" 
(p. 164).   
 Given these and other challenges that must be assessed and which vary according 
to individual circumstances, the manner in which the findings of this dissertation could be 
implemented in a particular setting is beyond the scope of this research.  Nevertheless, 
the universal principles established serve as a standard for a level of improvement 
determined by the degree to which pertinent factors permit.   
The Aristotelian-Thomistic Method of Philosophical Inquiry 
 According to St. Thomas, the purpose of philosophy is the attainment of wisdom, 
which consists in a knowledge of the essences of things (what they are) and their causes 
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(why they are). (Lewis, 2013).  In other words, to understand something most fully, one 
must be able to give an account not only of the phenomena, but also of the reasons or 
causes of these phenomena.   For example, one may understand that there are four 
seasons and know when these seasons begin and end, but not know why there are four 
seasons.  The one who knows not only that there are four seasons, but why there are four 
seasons is wiser in this respect.    This attainment of wisdom, however, is neither quickly 
nor easily achieved.  It is a long and difficult process that involves the mastery of many 
disciplines and capabilities along the way.  In the quest to answer the most important and 
perplexing questions, philosophy uses a method of attaining knowledge, which has as its 
end understanding the natures and causes of things.  
 There are three key parts of philosophical inquiry on the basis of which the texts 
of Aristotle and Aquinas will be examined: dialectic, definition, and demonstration.  At 
the heart of this threefold distinction among the parts of philosophical method is the 
notion that an assertion must be supported by a logical argument.  
 To this point, Angioni (2014) observes that scientific demonstration depends on a 
thorough explanation of the essences signified by the terms used in the demonstration: 
"When Aristotle says that demonstration must proceed from necessary principles, he 
means that each demonstration requires the principle that is the necessary one for the 
fully appropriate explanation of its explanandum" (p.1).  This kind of explanation 
demands that one address the essences of those things that the demonstration concerns 
and not simply the terms that signify those essences: "This picture also provides a key to 
understand Aristotle's thesis that scientific explanation depends on essences: it is the 
essence of the attribute to be explained (rather than the essence of the subject-term within 
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the explanandum) that should be stated as the fully appropriate explanatory factor" 
(Angioni, p. 1).   
 The substance of Angioni's (2014) point here is that for Aristotle, knowledge is 
attained by way of logical argument.  But logical arguments use terms that refer to the 
essences of things.  Therefore, if one is to attain the knowledge that results from the 
argument, one must first be able to explain the essences of those things that are referred 
to in the argument itself.   
 To cite a practical example, Plato, who was the teacher of Aristotle, makes the 
point in the Meno that one cannot approach the question whether virtue can be taught 
without first knowing what virtue is.  There is no way that one could claim to know that 
virtue can or cannot be taught without first being able to explain what virtue is.  Further, 
in the Ion, Socrates shows that Ion is not competent to speak about whether the Iliad is a 
great poem unless he can first supply a definition of poetry, or, in other words, unless he 
is able to explain the nature of poetry.   
 Applying these terms to this exploratory qualitative text-based analysis, one has a 
standard on the basis of which to proceed in the examination of arguments in the text.  If 
one is presenting a complete argument clearly and persuasively in a given text, a full 
explanation of those things that the argument concerns must be given  (Feser, 2013).  In 
order to apply this kind of explanation as a standard of textual analysis, however, an 
account of what makes a good explanation must be given.  At the heart of this 
explanation is a definition of those things signified by the terms of the argument. 
 The reason that definition is so important is that it signifies distinctly in words the 
essence of something that is understood by the intellect (Burnyeat, 2011).  So, if one 
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cannot supply a definition of what one is making an assertion about, one really does not 
understand what is being said (Peramatzis, 2010).  Once one has supplied a good 
definition, one is ready to begin to present an argument about the thing defined (Goldin, 
2013). This argument may be either dialectical or demonstrative.  Aristotle distinguishes 
dialectic from demonstration at the beginning of his Topics:  
 Now a deduction is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, 
 something other than these necessarily comes about through them. It is a 
 demonstration, when the premisses from which the reasoning starts are true and 
 primitive, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through 
 premisses which are primitive and true; and it is a dialectical deduction, if it 
 reasons from reputable opinions. (Aristotle, trans. 1984, 100a25-30).    
So, a demonstration is a syllogism that argues from true and primary premises, which are 
either first principles themselves or premises that have come from first principles.  
Demonstrations yield certain knowledge (Malink, 2013).  In contrast, dialectic is not 
grounded in indisputable first principles, but in opinions that are generally accepted.  For 
this reason, dialectic yields knowledge that is not certain, but only probable.  It is 
nevertheless important to consider dialectical arguments because they are the starting 
point of an inquiry and concern what the majority or the experts in a given field are 
saying.  
 In sum, the epistemological claims made by Aristotle and St. Thomas will be 
textually analyzed on the basis of dialectic, definition, and demonstration (Feser, 2013). 
In other words, it will be made explicit in the textual analysis the manner in which 
Aristotle is using these three methods.  Specifically, in his treatment of happiness, he 
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begins with dialectic by examining the differing opinions about what happiness is.  Then, 
by way of demonstration, he shows that certain of these opinions are inconsistent with 
human happiness.  Finally, he concludes with a definition of happiness (Aristotle, trans. 
1984, 1097a15-1099b8).  
 Because St. Thomas considers that happiness is the goal of education and that the 
arts and sciences as Aristotle conceived of them form the nature of education at its core, 
Chapter 4 will be devoted to a consideration of these arts and sciences, examples of how 
the principles established in these arts and sciences impacts curriculum design and 
instructional practice, and how these arts and sciences are related to happiness. Chapter 5 
will then examine the role of the teacher in concerning these arts and sciences.  Chapter 6 
treats of how these fundamental notions relate to the role of educational leaders who 
design curricula.  The following diagram illustrates the order of the parts of Chapters 4-6 
of this dissertation and shows how they are connected. 
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Figure 1.  The order of the parts of Chapters 4-6 and the connection between them. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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CHAPTER 4:  
THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF EDUCATION ACCORDING TO AQUINAS 
 In the following statement in his commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, 
Aquinas articulates clearly his understanding of the purpose of education:  "Now all the 
sciences and arts are ordered to a single thing, namely, to man's perfection, which is 
happiness" (Aquinas, trans. 1995, p. xxix).  It is difficult to overestimate the importance 
of this passage when examining the position of Aristotle and Aquinas on education:  it is 
the focal point of this dissertation. It is significant for two main reasons.  First, Aquinas 
enunciates what constitutes the nature of education at its core: the arts and sciences.  
Second, he states what education is ordered to, or in other words, what its purpose is: 
happiness. In Aquinas's day, the arts and sciences were considered the fundamental basis 
of education and prerequisites for any future study.  Hence, they formed the basis of all 
higher education.  But because the arts and sciences are ordered to the perfection of 
human nature, which does not change, they are the fundamental basis of education today 
as well.  What was humanizing then is still humanizing now.  So, because the arts and 
sciences comprise an education directed to knowledge that perfects the mind, considering 
them in some detail is necessary for educational leaders who design curricula and 
instructional practices directed to this knowledge. 
 It is significant that Aquinas addresses the purpose of education in his 
commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle because according to Aquinas, metaphysics 
is the highest philosophical discipline.  As such, it pertains to metaphysics to address all 
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of education.  This is why this statement on all the arts and sciences is found at the 
beginning of his commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle.   
 This chapter of the dissertation has two purposes.  The first is to explain this 
passage in detail.  This is important because it states the nature and purpose of education 
according to Aquinas, which as the title of this dissertation indicates, is the central focus.  
The second purpose is to supply specific examples of how the principles established in 
the arts and sciences are applicable to the area of educational leadership that concerns 
curriculum design.  This will be done by examining particular disciplines and applying to 
them the principles established in the arts and sciences that are explained. 
Philosophical Principles and Educational Leadership 
  Elmore (2004) observes that the primary concern of educational leaders in the 
improvement of instructional practice.  If, therefore, the nature and purpose of education 
according to Aquinas is of importance to educational leaders, it will necessarily be 
relevant to improving learning in the classroom.  In light of this consideration, after the 
following discussion of the liberal arts, a practical example of how a Thomistic 
understanding of the liberal arts can be applied in practice will be extenuated.  Likewise, 
after each section of the dissertation that treats of a major work of Aristotle, the 
application of his principles regarding the teaching and learning of the discipline related 
to that work will be made in light of how it impacts curriculum design and instructional 
practice. 
  It should be noted that the philosophical principles discussed in this chapter 
concern the area of educational leadership that concerns curriculum design specifically.  
These principles are applicable neither to administrative leadership nor to a broad-based 
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consideration of leadership in general, which would be beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  
  In their book, Instructional Rounds in Education, City et al. (2009) assert that 
instructional practice chiefly concerns "the relationship between the teacher and the 
student in the presence of content" (p. 22). When the Aristotelian-Thomistic principles 
are applied to a particular discipline, then, two areas will be covered: the subject matter 
("content") and the pedagogy ("the relationship between the teacher and the student").   
  It is important that the teacher and the student not be considered independently of 
each other, but that they be considered together in light of the "relationship" between 
them.  The reason for this is that teaching and learning do not take place independently of 
each other: there is no teaching without learning.  Aristotle makes this point when he says 
that teaching and learning consist in "one identical actualization"  (Aristotle, trans. 1984, 
202b2).  He goes on to explain, "Teaching is the activity of a person who can teach, yet 
the operation is performed in something–it is not cut adrift from a subject, but is of one 
thing in another"  (Aristotle, trans. 1984, 202b6-8).    Because the one activity of teaching 
is performed in the student, the activity of teaching cannot be cut adrift from the student, 
wherein learning takes place.  Teaching and learning, therefore, will be treated together 
under the heading of "pedagogy." 
  In some cases, the application of Aristotelian-Thomistic principles to instructional 
practice in the classroom will be a reinforcement of current practice.  In many instances, 
however, serious changes to conventional methods will be required.  City et al. (2009) 
observe that significant differences should be expected whenever instructional practice is 
significantly improved: "Making meaningful and productive changes in instructional 
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practice requires us to confront how they upset and, in some sense, reprogram our past 
ways of doing things"  (p. 22). 
The Arts and Sciences in Aristotle and Aquinas 
  Because Aquinas often used terms in a different way from their current meaning, 
an explanation of the terms as they apply to education is in order.   First of all, by the 
word "science" he means a subject or discipline whose study yields a knowledge that one 
can support with argument.  For example, philosophy is a science for Aquinas: the 
meaning of this term is not limited to such subject areas as biology, chemistry, and 
physics, though it certainly includes these disciplines.  Aquinas divides the sciences into 
two distinct categories: practical and speculative.  The practical sciences exist to direct 
our actions and the speculative sciences exist for the sake of knowledge that perfects the 
mind.  The practical sciences are ethics, domestics, and politics and the speculative 
sciences are mathematics, natural philosophy, and metaphysics. Second, the word 
"art" refers principally to the seven liberal arts upon which education was based in the 
middle ages:  grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy.  
These arts were seen as necessary skills that one needed in order to advance in the 
sciences that followed them. 
 According to Aquinas, these sciences and arts are "ordered to one thing."  For one 
thing to be "ordered to" another means that it exists for the purpose of that other.  For 
example, if one says that a framing hammer is ordered to pounding in nails, this means 
that the hammer exists for the purpose of pounding in nails.  Likewise, to say that a house 
is ordered to shelter means that the house exists for the purpose of providing shelter. 
Following this explanation, if one were to say in the language of Aquinas that all the arts 
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and sciences are "ordered to" one thing, this means that they exist for the purpose of 
bringing that one thing about. In other words, when Aquinas says that all sciences and 
arts are "ordered to" human perfection, he means that the purpose of studying the arts and 
sciences is human perfection.  Human perfection, then, is the purpose of education 
according to Aquinas.   
 To the notion of human perfection, St. Thomas adds the words, "which is 
happiness."  By putting it this way, he is equating human happiness with human 
perfection.  Because the word, "education" was hardly ever used in the Middle Ages, 
Aquinas's thought on the purpose of education must be determined by what he is saying 
the purpose of the sciences and arts is because, according to Aquinas, the sciences and 
arts made up the essentials of good education.  This education is directed to human 
perfection, which Aquinas equates with happiness.  In the following passage, he explains 
the connection between human perfection and happiness. 
 To make this clear, two points must be observed.  First, that man is not perfectly 
 happy,  so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that 
 perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object.  Now the 
 object of the intellect is what a thing is, i.e., the essence of a thing,  according to 
 De Anima iii.6.  Wherefore the intellect attains perfection,  insofar as it knows the 
 essence of a thing.  If therefore an intellect know the essence of some effect, 
 whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the 
 cause what it is; that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply, 
 although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge that the cause is.  
 Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there 
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 naturally remains in man the desire to know about that cause, what it is.  And this 
 desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of 
 the Metaphysics (i.2).  For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, 
 consider that it must be due to some cause, and know not what that cause is, he 
 wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire.  Nor does this inquiry 
 cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause  (Aquinas, trans. 
 1947, I-II Q3 A8). 
There are three important things to note about this passage from Aquinas.  First, he is 
basing his understanding of happiness and the perfection of the mind on the works of 
Aristotle.  In this particular passage, he cites the De Anima and the Metaphysics.  This 
shows the importance of examining the works of Aristotle in order to arrive at a complete 
understanding of how Aquinas considers education to be ordered to happiness.  Second, 
he is saying that the component of happiness that concerns the perfection of the mind 
consists in knowing the causes of things.  For example, if one sees an eclipse of the sun, 
one naturally wonders why this phenomenon occurs.  This wonder about the cause of the 
eclipse is not satisfied until one knows that the eclipse is caused by the moon coming 
between the sun and the earth and obstructing the view of the sun.  Third, the knowledge 
of the cause perfects the mind because the object of the mind is the essence of the cause.  
In other words, knowing why things are a certain way perfects the mind and contributes 
to human happiness.   According to Aristotle and Aquinas, the arts and sciences lay out 
the path that the mind follows to obtain the knowledge that perfects it. 
 Therefore, in order to better understand what the purpose of education is for 
Aquinas, one must first investigate thoroughly the following two categories of things: 
  
 
46 
first, the arts and the sciences that made up an education (Chapter 4), and second, 
Aquinas's understanding of human perfection or happiness (Chapter 5).  Because the arts 
of which Aquinas speaks, namely the liberal arts, were first in the order of learning, these 
arts will be examined first.  Following this examination, the sciences will be considered. 
 Before examining the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of the liberal arts, it is 
important to note that the meaning of the term "liberal arts" in the time of Aquinas was 
quite different from its meaning today.  In contemporary education, "liberal arts" usually 
connotes a large area of study that includes non-scientific or non-technical disciplines 
such as literature, history, music, and the visual arts.  In the Middle Ages, however, 
following an ancient tradition, the term "liberal arts" referred to something much more 
specific.  To ascertain this specific meaning of what a liberal art was for Aquinas, it is 
first necessary to investigate what he meant by "art" and second, what it means for an art 
to be "liberal."    
What is a Liberal Art According to Aquinas? 
 Aquinas defines art at the very beginning of his commentary of the Nicomachean 
Ethics of Aristotle:  "right reason applied to things to be made"  (Aquinas, trans. 1993, p. 
4).   Putting it in more simple terms, this definition could be restated in this way: "using 
knowledge to make things."  In defining art this way, Aquinas meant to speak of art in a 
very general sense.  In other words, it does not refer only to the fine arts of painting and 
sculpture, for example, but rather to any process in which knowledge is used to make 
something or put something together, step by step.  By this definition of art, then, 
cooking, carpentry, and even computer programming would be considered arts.  
According to this meaning of art, therefore, anything that involves using human reason to 
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make something is worthy of being called an art.  In contrast, natural functions of the 
body such as digestion would not fit the definition because they are entirely involuntary 
and take place without the direction of the mind or a process of reason.   
 Aquinas not only presents this definition, but explains why it functions well as a 
definition. In his explanation, he presents the following argument.  "We see architecture 
as a kind of art, and also as a kind of habit for making something through reason.  
Likewise, every art is so constituted that it is a habit, concerned with making, under the 
guidance of reason.  Likewise, no productive habit of this kind, i.e., directed by reason, is 
found which is not an art.  Hence it is evident that art is the same as a habit concerned 
with making under the guidance of true reason"  (Aquinas, trans. 1993, p. 367).   
 Aquinas is using a dialectical argument here, which means that he starts the 
argument by referring to what most people think about art.  A sign that he is starting with 
what most people think is that he starts the argument by saying that we see architecture as 
a kind of art.  Then he says that we also see architecture as a habit of making something 
with the use of reason. By the word "habit," he means something like a skill set or ability 
to make something that has been developed over time by repeated action.  This ability to 
make something is guided by reason or the knowledge of what has to be done to bring 
about the desired result.  Next, not only architecture, but everything that we call an art, is 
a habit of making something under the guidance of reason.  Conversely, every time we 
find someone with a habit of making something under the guidance of reason, we call it 
art.  Therefore, art must be a habit of making something under the guidance of reason.  
So, according to this understanding, art is a knowledge or skill directed to making 
something, or "right reason applied to things to be made." 
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 This method that Aquinas is using here to explain his definition is a good example 
of how he applies practically his theory of education.  For example, he does not stop at 
merely stating the definition for his readers to accept or reject, but he supplies his reasons 
for thinking that it is a good one. He does this by showing that his definition is 
convertible with the thing that he is defining, namely art.  In so doing, he appeals to 
common knowledge and what is easiest to grasp.   
 He does this specifically by showing that every thing called an art answers to the 
definition and, conversely, everything that answers to the definition is called an art. In 
other words, he shows that everything called an art is convertible with the definition.  To 
cite another example, if a triangle is correctly defined as a three-sided rectilinear plane 
figure, every triangle should be a three-sided rectilinear plane figure and every three-
sided rectilinear plane figure should be a triangle.  As a counter example of a definition 
that does not fit this criterion, "an animal that flies" could not be the definition of a bird 
because not all birds fly and not all flying animals are birds. So, it is not the case that the 
proposed definition, "an animal that flies," is convertible with all things that are called 
birds. Thus does Aquinas demonstrate the qualities of a good teacher by supplying an 
exposition and defense of his definition of art.  Now that it has been determined what art 
is according to Aquinas, it remains to ascertain what it meant for an art to be liberal.   
 Education was first called "liberal" or "free" in reference to the liberal arts which 
were distinguished from the servile arts because they were practiced by free men as 
opposed to slaves. (Rose, 2015). One of the earliest references to the liberal arts we find 
in the very first chapter of Aristotle's Metaphysics, which is an introduction to all of 
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education (Charles, 2011). Here Aristotle divides the arts into three kinds and establishes 
a hierarchy among them.  The following chart illustrates this threefold division. 
 
Figure 2.  The threefold division of the arts. 
_________________________________________________________________  
Why the Arts are Important for Educational Leaders 
Who Design Curricula 
 The order and design of curricula, as well as courses within those curricula, is 
determined by their purpose.   Broadly speaking, the purpose of education can be divided 
into two categories: practical and speculative.  A practical purpose is one ordered to 
action and a speculative purpose is one ordered to knowledge that perfects the mind.  
Regarding the threefold distinction of the arts into servile, fine, and liberal, the servile 
arts are practical because they are directed to producing necessary and useful things and 
the fine and liberal arts are speculative because they are directed to those pursuits that are 
in themselves perfective of human beings.  One may ask, then, given any course offered 
at the college level, "Is it primarily practical or speculative?" 
Art	Servile	 Fine	 Liberal	
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 The blurring of this distinction and a lack of clarity concerning whether the 
primary purpose of such disciplines as mathematics is understanding or action has led to 
confusion and to the skewing of a curriculum that favors practicality over understanding, 
doing over knowing, and the repeating of information over the firm grasp of the truth.  
For example, in the popular Saxon mathematics series, Saxon says, "it is also important 
not to let the emphasis on understanding interfere with our ability to do" (Saxon, 1984, p. 
14).  If understanding should not interfere with doing, then the emphasis is clearly on 
doing over understanding.  This means that mathematics, according to Saxon, is pursued 
as a servile endeavor rather than a science the knowledge of which is ordered to 
happiness; not surprisingly, the mode of instruction follows suit.   
 In light of this, it is incumbent upon educational leaders to assess whether their 
curricula favor doing or understanding.  The consequences of the failure to address this 
question are potentially disastrous, for we run the risk of churning out a population of 
citizens who can get answers without knowing what they are doing or why.  The ability 
to answer this question, though, depends on a thorough understanding of the distinction 
among these three kinds of art, which will now be explained. 
 First are the servile arts, myriad in number, which are ordered to the production of 
what is necessary or useful for human life.  Examples of the servile arts are carpentry, 
medicine, and farming.  Next are the fine arts, which aim at what is beautiful and 
therefore pleasing (Aristotle, trans. 1984, 981b14-25). These are traditionally enumerated 
as the following seven: music, theater, dance, painting, sculpture, architecture, and 
literature.  At the top of the hierarchy are the liberal arts, which are ordered to 
knowledge.  They are divided into the logical arts of the trivium (grammar, logic, and 
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rhetoric), and the mathematical arts of the quadrivium (arithmetic, music, geometry, and 
astronomy).  This hierarchy is in fact rooted in Aristotle's notion of intellection in his De 
Anima.  It is because the intellect in the highest human faculty that the liberal arts are at 
the top of the hierarchy: what develops the higher faculty is the higher art. 
 Pieper (1963) explains this contribution of Aristotle's in Leisure, the Basis of 
Culture:  "the Christian and Western conception of the contemplative life is closely 
linked to the Aristotelian notion of leisure.  It is also to be observed that this is the source 
of the distinction between the artes liberales and the artes serviles, the liberal arts and 
servile work"  (p. 23).  Pieper here is referring to the distinction in Book I, Chapter 1 of 
Aristotle's Metaphysics between what came to be known as the servile arts and the liberal 
arts.  His point is that in our leisure time, which is the time not needed for procuring the 
necessities of life, makes us more human if we us it for contemplation or developing the 
mind. The arts to be pursued in leisure time were originally called "free" as opposed to 
"servile" because they were studied by those who were free as opposed to those who were 
slaves. 
 There is another meaning of the word "liberal" or "free," however, which merits 
the retention of the name as applied to education.  In the Summa Contra Gentiles, 
Aquinas (1934) defines "free" as "that . . . which is for its own sake" (p. 241).   This more 
precise meaning of free is in fact related to the original meaning.  Here, "for its own sake" 
means simply "for the sake of the perfection of the human person" as opposed to being 
ordered to some other practical or utilitarian end.  So, one who is free is able to devote 
oneself to those pursuits specifically ordered to the perfection of human faculties.  In 
contrast, a slave is treated as a mere possession that is ordered to someone else's benefit.  
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This is why slavery is dehumanizing and wrong: slaves are not treated as human beings 
who realize within themselves their own ends, but as objects that exist for the sake of 
someone else.  True freedom in this sense lies in self-governance and self-determination 
and in the ability to act in a human way. 
 This Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of knowledge for its own sake sheds 
light on an underlying assumption and unspoken first principle that governs educational 
policy in contemporary times.  This principle is that education is a humanizing endeavor.  
In other words, it is suited to our humanity to become educated citizens.  No one would 
deny that historical practices of denying a human being an education because of race or 
sex or for any other reason is dehumanizing.  Yet, the reason that it is dehumanizing to 
deny someone an education is that it is humanizing to provide that education. In other 
words, developing the mind is a characteristically human activity that is conducive to 
actualizing one's full potential (Maslow, 1954).  When St. Thomas speaks of human 
perfection, the understanding is that human beings develop their abilities and actualize 
their potential. 
 Following this understanding of freedom and its connection to human 
actualization or perfection, then, an education that is liberal or free is an education that is 
for its own sake.  In other words, it is ordered to the kind of knowledge that is an end in 
itself because it forms and perfects the human person.  Newman (1927) puts it this way in 
The Idea of a University:  "I am asked what is the end of University Education, and of the 
Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge which I conceive it to impart: I answer, that . . . it 
has a very tangible, real, and sufficient end, though the end cannot be divided from that 
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knowledge itself.  Knowledge is capable of being its own end . . . sufficient to rest in and 
to pursue for its own sake" (p. 321).    
 Historically, then, a liberal education was considered to be an education that was 
free in the sense that it is for its own sake, meaning that it is humanizing or perfective of 
human beings.  The liberal arts, which focus on verbal and mathematical skills, are the 
beginning of this liberal education. 
 This original understanding of what constitutes a liberal education is important 
because it forms the basis for understanding why our current educational culture, which 
considers verbal reasoning and mathematical reasoning the most fundamental skills 
required for success in both undergraduate and graduate schools.  This distinction 
between verbal and mathematical reasoning mirrors the distinction between the logical 
arts of the trivium (verbal reasoning) and the mathematical arts of the quadrivium 
(mathematical reasoning).  In short, a thorough examination of ancient methods helps us 
to understand why our current system emphasizes certain disciplines.  Also, the current 
emphasis on mathematics and science began with Aristotle (Lewis, 2013; Harry, 2015).  
 The study of ancient and medieval forms of education, then, provides a 
knowledge of the foundations of our own ways of thinking about education.  The parallel 
between the verbal (trivium) and mathematical (quadrivium) arts of the Middle Ages and 
our own emphasis on verbal and mathematical reasoning on the SAT and GRE tests 
speak volumes in answer to the question of why we focus our attention on reading and 
math as foundational disciplines.  This historical and philosophical inquiry into the 
origins of our educational subjects also provides us with a lens through which we can 
examine the changes that have been made and whether these changes are for the better. 
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The following chart delineates the difference between the three logical arts of the trivium 
and the four mathematical arts of the quadrivium: 
 
Figure 3. The Seven Liberal Arts. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 In her famous essay on the liberal arts of the Middle Ages, "The Lost Tools of 
Learning," Sayers (1948) presents a fascinating critique of twentieth-century education.  
This essay has inspired a mini-revival in classical education and has prompted other 
works detailing the strongpoints of medieval education: "The modern revival of the 
Trivium or language arts was influenced by a famous essay called 'The Lost Tools of 
Learning,' by Dorothy L. Sayers (best known for her fictional detective, Lord Peter 
Wimsey)" (Caldecott, 2012, p. 17). 
 In this essay, Sayers (1948) argues that "Too much specialisation is not a good 
thing"  (p. 1).  This raises an interesting question.  Though the number of majors and 
areas of specialization are continually increasing as the collective amount of knowledge  
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increases, does this necessarily mean that contemporary students know more and are 
better equipped as problem-solvers and lifelong learners than the students of the past?  
Sayers puts the question this way, "Is not the great defect of our education to-day . . . that 
although we often succeed in teaching our pupils "subjects," we fail lamentably on the 
whole in teaching them how to think?  They learn everything, except the art of learning.  
It is as though we had taught a child, mechanically and by rule of thumb, to play The 
Harmonious Blacksmith upon the piano, but had never taught him the scale or how to 
read music"  (p. 7).  Perhaps the same sentiment is expressed by so many math and 
science teachers who lament that they are beholden to standardized tests rather than to 
more traditional ways of teaching mathematics that emphasize logical thinking.  Does our 
modern schema favor the outcome of forging test-takers rather than problem solvers?  
Sayers seems to think so.  She identifies the difference between modern and medieval 
education as follows.  "modern education concentrates on teaching subjects, leaving the 
method of thinking, arguing, and expressing one's conclusions to be picked up by the 
scholar as he goes along; mediaeval education concentrated on first forging and learning 
to handle the tools of learning, using whatever subject came handy as a piece of material 
on which to doodle until the tool of learning became second nature"  (p. 10).  The "tools 
of learning" to which Sayers refers are the seven liberal arts as they were conceived of in 
the Middle Ages.   
 In The Lost Tools of Learning, then, Sayers (1948) alights upon perhaps the most 
essential difference between the way that Aquinas conceived of education in the Middle 
Ages and the way that it is conceived of by so many in the current system.  This 
difference is stated most succinctly as follows:  Aquinas conceived of education as 
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ordered to universal knowledge, whereas the current system conceives of education as 
ordered to particular knowledge.  For example, medieval education emphasized the 
disciplines of the trivium: grammar, logic, and rhetoric.  These disciplines are universal 
in the sense that everyone needs grammar to speak and write; everyone presents and 
responds to logical arguments and everyone appeals to rhetoric to persuade others.  These 
disciplines were studied in great detail by everyone and were considered universal in 
their application in that everyone speaks, thinks, and persuades and they are used in all of 
the sciences.  Aquinas puts it this way: "before all the other sciences a person should 
learn logic, which teaches the method of all the sciences; and the trivium concerns logic"  
(Aquinas, trans. 1986, p. 17).  Caldecott (2102) also emphasizes the notion that the 
trivium is the foundation of all the other disciplines and remains active throughout the 
pursuit of future knowledge: "The three arts [of the trivium] are not 'left behind' as one 
moves up the educational ladder, but they remain foundational, and each of them can 
color one's whole approach to learning"  (p. 61).   Though it would be a mistake to say 
that these disciplines are no longer studied in contemporary curricula, they are 
emphasized less in deference to a greater number of subjects that emphasize a particular 
knowledge required for specialized skills.  To remedy this, a paradigm for how the liberal 
arts may be incorporated will now be presented. 
Curriculum Design and Instructional Practice: the Liberal Arts 
Subject Matter  
 Everybody thinks, speaks, writes, and attempts to persuade.  For this reason, the 
arts that perfect these activities should be part of everyone's general education.  An 
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excellent way to incorporate the arts of the trivium (grammar, logic, and rhetoric) that 
improve these tasks is in composition class.   
 The reason that composition class is an ideal setting to practice the arts of the 
trivium is that in order for an essay to excel, it must exhibit a command of the three arts 
of the trivium in the following ways.  First, it must be grammatically correct.  The art of 
grammar concerns the proper construction of the sentence.  Without correct grammar, 
clarity suffers and the reader's trust in and esteem for the writer wanes considerably.  
Second, the reasoning must be sound.  Without logical arguments and solid evidence, 
critical readers are unlikely to be convinced.  Third, the essay must be persuasive.  Thus, 
it must attend to rhetoric, which is the art of persuasion. Rhetoric takes into account such 
things as the tone of writing, the intended audience, and the emotional appeal that a style 
of writing may have.  To reinforce the arts of the trivium, then, attention should be paid 
in composition class to these three arts specifically.   
Pedagogy  
 This reinforcement can be accomplished in three stages.  First, salient examples of 
essays and speeches celebrated for their persuasive power can be subjected to critical 
analysis.  The speeches and letters of Lincoln, for example display superlative 
applications of grammatical, logical, and rhetorical prowess.  In order to encourage as 
active a role as possible on the part of students, they should be required to pinpoint and 
categorize deft grammatical constructions, valid modes of argument, and the most 
convincing rhetorical devices after being introduced to these in principle by a teacher.   
 The second stage of learning the arts of the trivium is to require of students that 
they compose essays utilizing the same general methods that were identified in the 
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models analyzed.  For example, students could be asked to formulate a reductio ad 
absurdum argument for their own positions and then to answer objections in moderate 
and charitable tone that displays regard for the proponent of the opposing view.   
 In the third stage, again emphasizing the active role of the student, participants in 
the class should present their essays to the class for discussion.  In this way, the entire 
group garners further practice in critical analysis and in offering and receiving 
constructive evaluation and critique.  
 If these three stages are followed, the liberal arts of grammar, logic, and rhetoric 
can be practiced and markedly improved.  The point of this class would not be to master 
formal logic, which would be the subject matter for another course.  Even still, the more 
general modes of argument could be identified and practiced.  Questions such as the 
following could be used when analyzing a model.  Does the author have a central thesis? 
If so, what is it?  Is it implied or stated directly?  How does the author arrive at the thesis?  
Are the arguments dialectical or demonstrative?  Are they inductive or deductive?  Are 
the most formidable objections raised in a way that the objector would present them?  
Are the objections answered in a moderate and charitable tone that concedes the merit of 
the opposing side when necessary? 
 For explanatory essays, the following questions could be addressed.  Does the 
author supply a definition of the explanandum?  What kind of definition is it? Is it a 
nominal definition (as one would find in a dictionary), or a real definition (a 
philosophical definition that would stand up to the strictest scrutiny)?  Is the definition 
clear and accurate?  Does the author make the necessary distinctions concerning the 
subject of explanation?  Are these distinctions precise and exhaustive?  Does the author 
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supply examples of what is being explained?  Are the examples familiar and illustrative?  
Does the author properly qualify or limit what is being said?  If not, are the claims being 
made too broad in scope?  What are the implications of the author's explanatory account? 
Questions such as these can serve to help the reader identify the quality of the author's 
writing and can be used as a checklist for the student's own writing.   
 Given that a liberal education, according to a Thomistic understanding, has as its 
purpose the attainment of that knowledge which is ordered to human perfection, it 
remains to determine what this knowledge consists of beyond the liberal arts.  Because 
we desire our perfection and our highest good for its own sake, and everything else for 
the sake of this, a truly liberal education consists in the knowledge required to perfect our 
reason both in its proper operation and in its ruling of the other faculties.  To this end, it 
is necessary to examine not only the arts, but the sciences as well.  It is for this reason 
that Aquinas says, "Now all the sciences and arts are ordered to a single thing, namely, to 
man's perfection, which is happiness" (Aquinas, trans. 1995, p. xxix).  This quotation 
states the guiding principle for those educational leaders who design curricula and 
determine instructional practice.  Understanding this principle, however, requires 
examining the arts, the sciences, and the nature of happiness in some detail.  Having 
examined the arts in the first part of this chapter, the sciences will now be considered.  
But because St. Thomas meant by "the sciences" the works of Aristotle, it is helpful to 
examine his works as a whole before turning to the individual sciences that establish 
principles so crucial and necessary of educational leaders who design curricula.   
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The Examination of Aristotle's Works as a Whole 
 Examining the sciences according to Aquinas, then, is nothing other than 
examining Aristotle's major works, on which he wrote line-by-line commentaries: 
namely, the Organon (logical works), the Physics, the De Anima, the Nicomachean 
Ethics, and the Metaphysics. It may seem that this treatment of these ancient and 
abstruse treatises is irrelevant to the vast majority of individuals living today.  To 
appreciate how Aristotle and Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy applies not only to the 
philosopher or historian with a cultural interest in ancient and medieval ways of thinking, 
but also to education in every age, and most especially to educational leaders who design 
curricula, it would be helpful to reflect for a moment on the worldview of Aristotle and 
Aquinas, insofar as Aquinas is an Aristotelian through-and-through and embraces all of 
his philosophical principles. 
 Today, philosophy is often considered to be an arcane and isolated discipline.  It 
is often regarded as a subject of little practical application, studied by intellectuals who 
have some cultural or historical interest in the expression and development of ideas 
throughout history.  Aristotle, however, did not consider philosophy this way. Rather, 
philosophy was the most relevant consideration not only for the highly educated, but for 
all human beings.  Philosophy was a way of life.  We find evidence for this in the Poetics 
where Aristotle says, "to be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not only to the 
philosopher but also to the rest of mankind, however small their capacity for it"  
(Aristotle, trans. 1984, 1448b 13-15).  According to Aristotle, then, growth in knowledge 
is a pleasure that everyone can and should partake in.  Every teacher's greatest hope is 
that a student become a lifelong learner who takes pleasure in learning.  This, finally, is 
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what educators strive for: a lasting effect on the student that governs that student's entire 
life.  This is precisely what Aristotle's philosophy is about and precisely why it should be 
a consideration for educational leaders. 
 The notion that being a lifelong learner is a desirable thing at all is based on the 
notion of what a human being is.  A human being is fundamentally an intelligent being.  
In other words, the mind is the greatest human power.  If this is true, then the 
development of this power is the very best thing that a human being can do.  A sign that 
this is true is that human beings alone take part in formal education.  Everyone would 
agree that it is dehumanizing to deny someone an education.  But if it is dehumanizing to 
deny someone an education, then it is humanizing to provide an education.  And if it is 
humanizing to provide it, this must mean that it is good for us as human beings to be 
educated and to develop the human mind.   This is precisely what Aristotle's philosophy 
is about. 
 Rather than specialize in an isolated subject, Aristotle intended his core 
philosophical treatises to cover the most universal consideration of intellectual 
development that would be useful for all disciplines, no matter how particular or 
specialized.  This is precisely why his works are relevant for educational leaders who 
design all manner of curricula.   
 This is also why his logical treatises should be read first in preparation for putting 
a curriculum together.  There is no discipline, whether it be mathematics or literary 
criticism, where illogical thinking should be accepted.  Logic and consistency is 
demanded in every kind of writing and in every subject matter.  Everyone needs it.  One 
might say that we are all logicians, yet some are better or more advanced at logic than 
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others.  For example, a baseball fan needs to appeal to the rules of baseball to determine 
whether a player on the field is out or safe.  Any time that a rule or principle is applied to 
a particular case, logic is being used.  When a citizen disputes a ticket for a traffic 
violation, an argument must be made on the basis of whether a traffic law was broken or 
not.  Most especially, though, logic is used in education to govern the mind's advance in 
knowledge.  Logic for Aristotle was not considered to be one of the most perfective 
sciences in itself; rather, it is a tool used for all the sciences.  As an example of a practical 
application to a science curriculum, it will now be explained how astronomy can be 
approached while observing a logical progression. 
Curriculum Design and Instructional Practice: Astronomy 
 We all know that the earth and the other planets of the solar system travel around 
the sun in an elliptical path.  Or do we?  The fact is, very few know how to verify the 
heliocentric theory.  If Aristotle is right, one knows that something is true only if an 
argument can be given from self-evident principles that can be, in this case, verified by 
sense experience.   
 Though everyone learns astronomy as part of physics, an infinitesimal percentage 
of students will use this knowledge for any practical purpose.  It makes more sense, then, 
to teach astronomy, if it is taught at all, in such a way that students leave with knowledge 
that can be verified and defended because it has been presented in a logical order. 
Subject Matter 
 A rewarding and fruitful method for accomplishing this purpose in the classroom 
is to trace the historical development of astronomical inquiry.  This method would follow 
a "Great Books" approach, focusing on the original works of scientists rather than 
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textbooks.   A curriculum may begin with Ptolemy (90-168) who argued that the earth 
was stationary.  Next in the progression is Copernicus (1473-1543), who argued for a 
heliocentric theory, but with circular planetary motion. Then Kepler (1571-1630) adopted 
the theory of Copernicus, but added that the path of the planets was elliptical, setting the 
stage for Newton (1643-1727), who retained Kepler's theory, adding the theory that the 
reason for the elliptical path of the planets was the natural uniform straight line motion of 
the planets coupled with the law of universal gravitation.   
 The advantage of tracing the historical development of astronomy in the 
classroom by the careful reading of the texts of those who made the discoveries 
themselves for the first time is multifarious.  First, the mode of discovery follows 
Aristotle's logical method.  These scientists present the arguments that brought them to 
the conclusions that they arrived at, leading students step by step to see the same things 
that they saw.  By engaging is such a study, a student is lead to see not only that the 
planets travel in elliptical paths, but also to consider why they do so.   
Pedagogy 
 To do this, however, it is necessary that students are themselves capable of 
making the same arguments that the scientists themselves make.  To ensure this result, 
and at the same time to cultivate active participation in the classroom, pupils should be 
required to present from memory for the class the same demonstrations and proofs that 
make up the original works of these scientists.   
 Perhaps the most important application of Aristotle's logic, then, is just how 
important it is for each person to know something on one's own.  Because of the way that 
the human mind works, namely, by the simple apprehension of individual substances and 
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qualities, followed by formulating statements based on this apprehension, followed in 
turn by using these statements to reason, it is important for everyone to understand what 
is learned for oneself.  So, if one really knows something in a way that is perfective of the 
human mind, this knowledge can be resolved to first principles that are known 
immediately without proof.  This has profound implications for education and 
educational leaders who design curricula.  Regarding the example given above, it is 
common for one to think that one knows that the earth travels around the sun and not 
vice-versa.  However, according to Aristotle one does not really know this truth unless 
one is able to present the full argument which resolves to self-evident and undeniable first 
principles.  Thus, very few really know that Kepler was right and Ptolemy was wrong.  
Most just believe in the heliocentric theory without actually knowing that it is true.  So, if 
one were to follow Aristotle's line of thinking in his logical works, education should be 
designed so that knowledge is attained and that our progress in knowledge is based on 
true science, not just belief (Fine, 2010).  Following this line of reasoning, it is the 
responsibility of educational leaders to support curricula and teaching styles that foster a 
growth in knowledge that can be explained by the phenomena, supported with arguments, 
and defended against objections by students.   
 For Aristotle, one develops one's humanity by perfecting the mind and one 
perfects the mind by knowing the world and our place in it as much as possible.  After the 
study of logic, then, comes the inquiry into nature or the world around us.  This is 
covered in Aristotle's natural philosophy, which is made up of the two works: the Physics 
and the De Anima.  The Physics concerns the most universal principles of the natural 
world and what is common to all natural things.  Just as science is part of everyone's 
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education, even if one is not destined to become a vocational scientist, the study of nature 
was considered by Aristotle to be something that would perfect the mind of everyone.  It 
is more human to know about one's surroundings than not.  Aristotle's natural philosophy 
is the most general consideration of science in the sense that it provides the most 
universal principles of every branch of natural science.  This is most important for those 
educational leaders who design science curricula because the order of progress and the 
manner in which the subject matter is presented are determined by these works of 
Aristotle. 
 Also included in natural philosophy is the more particular study of the soul.  By 
"soul" Aristotle meant the principle of life in living things: plants, animals, and human 
beings.  The discussion of what is common to all living things and what distinguishes one 
living thing from another is the consideration of the De Anima (Polansky, 2007). The 
most important part of this treatment, however, is that of human life and human nature.  
For it is in the De Anima that Aristotle considers human knowing and how this takes 
place.  Though there is no separate treatise dealing with epistemology, the branch of 
philosophy and psychology that now goes by this name is covered in Aristotle's logical 
works and in the De Anima.  This understanding of how a human person comes to know 
governs how one should proceed in the advance toward knowledge.  For example, 
because all knowledge begins with the senses, there is nothing in the intellect which is 
not first in the senses.  Thus, the natural road in our knowledge is from the senses to 
reason.  In other words, our understanding of absolutely everything begins with receiving 
a particular stimulus in one of the five senses.  Consequently, our progress in knowledge 
should always begin with what we can sense.  For this reason, one should always supply 
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examples that can be sensed.  This has applications at every level and in every branch of 
knowledge.  For example, it is due to this principle that hands-on experiments in science 
are always preferable to reading about those experiments that have been performed by 
someone else.  Hearing an example of a chord progression in music is always preferable 
to being told about it.  Seeing a falling star or a supernova is invariably better than 
reading about it.  Touching or holding different specimens of minerals is the best way to 
know their qualities.   The principles of the De Anima, therefore, are not esoteric notions 
without practical application.  Rather, they govern our lives as human beings and should 
govern the decisions of educational leaders about curricula, instructional practices, and 
teaching methods. 
 After the study of natural philosophy comes the study of ethics.  Again, Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics is not just a treatise about morals; it is about the whole of human life 
and what all human beings strive for.  Everyone wants to be happy; but all do not agree 
on what happiness is.  Determining the things we have in common that contribute to the 
greatest human goods, therefore, is a consideration for everyone, not just the philosopher.  
Are there things that contribute to the human flourishing of all, regardless of race, sex, 
and religion?  Why is it that as a society it is preferred that one is educated rather than 
not?  Why do we consider freedom a good that everyone should have?  Why do we hold 
as an undeniable and self-evident truth that everyone should be treated equally before the 
law?  Is happiness the purpose of education?  These are all questions of ethics that are 
determined by returning to the most fundamental principles in Aristotle's work. 
 Finally, the last discipline to be studied according to Aristotle is metaphysics.  
This work is in some ways the most relevant to education and the intellectual life because 
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it pertains to all of learning.  As the highest discipline, it governs all of the others.  So, 
metaphysics is to the other disciplines of philosophy what a principal or curriculum 
director is to a school.  It supplies the ordering and organizing principles.  It searches out 
the final answers to all the questions that ask "Why?"  In other words, it treats of the 
causes of all things and supplies the most universally applied principles.  It treats of what 
is most common to every inquiry: being itself.  In this way, the treatment of metaphysics 
rounds out and completes an education that is searching for answers and an explanation 
of the world around us.  Though no knowledge is complete or perfect, metaphysics aims 
at coming as close as possible.   
 Aristotle's philosophy, then, is really a way of living as human beings.  It is a way 
to live life to the fullest and to become more perfect and happier human persons.  As 
such, it is universally applicable, just as education in society extends to as many citizens 
as possible.   
 At this point it is important to answer an objection against the idea that Aristotle's 
philosophy is really for everybody.  First of all, there seem to be many who are 
disinclined to study and incapable of entering into the life of a philosopher.  Given the 
necessity to make a living, few have time to devote their lives to a study of what Aristotle 
considered the highest things.  Further, even concerning those with time and inclination, 
it seems that only very few, after a very long time, and with many errors and 
disagreements among them would arrive at the same conclusions that Aristotle did.  
 To answer this objection, it must be conceded that there is a certain truth to it.  
Very few attain true wisdom.  Most of humanity must be concerned with the necessities 
of life to such an extent that a life entirely devoted to leisure is impossible.  At the same 
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time, every step in the direction of wisdom is worthwhile and humanizing.  Saying that 
we should not use philosophy as a model for the life of the mind would be like saying 
that because few master calculus, no one should study mathematics at all.  Even a 
beginning toward wisdom is far better than no knowledge at all.  Knowing some 
mathematics, even if one learns nothing of calculus, is immeasurably better than knowing 
no mathematics at all.   
 The life of the philosopher, then, is really a life for all, even if few advance very 
far along the path to wisdom.  Some knowledge is better than no knowledge.  Well begun 
is half done.  If one begins life with some fundamental principles of governing the life of 
the mind insofar as the mind directs one's life as a whole and the growth in knowledge, 
one can attain far more and live a far happier life than if one acts by no principles at all.   
Thus, a consideration of the truths of Aristotle is a benefit not only to the philosopher, but 
to all, however small one's capacity for knowledge might be.  Seeing how Aristotle and 
St. Thomas regarded philosophy as a whole is the key to understanding the relevance of 
their works for educational leaders.  Now it remains to treat the elements of the sciences 
which are most pertinent to educational leaders who design curricula and to supply 
specific examples of how these elements are can be applied in particular disciplines. 
What is a Science According to Aquinas? 
 The word "science" used by Aquinas in the passage above refers to something 
quite different from the way that the word is used today.  One may think first of biology, 
chemistry, or physics when hearing the word science.   In fact, more often than not, 
contemporary speech distinguishes mathematics from science, as in the common 
expression, “math and science” or when the field of education refers to the STEM field of 
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learning (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics).  The meaning that 
Aristotle and Aquinas intend, however, is much broader than its contemporary meaning.  
For Aquinas, science includes mathematics and many other disciplines.   
 Aquinas uses the term science, (scientia in Latin) in this more universal sense to 
mean any reasoned-out knowledge, or knowledge that is the result of careful reasoning or 
logical argument.  So, any time someone attains certain and universal knowledge by a 
logical process, one is engaging in science.  This sense of the term is not altogether 
unfamiliar, even to the modern ear.  For example, it is common to distinguish between 
what are called the “hard sciences” of biology, chemistry, and physics, and the “soft 
sciences” which include such things as sociology, psychology, and political science.  
For Aquinas, all sciences, as all arts, are directed to attaining wisdom, which is a 
comprehensive and universal knowledge of the world around us.  In his article, 
"Reconciling Science with Natural Philosophy," Augros explains the Aristotelian-
Thomistic meaning of the word "science."  He says, 
In its ancient sense, scientia or episteme meant a very perfect knowledge, a 
 certainty of something obtained by seeing the reasons why it is so.  Accordingly,  
 mathematics would be the most scientific of all the sciences, as one can judge by 
 the standards laid out for "science" in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.  In this sense 
 of "science," the more general study of nature is more "scientific," because it is 
 much more certain than the detailed study of nature which rests upon hypotheses  
 (2004, p. 109). 
For Aristotle and St. Aquinas, then, the sciences are more certain or more scientific 
because they include a more general study of nature.  These sciences include such 
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disciplines as the philosophy of nature, of which Aristotle treats in his work, the Physics.  
The Physics examines the most general principles relevant to the study of the natural 
world. In the passage quoted above, Augros alludes to a passage in the Posterior 
Analytics of Aristotle wherein he lays out the criteria for a science.  To get some sense of 
his use of the term "science" Aristotle's use of will be examined in key texts. The most 
universal and fundamental account of his notion of science is presented in this key 
passage of the Posterior Analytics. 
 One science is more precise than another and prior to it if it is at the same time of 
 the fact and of the reason why and not of the fact separately from the science of 
 the reason why and if it is not said of an underlying subject (e.g. arithmetic and 
 harmonics); and if it depends on fewer items and the other on an additional posit 
 (e.g. arithmetic and geometry). (I mean by an additional posit, e.g. a unit is a 
 positionless substance, and a point a substance having position–the latter depends 
 on an additional posit.)   (Aristotle, trans. 1984, 87a31-36). 
In this passage, Aristotle supplies three criteria for a science being more precise and prior 
to another science.  
 First, a science is more precise than and prior to another if it pertains to not only 
that something is true but also why it is true.  For example, in the science of medicine, it 
is better to know not only that penicillin kills infections, but also why it does so. To cite 
another example, if someone knows that the gravitational force of the moon causes the 
change between high and low tide, this is superior to knowing simply that there is such a 
thing as high tide and a low tide.  Applying this general principle to education, one 
should always investigate causes and strive for a knowledge that gets to the heart of the 
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reasons why natural phenomena occur.   This principle also has applications for other 
non-scientific disciplines.  The historian who knows the causes or reasons for the Civil 
War has a better knowledge than the historian who knows simply the events that occurred 
without knowing the reasons for those events.  For Aristotle, then, knowledge is always 
superior if it includes the reasons and causes of a thing.   Those who design curricula, 
then, should ensure that causes and reasons for all phenomena are investigated by 
students according to instructional practices that require them to present these causes and 
reasons. 
  Second, one science is more precise than and prior to another if "it is not said of 
an underlying subject."  This means that if one science concerns an underlying subject, 
namely matter, it is less certain than one that abstracts from matter.  For this reason, 
music theory is less precise or less certain than mathematics. The implication of this point 
is that if one understands the mathematical principles of music theory, that student would 
know music theory better than the one who knows the theory without understanding the 
mathematics behind it.  Yet if someone knew music theory well without being able to 
defend any of the mathematical principles upon which it is based, this knowledge would 
be less certain than the knowledge of the mathematician who could explain and defend 
the truth of all mathematical statements and resolve them to first principles.  The 
implication of this particular example for curriculum design is that a mathematics class 
that focuses on the reasons why mathematical theorems are true should be a prerequisite 
for music theory.  Music theory should also focus on the mathematical causes of tonality. 
  Third, one science is more precise and prior to another if it "depends on fewer 
items."  For example, in mathematics, geometry presupposes arithmetic, but arithmetic 
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does not presuppose geometry. For instance, one must be able to count in order to know 
that a triangle has three sides, but one need know nothing about the figures in geometry 
to be an expert in arithmetic.   
 The following commentary of Aquinas on this passage concerning the three 
characteristics of sciences is illuminating.    
 He begins by positing three ways in which one science is more certain [more 
 precise] than another.  The first way. A science which knows both the fact and the 
 reason why is  more certain and prior to a science which knows the fact only, 
 separately from the science which knows the reason why.  This is the relationship 
 that a subalternating science has to a subalternated science, as explained  earlier.  
 For the subalternated science  knows the fact without knowing the reason why.  
 For example, the physician knows that circular wounds heal more slowly, but 
 does not know why.  This latter knowledge pertains to the geometrician, who 
 considers the nature of the circle insofar as it has parts which do not come  near 
 each other as angles do.  Because of this nearness, triangular wounds heal more 
 quickly.   
  The second way.  A science which is not about a subject is more certain 
 than one which is about a subject.  The word "subject" refers here to sensible 
 matter.   As Aristotle  teaches in Physics II, some sciences are purely 
 mathematical, i.e., the sciences which abstract altogether, according to reason, 
 from sensible matter.  Such are geometry and arithmetic.  Other sciences, those 
 which apply mathematical principles to sensible matter, are intermediate sciences. 
 Thus, optics applies the principles of geometry to the visual line, and harmonics 
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 or music applies the principles of arithmetic to sensible sounds.  This is why 
 Aristotle says that arithmetic is more certain and prior to music; it is prior because 
 music makes use of arithmetical principles, and more certain because the cause of  
 uncertainty lies in the changeability of sensible matter.  Hence, the more closely a 
 science approaches matter, the less certain it is.   
  The third way.  A science which proceeds from fewer principles is prior 
 and more certain than one which adds something. For example, geometry is 
 posterior to and less certain than arithmetic, since it adds something to the 
 principles of arithmetic (Aquinas, trans. 2007, pp. 199-200). 
The fundamental notion here is that a science is higher in the sense that it is more certain 
and more precise if it is closer to principles that account for the reasons for why things 
are the way that they are.  Thus, if a sciences deals with the why or the cause of things, is 
not dependent on matter that changes, and is not dependent on other knowledge, it has 
more the characteristic of science.  In other words, as knowledge it is independent and 
more certain and precise than other knowledge.   
 It may seem rather obvious at first that someone who knows that the moon causes 
the change in the tides has a better kind of knowledge than someone who knows that 
there is a change in the tides but does not know why.  Nearly everyone would agree that a 
student of geology should know this.  Yet, what Aristotle is saying has far more 
significant implications for education.  He is saying that for a student to know that the 
moon causes the change in the tides, this student must be able to present a reasoned 
argument beginning with phenomenon that everyone can observe and proceed logically 
to the inescapable conclusion that the effect of the falling tide is caused by the increase in 
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the gravitational force that the moon exerts on the surface of the earth.  Yet this mode of 
procedure is practically non-existent in science classes.  A student who is told that the 
moon causes the tides does not really have the kind of knowledge or science that 
Aristotle is speaking of.  Rather, unless this student is able to present the complete 
argument from beginning to end, he or she merely believes the conclusion.  If Aristotle is 
right, it is a worthwhile and humanizing endeavor to examine the complete arguments 
that establish the reasons why things are the way that they are.  This has monumental 
significance of educational leaders, whose primary role, according to Elmore (2004), is to 
improve instructional practice in the classroom.  Educational leaders should design 
curricula and encourage instructional practices that begin with sense experience and 
proceed by logical steps to the certain knowledge of the causes of phenomenon 
surrounding us.  This is the kind of knowledge that perfects the mind and leads to 
happiness.  Without this kind of inquiry, the students are at best able to repeat 
information and really have no knowledge at all, but only belief.  They have not been 
taught how to think, but have been told what to think.  They would be incapable or 
supporting or defending the facts which are on loan but in no way their own. 
 By examining these three criteria for a science being more precise or prior to 
another, Aristotle was explaining what kind of knowledge one should aim for in 
education.  He was developing a universal principle that could be applied at all levels and 
in all disciplines.  This gives us some sense of how he viewed philosophy as a whole and 
how his understanding of philosophy applies to educational leaders.  Because educational 
leaders formulate and implement policies concerning curriculum and methods of 
instruction, it pertains to these leaders to ensure that the kind of knowledge being pursued 
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is worthwhile. If Aristotle and Aquinas are right, the most worthwhile kind of knowledge 
includes the ability to know the causes of things: to know not only that they are so, but 
why they are so.  If the curriculum is not set up so that the students will be able to 
explain, support, and defend on their own the knowledge that they have attained, then it 
does not achieve this purpose.  To get the necessary understanding of the general 
principles that govern this knowledge and apply to the broad range of disciplines, a 
delineation of the sciences as Aristotle and Aquinas understand them will now be 
presented. 
 For Aristotle and Aquinas, philosophy, which was comprised of what they called 
sciences, was not an abstruse and singular discipline, but a way of life directed to 
knowledge and living in accord with this knowledge. Thus, his works have as their 
ultimate goal the attainment of excellence in accord with the unique human activity, 
which is reason.  Living a life in accord with reason consists in the proper exercise of two 
kinds of knowledge that Aristotle distinguishes between in Book II, Chapter 1 of the 
Metaphysics: 
It is right also that philosophy should be called the knowledge of the truth. For the 
end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action 
(for even if they consider how things are, practical men do not study the eternal, 
but what is relative and in the present).   (Aristotle, trans. 1984,  993b 19-23) 
In this passage, Aristotle divides knowledge into two kinds: practical and speculative.  
Practical knowledge is ordered to perfecting our actions and speculative knowledge is 
ordered to perfecting our understanding of the truth.  In Book VI of the Topics (145a15-
18) he adds a third kind of knowledge to this: productive knowledge or art.  One reason 
  
 
76 
perhaps that this is not mentioned in the passage above from the Metaphysics is that the 
goal of both practical and speculative knowledge is the perfection of the individual, 
whereas the goal of productive knowledge is the perfection of the thing produced.  
Therefore, the division in the Topics is more complete, but the division in the 
Metaphysics exhausts the kind of knowledge that is perfective of the individual as an 
individual. Concerning the practical and speculative sciences, each is further divided into 
three kinds.  The practical sciences are divided into ethics, domestics, and politics.  Ethics 
concerns the governing of the self, domestics the governing of the family, and politics the 
governing of the state.  The speculative sciences are also divided into three: mathematics, 
natural philosophy, and metaphysics.  The following chart manifests these divisions. 
 
Figure 4.  The Six Sciences According to Aristotle. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Science	
Practical	
Ethics	 Domestics	 Politics	
Speculative	
Mathematics	 Natural	Philosophy	 Metaphysics	
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Following Aristotelian-Thomistic principles pertinent to curriculum design, it is 
important not merely to assert that there are three speculative sciences, but to explain why 
there are three and only three. Aristotle explains this division of the speculative sciences 
in Book VI of the Metaphysics:   
 For natural science deals with things which are inseparable from matter but not 
immovable, and some parts of mathematics deal with things which are 
immovable, but probably not separable, but embodied in matter; while the first 
science deals with things which are both separable and immovable. Now all 
causes must be eternal, but especially these; for they are the causes of so much of 
the divine as appears to us.  There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies, 
mathematics, natural science, and theology, since it is obvious that if the divine is 
present anywhere, it is present in things of this sort (Aristotle, trans. 1984, 1026a 
13-20). 
The main point that Aristotle is making here is that there are three speculative sciences 
the knowledge of which is ordered to human perfection: mathematics, natural science, 
and theology, which is now usually referred to as metaphysics. 
 In his commentary of the De Trinitate of Boethius, published under the title of 
The Division and Method of the Sciences, Aquinas elaborates on the reason for this 
division and explains why it is exhaustive.  Because a thing's intrinsic intelligibility 
depends on its degree of separation from matter and motion, this degree of separation 
also determines the division of the sciences.  Mathematics depends on matter for its 
existence, but not for its definition because the objects of mathematics are considered 
apart from their existence in matter.  The objects of natural science depend on matter for 
  
 
78 
their existence and their definition, for we are studying natural things without abstracting 
from their material existence.  Finally, the objects of metaphysics depend on matter 
neither for their existence nor their definition because the object of metaphysics is being 
as such, which is considered in its universality, which transcends material things.  The 
only other logical possibility in this division would be a science that depended on matter 
for its definition but not for its existence.  This in reality, however, is impossible because 
a definition always signifies the essence of a thing and it would make no sense to have 
matter in the definition without matter in the definitum, the thing defined (Charles, 2010).  
This division, therefore, is exhaustive of speculative sciences and divides completely 
theoretical knowledge of things that reason alone can attain  (Aquinas, trans. 1986, p. 11). 
 Interestingly enough, the science of logic does not find a place in the division of 
either the practical or the speculative sciences.  This seems strange because logic does 
concern the way the human mind comes to know, which seems to be matter at least for 
the speculative science of natural philosophy, which includes the study of the soul or 
principle of life in living things.  Yet, logic is not principally a speculative science 
because its chief concern is to direct the mind in its attainment of the knowledge of the 
practical and speculative sciences.  As such, it is more an instrument of attaining 
knowledge than it is an object of speculative science.  Aquinas explains:  "So logic is not 
included under speculative philosophy as a principal part but as something brought under 
speculative philosophy as furnishing speculative thought with its instruments, namely 
syllogisms, definitions, and the like, which we need in the speculative sciences"  
(Aquinas, trans. 1986 p. 16).   Though logic is not a speculative science in the strict 
sense, however, it is a science that is necessary for the attainment of knowledge that is 
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necessary for human perfection and happiness.  Thus, to complete this account of the arts 
and sciences, an examination of the logic of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy is 
necessary.  It is also necessary as a consideration of educational leaders (Davies, 2014). 
The reason for this is that all disciplines are governed by logical thinking; there is no 
subject area that is improved by logical fallacies and illogical thinking.  Because of this, a 
knowledge of logic is crucial to make the determination that all of the disciplines in a 
curriculum are proceeding in a logical and orderly way.  Now that the sciences according 
to Aristotle and Aquinas have been explained, and that it has been established that logic 
is necessary for those sciences, the principles of these disciplines pertinent to curriculum 
design will be examined. 
Logic 
 Joseph Owens (1959) points out that logic should be studied first among the 
disciplines of philosophy: "Before anyone can rightly approach a theoretical science, he 
must have first studied the processes of human reasoning"  (p. 295).  Aristotle makes this 
point in Book IV of the Metaphysics:  "And the attempts of some who discuss the terms 
on which truth should be accepted, are due to a want of training in logic; for they should 
know these things already when they come to a special study, and not be inquiring into 
them while they are pursuing it"  (Aristotle, trans. 1984, 1005b 2-5).  Because logic is 
absolutely indispensible and necessary for the study of any discipline in Aquinas's 
philosophy of education, then, a brief account of Aristotelian-Thomistic logic will be 
presented here. 
 The Organon, which refers to the logical works of Aristotle, includes the 
following titles: The Categories, De Interpretatione, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, 
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Topics, Rhetoric, Poetics, and Sophistical Refutations.  This list of logical works is 
supplied by Aquinas in his Proemium to his Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior 
Analytics (Aquinas, trans. 2007, p. 3). 
 The reason that one should know logic before approaching a specific area of study 
like math or science is that logic is the common method of all the sciences and all 
disciplines. In other words, every subject uses logic and depends on its principles in order 
to proceed: it dictates the mode of procedure in every subject area.  It supplies for every 
learner a common method that is applicable to every kind of intellectual pursuit. Aristotle 
did not conceive of logic as merely a consistent and self-contained set of rules. Rather, 
Aristotle's attempt in the Organon was to explain the method that every human being 
must follow in order to attain and grow in knowledge (Lesher, 2001). Because human 
nature transcends time and place, the way that one comes to know the truth is the same in 
every age and in every circumstance.  In fact, the division of Aristotle's logical works is 
nothing other than a step-by-step explanation of how every human mind operates in order 
to attain knowledge.  It is for this reason that these works are now often considered part 
of epistemology, which is the science that explains how knowledge is attained. 
 This process begins with the Categories, which treat of the first act of the 
intellect, which is sometimes called simple apprehension (Agnioni, 2014). In this act of 
the intellect, the mind understands a simple or indivisible entity and conceives of the 
essence of the thing or what it is (Charles, 2000). The kind of being conceived by the 
intellect is of two kinds: substantial and accidental.  Of the ten categories of Aristotle, the 
first, substance, refers to what has being of itself and cannot be present in anything else.  
The other nine categories of being refer to accidents that cannot exist of themselves and 
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are present only in some other substance.  For example, a continuous quantity, such as 
length, cannot exist by itself, but only in some other material thing that has length.   
 The second act of the intellect is predication.  Once one has grasped the essence 
of a thing, it is possible to predicate one thing of another, which is called composition, or 
to deny one thing of another, which is called division.  This act of the intellect is treated 
in Aristotle's De Interpretatione.  It is here that truth and falsity are found, for a statement 
in which one thing is predicated of another is required for truth and falsity (Akrill, 1963).  
 The third act of the intellect is reason properly speaking, when a conclusion is 
drawn from two premises and a syllogism is made.  Aristotle treats of the syllogism 
formally in the Prior Analytics and the Posterior Analytics.  In these treatises, the method 
of attaining scientific knowledge is accounted for (Burnyeat, 2011).  Making sure that 
one is proceeding according to a curriculum design that is logically ordered, then, 
requires a fundamental knowledge of the basic principles of the syllogism enumerated 
here. 
 However, though the syllogism yields the most certain kind of knowledge, it is 
not the only way of arriving at the truth.  In fact, in difficult matters, one should not begin 
with the most certain kind of argument.  Rather, one begins by examining the opinions of 
others and making probable arguments from what is generally accepted.  This art is called 
"dialectic," which Aristotle examines in the Topics.   
 In addition to arguing from what most think and what the experts in a given field 
think, in the art of dialectic, one must also consider the process by which others are 
persuaded of the truth.  This discipline is called "rhetoric" which is defined as the art of 
determining in any given circumstance the available means of persuasion.  Interestingly 
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enough, the Poetics of Aristotle is also considered by Aquinas to be part of the science of 
logic.  He says,  
 Sometimes we are moved towards one part of a contradiction by nothing other 
 more than a kind of regard or esteem resulting from the way something is 
 represented.  This is analogous to the way in which a particular food appears 
 disgusting when it is represented in the image of something disgusting.  The art of 
 poetry is ordered to this.  For the poet's vocation is to guide us to what is virtuous 
 by representing it as attractive. (Aquinas, trans. 2007, p. 3) 
The reason, then, that the examination of the poetic art is considered part of logic is that 
poetry can move readers to one side of a contradiction by disposing them to accept or 
reject something based on how it is represented (Berquist, 1994). To elaborate on 
Aquinas's example, if I were to convince someone not to eat a bowl of soup by saying 
that it looks like vomit, I would be moving to think and act in a certain way by 
representing the food in the image of something disgusting.  Because the kind of fiction 
we read can influence the way we think, poetics is in some sense part logic because it 
deals with how individuals arrive at the truth.  Considering this logical element of the 
Poetics is an important element of classes concerning literary criticism.  It should be 
noted, however, that in literary genres such as the novel, though a reader may be moved 
to hold a position or to think a certain way, the literary mode does not move the reader by 
presenting arguments or strict demonstrations.   
 Finally, Aristotle's work On Sophistical Refutations concerns the refuting of 
faulty arguments.  It is necessary in the consideration of any truth not only to advance the 
truth, but also to address sophistical arguments.  One has a much better grasp on the truth 
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if one is able not only to supply reasons in favor of one's own position, but also to refute 
sophistry that has only the appearance of truth.  This completes the whole of the corpus 
of Aristotle's logical works. 
 Aristotle's Organon was written with a view to explaining how this collection of 
treatises is divided according to the ways that the human mind arrives at the truth.  Like 
the other disciplines of Aristotle, he considered his treatment of logic to deal with 
something that was discovered, not something that he invented.  In other words, it 
corresponds to the way that the human mind naturally arrives at knowledge.   
Thus, philosophy, which for Aristotle and Aquinas is a way of life governing the pursuit 
of wisdom, must begin with a study of logic as a prelude to the examination of the 
speculative sciences.   
 The next science to be considered in Aristotle's enumeration is mathematics.  Yet 
no work of Aristotle's devoted to mathematics has survived.  Therefore, in lieu of treating 
mathematics according to Aristotle, his logical methods will be applied to current 
methods used in teaching mathematics. 
Curriculum Design and Instructional Practice: 
Teaching Mathematics 
Subject matter 
  No core curriculum is complete without a course in logic, which is the art of 
thinking or reasoning.  Because all disciplines require reasoning, the mistakes of drawing 
a false conclusion or arguing fallaciously should be sedulously avoided in every branch 
of education.  More advanced students will profit from a careful reading of the Organon 
which is the corpus of the logical works of Aristotle, known as the father of logic.  For 
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less advanced students, fundamentals of logic can be learned from textbooks such as 
Logic: the art of defining and reasoning by Oesterle (1963), and Logic: an Aristotelian 
approach by Spangler (1993).   
  Logic should be approached in such a way that it is brought to bear on all other 
disciplines.  Because logic is often ignored, however, fallacies go unnoticed in many 
disciplines.  This difficulty is perhaps most conspicuous in mathematics, which is the 
most logically rigorous discipline.  One common logical error that is almost universally 
accepted is that a line, which has size or magnitude, is made up of points which have no 
size or magnitude.  In the popular math textbook, Advanced Mathematics, author Saxon 
(1993) says, "a mathematical point is so small that it has no size at all"  (p. 47).  On the 
very next page he says, "a line is made up of mathematical points" (p. 48).  This is a 
logical fallacy because it violates the principle of non-contradiction.  It is impossible for a 
line, which does have size to be made up of points that do not have size.  No amount of 
things that have no magnitude can make up something that does have magnitude, no 
matter how many of them there are.  In spite of this impossibility, the principle that points 
make up lines and all other geometrical figures is accepted without question almost 
universally because of an inattention to logic. 
  The error that a line is made up of points leads to additional errors in 
mathematics, which further demonstrate the necessity of logic for this discipline.  For 
example, angles are defined as "the geometric figure formed by two rays that have a 
common endpoint.  This definition says that the angle is the set of points that form the 
rays"  (Saxon, 1993, p. 50).  The angle, according to this explanation, is also made up of 
points.  This definition, therefore, is faulty because it depends on the faulty definition of a 
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line.  Thus, the logical error multiplies as the study of mathematics proceeds.  To avoid 
these errors, both the study of logic and the attention to logic in the study of mathematics 
is necessary.  
Pedagogy 
  Often logic is taught in conjunction with mathematics, the readiest and clearest 
paradigm for logical principles.  One solution to the difficulty of the logical errors in the 
current approach to mathematics is the study of Euclid's Elements which pays particular 
attention to a rigorously logical and orderly procedure.  To ensure the active participation 
of students, they should be required to prepare the theorems or proofs for demonstration 
in front of the class.  In this way, students themselves take part in the teaching process by 
instructing and evaluating themselves, with guidance from the professor.  This also 
fosters public speaking skills, the ability to field questions, answer objections, and 
explain difficult concepts to those who do not understand them, all with the most rigorous 
logical procedure.  These skills are useful in all other disciplines and in any walk of life.  
Physics or Natural Science According to Aquinas 
 The two chief works dealing with natural philosophy are the Physics and the De 
Anima (Feser, 2013). To establish the principles that govern design of curricula and the 
educational practices that go along with it, a brief summary of their subject matter will be 
presented. Aquinas addresses natural science in his work entitled The Principles of 
Nature (Aquinas, trans. 1965). The subject of natural philosophy or natural science is 
mobile being.  In other words, it is all things that are subject to motion.  When Aristotle 
and Aquinas use the word, "motion," however, they mean something more general than 
what the word means today.  By motion, they mean what we mean by the word "change."   
  
 
86 
So, natural science refers to the discipline that examines all things that change.  This fits 
with the contemporary division of science into biology, chemistry, and physics.  What is 
common to all things studied in these and other related sciences is that they examine 
things that change (Harry 2015).  The Physics of Aristotle, then, provides the principles 
necessary for designing science curricula in these three areas of science. 
 In natural science, the kinds of beings that undergo change according to Aristotle 
and Aquinas are either substantial or accidental.  A substantial being is one that exists of 
itself and never in another being.  For example, to say that a human being exists refers to 
substantial existence, because human beings are not part of other existing things; rather 
they exist on their own.   An accidental being is one that cannot exist by itself and only 
exists in some other being. Height, for example, only exists in other beings that have 
height. To say that the man is tall, for instance, refers to accidental existence because 
"being tall" can only be in something else. The subject of natural philosophy, then, is the 
change that each of these kinds of existence (substantial and accidental) undergoes.  An 
example of this distinction of Aristotle's is preserved in chemistry.  When two elements 
combine to form a compound, such as hydrogen and oxygen combining to form water, 
substantial change is occurring.  However, when two substances join to form a mixture, 
such as mixing salt and water together, accidental change is occurring.  Aristotle's most 
fundamental principles of change, therefore, serve as guides in the development of the 
sciences: the distinctions he made are still applied in the study of the sciences (Coughlin, 
2014).  These distinctions also have far-reaching ramifications for the study of ethics, 
which is based on the principle that a human being has one nature to which certain acts 
are suited and others are not. 
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 Corresponding to substantial and accidental existence are two kinds of form: 
substantial and accidental.  A substantial form makes a substance to be the particular kind 
of substance that it is.  Examples of substances whose act is due to a substantial form are 
a man, a horse, a bird, a tree, gold, water, and oxygen. Each of these is a substance that 
exists on its own. The accidental form refers to the accident itself.  Examples of accidents 
are height, weight, skin color, knowledge, density, and temperature.  These qualities or 
accidents cannot exist of themselves, but only in other substances.  For example, "being 
tan" must exist in a material body.  There is no such thing as "tan" existing on its own or 
floating around in the air.  "Being tan" must exist in a physical body. 
 Given these two kinds of form that give rise to substantial and accidental 
existence, each of them can come to be (be generated) or pass away (corrupt).  When a 
substance comes to be or passes away, it is called substantial change.  When an accident 
comes to be and passes away, it is called accidental change, of which there are three 
kinds: local motion (change of place), alteration (change in quality), and growth and 
diminution (getting bigger or smaller).  
 There are three things required for generation or substantial change: matter (being 
in potency), form (that through which being is actual), and privation (not being in act).  In 
other words, for a change to take place, it is necessary to have a thing that changes 
(matter), that from which the thing changes (form) and that to which it changes 
(privation).  So, matter is what underlies or remains the same throughout the change.  
Form is what the matter possesses before it undergoes the change.  Privation is the from 
to which the matter is changing but lacks in actuality during the change.  For example, 
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when a leaf changes from green to red, three fundamental principles are involved in the 
change: 1) the leaf (the thing that is changing or the matter)  2) the color green (that from 
which it changes or the form) and 3) the color red (that to which it changes or privation.) 
 Thus, privation is a per accidens principle because during the motion or change it 
does not yet exist.  Matter and form are per se principles because the matter and the form 
together constitute a substance with actual existence. 
 In all accidental changes, a substance corresponds to the matter because the 
substance remains the same throughout the change.  It underlies a change from one 
accidental form to another.  Yet in a substantial change, prime matter underlies the 
change.  Prime matter exists only potentially: it has no actual existence.  As such, it has 
no form or privation but is subject to form and privation. 
 So, for all changes, at least three principles are required: matter, form, and 
privation.  Yet these are not sufficient for generation to occur.  The reason for this is that 
what is in potency cannot bring itself to actuality.  In other words, a thing cannot give 
itself what it does not have: a statue cannot make itself.   There must be some outside 
cause to bring something from potency to act.  This outside cause is called the agent.  But 
the agent does not act by chance, but by intention.  So there must be some fourth cause, 
namely what is intended by the agent.  This is called the end or final cause. There are, 
then, four per se causes: the matter, the form, the agent, and the end.  Of these four, the 
matter and the form are intrinsic causes because the belong to the subject of change itself.  
The agent and the end are extrinsic causes because they are outside the subject of change 
and belong to something else.   
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 The reason that privation is not considered one of the four causes is that it is not a 
per se cause, but only a per accidens cause and principle (Berquist, 2010). Privation is 
simply the lack of what the changeable being is changing to.  Considered as such, it does 
not have actual existence. 
 It is important to note that "principle" is more general than "cause" in the sense 
that every cause is a principle, but not every principle is a cause.  For example, if a leaf 
changes from green to red, green is a principle of the motion or change from green to red, 
but it is not a cause of the change. 
 Also, "cause" is said only of that whose existence is prior in being to another.  
Hence, a cause may be defined as that from whose being another follows (Aquinas, trans. 
1965).  A cause is always prior in being, though not necessarily prior in time, to the 
effect. 
 Regarding the causes of being and becoming, it is important to note that a thing 
can have a variety of causes.  For example both the artisan and the bronze are causes of 
the statue.  In this case, the artisan is the agent cause and the bronze is the material cause.   
 It is possible for the same thing to be both an effect and a cause of the same thing, 
though not in the same respect, but only in different respects.  For example, walking is 
the cause of health as an agent cause, but health is the cause of walking as a final cause.  
To put it another way, the act of walking contributes to health, yet becoming healthy can 
be a reason why someone engages in the act of walking.  Similarly, matter is the cause of 
form insofar as matter is necessary for the existence of the form of material things.  But 
form is the cause of matter in that matter has actual being only through the existence of 
form. 
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 What is most fundamental in the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of nature, which 
includes all things subject to change, is that our knowledge of these things begins with 
sense experience.  All things that the mind understands have a foundation in our sensory 
awareness: there is nothing in the intellect that is not first in the senses.   With this as a 
starting point, we have a fundamental knowledge of the things around us that is self-
evident or per se notum. This is sometimes called "the knowledge of common 
experience."  One example of the knowledge of common experience is the perception of 
substantial unity.   For example, everyone knows that one's mother is one thing and not a 
heap of things.  The same is true for animals, plants, and all living things: they are 
substantially one (Berquist, 2010). 
 This kind of knowledge is the most certain of all and it forms the foundation of all 
other inquiry.  By this self-evident knowledge that is common and accessible to all, we 
know certainly the principles of nature that he expounds in the Physics.  For example, 
everyone knows that there are things in the world are subject to change.  Everyone also 
knows that this change involves three things: the thing that changes, that from which it 
changes, and that to which it changes.  This sums up Aquinas's understanding of the 
principles of nature, the knowledge of which begins with things that everyone is certain 
of.  This most basic kind of knowledge of the external world, or the knowledge of 
common experience, is the beginning of the inquiry into knowledge of the universe.  It 
governs and guides the progress of the mind as it grows in knowledge and constitutes the 
principles of the scientific disciplines.  Through the entire curriculum of the sciences, 
these principles serve as the guides and guardrails of advancement in knowledge. The 
following practical example will show how important it is for educational leaders who 
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design curricula to ensure that these guardrails are present by requiring a philosophical 
treatment of science. 
Curriculum Design: Aristotle's Physics and Modern Physics 
 Now that certain fundamental notions of Aristotle's natural philosophy have been 
discussed, it is important to determine how and why these fundamentals should be 
implemented in a classroom setting.  
 One reason is that Aristotle is the source for the current division of the sciences 
into biology, chemistry, and physics.   The De Anima deals with the principles of 
biological science, whose subject matter is the living as opposed to the nonliving.  The 
principles of chemistry are established in the first two books of the Physics where 
Aristotle distinguishes between substantial and accidental change.  These principles are 
further developed in the work, On Generation and Corruption, which deals with 
substantial change.  Finally, modern physics can trace its origins to the De Coelo of 
Aristotle, which treats of the motion of the heavens.     
   Another reason is that because natural philosophy is nothing other than an 
investigation of the principal truths about nature that are most fundamental and which are 
the basis for all further scientific inquiry, no treatment or study of science is complete 
without attending to these principles.  On a practical level, these philosophical principles 
could be examined in a prerequisite for science majors or for any high-level sciences 
course.  A course called "The Philosophy of Nature" or "The Fundamentals of Natural 
Science" could be part of general education requirements.  Ideally this would be 
accomplished by reading the Physics of Aristotle.  Granting the difficulty of this text, 
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however, these fundamentals could be established with manuals or secondary sources 
based on the text and methods of Aristotle.  
 The fundamental principles of all motion or change are an unavoidable and 
integral part of physical science, whose common subject matter is all things subject to 
motion.  It is of the utmost importance to examine these principles. If they are not 
addressed they will either be assumed without question or dismissed without cause.   
 To cite some examples of principles that are largely assumed without question, 
nearly everyone assumes the principles asserted in Newton's Mathematical Principles of 
Natural Philosophy (Newton, trans. 1934).  It is in this work that we find for the first time 
such concepts as gravity, inertia, absolute time, and absolute space.  We also find an 
account of planetary motion based on Newton's first law of motion which is stated thus: 
"Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is 
compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it"  (Newton, p. 13).  This law, 
is, in fact, based on Newton's definition of inertia which is as follows:  "The vis insita 
[inertia], or innate force of matter, is a power of resisting, by which every body, as much 
as in it lies, continues in its present state, whether it be of rest, or of moving uniformly 
forwards in a right line" (Newton, p. 2). Newton is saying here that a body, such as a 
planet, moves forward in a straight line by its own innate force of matter, or inertia.  If 
this is true, however, then either the motion of the planets is an effect without a cause or 
the planets cause their own perpetual motion.  One difficulty that can be raised with the 
Newtonian notion of inertia is that it contradicts the very notion of what motion is, which 
must be understood in light of Aristotle's principles of matter, form, and privation, which 
were explained above. 
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  Aristotle defines motion as follows: "The fulfillment of what is potentially, as 
such, is motion" (Aristotle, trans. 1984, 201a11).  By "motion," Aristotle meant what we 
mean by "change." Putting this definition in more familiar terms, all change is the 
acquiring of something new that was not previously possessed.  If this is so, then nothing 
can change itself or move because it would have to give itself something that it does not 
have. It would have to be in the possession of something and not in the possession of it at 
the same time and in the same respect. Yet this is precisely what the notion of inertia 
requires.  The point here is not so much to argue that Aristotle was right and Newton was 
wrong.  Rather, the point is that neither should be accepted without critique and 
investigation.  Yet this is exactly what we do as a society.  The force of inertia is 
uncritically and unquestionably assumed as a fact of our existence.  To remedy this 
difficulty, it is necessary for educational leaders to establish as part of every science 
curriculum courses that teach the philosophy of nature to which one must necessarily 
appeal to resolve the discrepancies between Aristotle and Newton. 
 After the determination of what is known about the natural world, Aristotle turns 
to the treatment of how we know the world, the part of philosophy known as 
epistemology. 
Aristotle's Epistemology: The De Anima 
 Epistemology, or the science of human knowledge, is now often treated as a 
single philosophical discipline.  This was not the case, however, for either Aristotle or 
Aquinas.  Neither of them spoke of "epistemology" as one of the sciences of philosophy.  
Rather, human knowledge was treated in the areas of logic and natural philosophy.  An 
inquiry into Aristotelian-Thomistic epistemology, then, requires an examination of 
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Aristotle's logical works and natural philosophy, which is comprised of his Physics and 
what is commonly known as the De Anima or On the Soul in which he treats of the 
human faculties that make up the capacity for knowledge (Polansky, 2007). Having 
already examined Aristotle's logic and the fundamental principles of natural philosophy 
discussed in the Physics, it remains to discuss his De Anima. 
 In this work, Aristotle treats of the powers of the soul that make the acts of 
knowing possible.  According to Aristotle, all knowledge begins with sensation as the 
foundation of what is known in the intellect.  This has profound significance for the 
philosophy of education.  For example, if all concepts understood by the mind have a 
foundation in physical sensation, then the natural way to progress to abstract and 
universal concepts is by first sensing the particular and material things around us (Davies, 
2014). 
Aristotle's Notion of Sensation 
At the heart of Aristotle's understanding of epistemology, then, is that all knowledge 
begins with the senses, which means that there is nothing in the intellect that is not first in 
the senses.  What the five external senses –touch, sight, taste, smell, and hearing–perceive 
form the basis of all human knowledge.  In other words, if there were no sensation in a 
human being, there could be no natural knowledge (Menn, 2002).    
 According to Aristotle and Aquinas, it follows from this that non-sentient living 
beings, namely plants, have no knowledge or self-awareness.  All higher animals that 
have the five senses have sense knowledge and therefore some awareness of the world 
around them.  In addition to theses five external senses found in higher animals are also 
found four internal sense powers: imagination, memory, the common sense, and the 
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cogitative power.  Working in conjunction with each other, the imagination and the 
memory are able to conjure up and retain the impressions of the external senses.  The 
common sense (sensus communis) unites and coordinates the activities of the external 
senses so that, for example, we are aware that the wine that we see and smell is the same 
wine that we touch and taste.  The cogitative power allows us to react to objects of sense 
that are to be pursued or avoided.  In animals, for example, the cogitative power informs 
the deer that the wolf is dangerous and to be avoided.  This same power informs the wolf 
that the deer is food and to be pursued.  In human beings, this power gives a child a fear 
of heights or potentially dangerous situations.  Let this suffice as a summary of Aristotle's 
account of the external and internal sense powers of the soul. 
Curriculum Design and Instructional Practice: Biology 
Subject Matter 
 Aristotle's De Anima establishes the principles of the study of all living things and 
is the beginning of the study of the biological sciences in the sense that what separates 
biology from the other disciplines is that it considers living things as opposed to non-
living things.  (For Aristotle, all living things have a "soul" which is a principle of life 
within them.)   
 Because the study of living things and their principle of life also concerns the 
study of their operations or activities, it includes the study of how human beings acquire 
knowledge.  For this reason, the epistemological facet of Aristotle's work on living things 
also concerns how the knowledge of living things is approached. 
 In his account of human knowledge, Aristotle observes that all knowledge begins 
with the senses.  Because the order of our progression in knowledge is from the 
  
 
96 
particulars of sense knowledge to the more general or universal concepts understood by 
the mind, the order of learning should follow in kind.  What is first sensed should be first 
learned. 
 This, however, is not the order followed in the biological sciences.  To cite a 
typical example, in the Holt, Rinehart, and Winston science series, the textbook Modern 
Biology (Otto & Towle, 1985), begins with the treatment of the cell in Unit 1 and then 
progresses to tissues, organs, systems, and finally ends with a study of the whole 
organism and animal behavior within ecosystems at the end of the book in Unit 8. This 
order is typical of the vast majority of biology textbooks. 
 The first thing that is striking about this order is that it is not the order of 
discovery.  Animals themselves and their behavior in their environment were objects of 
human knowledge for thousands of years before the existence of the cell was first 
discovered.  Likewise, even today all human beings have an experience of animals and 
their behavior before cells are studied.  So, what is first sensed in the order of discovery, 
namely the animal itself, is the last thing studied in biology classes.  One of the 
difficulties of approaching a discipline in the reverse order of discovery is that it lends 
itself to making mistakes in judgment about the object of study. 
 For example, in modern cell-theory, the cell is considered the "unit of life" (Otto 
and Towle, 1985).  A unit is what is fundamentally one, complete, and whole.  But what 
is fundamentally one, complete, and whole is not the cell, but the entire organism.  The 
animal is more of a unit than the cell is. 
 In contrast, in Aristotle' view, all the parts of the organism exist for the sake of the 
whole organism (Aristotle, trans. 1984).  For example the digestive system of an animal 
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exists for the purpose of supplying nutrition to the animal, which is essentially one thing 
and a unit of life.  If, however, one considers the cell to be essentially one, the entire 
organism is not essentially one, but essentially many things without a single nature.  This 
causes significant difficulties in the understanding of the natures of living things. 
 The solution to this difficulty is to begin at the beginning and start with a study of 
animal behavior, which approaches the study of the whole animal as unit (one thing) with 
a single nature.  In this way, the order of instruction follows the natural order of learning 
and the mind is habituated to see the systems of the animal (digestive, respiratory, and 
circulatory) as existing for the sake of the whole animal, the organs for the sake of these 
systems, the tissues for the organs, and the cells for the tissues.  Cells, then are not 
fundamentally and essentially one, but parts of the whole animal which is fundamentally 
and essentially one. 
 Books for biology classes, then, should be chosen on the basis of whether they 
proceed according to the order of learning, which is the order of discovery.  For example, 
the French biologist and entomologist J. Henri Fabre does an excellent job of recounting 
his studies of animal behavior.  A collection of his best work is published in The Insect 
World of J. Henri Fabre  (Fabre, trans. 1991).  Another fine example is the work of 
Konrad Lorenz (2002).   
Pedagogy 
 Biology classes should always begin with or at least include the sense experience 
of animals, so far as this is possible. When this is not possible, descriptive studies of 
scientists who have made compelling discoveries in the area of animal behavior can serve 
as a worthy substitute.  Inner cities, for example, do not usually afford the opportunity for 
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the study of natural things in their environment.  When studies in the field are not 
possible, active participation in the process of inquiry can still be encouraged.  If students 
are required to read the accounts of great biologists, they should be asked to recount what 
they have learned and to participate actively in a discussion of the implications of what 
they have learned.  Also, in-class experiments and portable exhibits can serve as a 
substitute for first-hand experience of animals in their own habitats.  
The Objective Character of Sense Knowledge 
 Regarding the sense powers, for Aristotle and Aquinas, what is known by the 
sense power is the object, which is external to the sense power (Taylor, 1990). For 
example, if a human being sees a mountain, the mountain is the object of sense 
knowledge.  For this reason these philosophers are called "objectivists."  This name 
comes from the notion that the "object" which is external to the knower is the primary 
object of knowledge.   
 Beginning with the empiricist philosophers, however, the external object was no 
longer viewed as the primary object of knowledge.  Rather, the sense impressions 
themselves, which are the effect of the external object of sense on the sense power, were 
seen as the primary object of knowledge.  Because the sense impressions are in the 
subject, this ideology is known as "subjectivism."  For a subjectivist, the sense 
impression is the very object of knowledge.  In contrast, for Aristotle, the sense 
impression is that by which we know the external object of sense.   This raises a question 
regarding how Aristotle might defend his understanding of sensation when faced with 
objections from modern philosophers.  In answer to this question, it should first be 
pointed out that it is not possible to present a demonstration from premises more known 
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to us that things exist outside of us and that these things are known with certainty.  The 
reason that no argument can be presented is that this truth is self-evident.  It is what is 
most fundamental in our knowledge.  All other knowledge presupposes this.  Because all 
knowledge comes from the senses, the certitude of the senses is the starting point of all 
other inquiry.  Despite the truth that no demonstration can be presented in favor of 
objectivism, the truth of Aristotle's position can be manifested by showing the 
deficiencies in arguments against it.  We will focus on two modern philosophers: 
Descartes and Hume. 
 Hume (1955) presents this argument that we cannot trust our senses and that we 
really know our sense impressions, not the world around us:  
 The table which we see seems to diminish as we remove further from it; but the 
 real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration.  It was, therefore, 
 nothing but its image which was present to the mind (p. 161) 
Hume's conclusion here is that the mind knows only the image of table, not the table 
itself.  His argument is that when we move further from the table, the actual table suffers 
no alteration.  Yet, it appears smaller to us as we move away.  Therefore, we really 
cannot trust that what we perceive with our senses conforms to reality. 
 There are two key problems with Hume's argument.  The first problem is that he 
presupposes in his argument the opposite of what he concludes from it: he says "the real 
table . . . suffers no alteration."  This he could only know by sensing the table. He claims 
to be able to sense what the real table is like; for he says that the real table suffers no 
alteration. Here he is presupposing the certitude of his sense powers in order to deny the 
certitude of his sense powers.    
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 The second difficulty is that the phenomenon that he notices, namely that the table 
appears smaller as we move farther away, is a necessary component of perceiving 
distance.  If all things appeared the same size to us, no matter how far away they were, 
we would have no way of telling how far away familiar objects are.  The fact that an 
object appears smaller as we get farther away, then, contributes to the certitude and 
accuracy of our senses; it does not detract from it.   
 In the end, Hume's (1955) attempt to argue that we do not sense external objects 
but only their images strengthens the case of the certitude of our senses.  Without 
realizing it, he contributes to the certainty we have that we can trust our senses. 
 Next, Descartes (2006) presents the following argument that we should not trust 
our senses: 
 I have learned from certain persons whose arms or legs had been amputated that it 
still seemed to them sometimes that they felt pain in the parts which they no 
longer possessed.  This gives me reason to think that I could not be entirely sure 
either that there was something wrong with one of my limbs, even though I felt 
pain in it.  (Descartes, p. 131) 
Again, there are two problems with Descartes' argument here.  First, like Hume, he 
presupposes the opposite of what he is trying to prove.   He claims to be certain that 
others have lost their limbs and that he has not.  How could he possibly know this?  Only 
be being certain that he can trust his sense powers.  Yet this is the very thing that he 
denies.   
 The second problem with his argument is that he bases it on the perceptions of 
one whose sense organs have been damaged.  One should not expect someone with a 
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severed limb to be the standard by which sensation is judged.  This would be like saying 
that because someone with a damaged eye cannot trust his sight that neither should 
anyone else.  This amounts to making an aberration the norm.   
 Similarly, most other subjectivist philosophers such as Locke, Berkeley, and Kant 
supply arguments against the certitude of the sense powers by presupposing the certitude 
of these same sense powers or by basing their judgments of what is normal on what is 
knowingly defective.  As such, their arguments, rather than shaking the ground on which 
Aristotle stands, actually solidify and strengthen it.    
 Because all of our knowledge begins with the senses, any attempt to deny the 
senses must be done by using them and trusting their ability to lead us to true 
conclusions. The arguments against the certitude of the senses actually confirm the 
reasonability of Aristotle's position.  The next of the disciplines taken up by Aristotle is 
ethics, which treats of human action. 
The Importance of Aristotle's Ethics for Educational Leaders 
 Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, upon which Aquinas's understanding of human 
action is based, is much more than a treatise on what is usually thought of as ethics or 
morals.  It is a consideration of the whole of human life.  The author intended the work to 
be universally applicable in all times and cultures.  It was meant to address what is 
common and natural to all human persons regarding their happiness and what is 
necessary for directing their lives in a way that allows them to flourish and reach their 
full potential.  In other words, it is a work about the end or purpose of human life and all 
that is required to attain this purpose.  Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics begins, then, with a 
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discussion of happiness, or eudaimonia, which is usually translated as "happiness" but 
also as "human flourishing" or "living well."   
 This consideration is crucial to the discussion of education because Aquinas, 
along with contemporary scholars, argue that education is directed to happiness.  Getting 
some sense of what this means requires a careful examination of what Aristotle meant by 
happiness. 
 First of all, the term "happiness" used in the Nicomachean Ethics does not 
connote what is normally meant by the term in contemporary parlance.  When one hears 
the term, one usually thinks of an emotion of joy or a feeling of delight.  If someone were 
to ask, "Are you happy or sad?" one would usually be inquiring about an emotion.  
Aristotle, however, used the term to refer to the greatest human good or the best thing 
that human beings can attain.  
  This is of the greatest significance for education and educational leaders.  For if 
education, identified by Aquinas as the arts and sciences, is ordered to the fulfillment of 
the greatest possible potential, education is a key component in the most exalted of 
human endeavors.  If happiness is the purpose of education, then determining what it is 
and how to attain it would be the paramount concern of educational leaders to whom it 
falls to direct others to its attainment and design curricula and determine instructional 
practice in accord with this (Kingsland, 2010). 
 How, then, does Aristotle go about determining what happiness consists in?  He 
begins by asking this question: "What is the highest of all goods achievable by action?"  
(Aristotle, trans. 1984, 1095a16).  He begins his answer to the question by saying that the 
highest of all goods that we can achieve by action cannot be something that we want for 
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the sake of something else.  For if we wanted it for "something else," that "something 
else" would be more desirable than the happiness we desire.  So, happiness must be 
desirable for itself, and not for the sake of something else.   
 This greatest human good, which is desirable for its own sake, must be the highest 
kind of action that human beings are capable of.  Because the faculty of reason is the 
highest human faculty, it necessarily follows that the exercise of this faculty is the highest 
human activity.  Aristotle puts it this way:  "Now if the function of man is an activity of 
soul in accordance with, or not without, rational principle . . . human good turns out to be 
activity of soul in conformity with excellence [virtue], and if there are more than one 
excellence [virtue], in conformity with the best and most complete"  (Aristotle, trans. 
1984, 1098a7-8 and 1098a17-18).   To exercise human rationality with excellence or 
virtue, then, is the greatest human good in which happiness consists.   To put in simply, 
Aristotle's position is that human happiness is virtuous activity. 
 This virtuous activity, which is nothing other than excellence in accord with 
reason, is divided into two kinds: moral and intellectual.  Though a strong case can be 
made that education must deal with both kinds of virtue, the focus of this dissertation is 
on the intellectual virtues or the cultivation of the mind.  In the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle enumerates three virtues of the speculative intellect: understanding, science, and 
wisdom (1139b15).  In keeping with Aristotle's logical works, he identifies understanding 
as a knowledge of self-evident first principles.  Science is the ability to draw conclusions 
from these principles.  Finally, wisdom is a knowledge of causes which is attained by the 
virtues of understanding and science.  Aquinas explains these three intellectual virtues as 
follows: 
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 The Philosopher (Ethic. vi.1) reckons these three alone as being intellectual 
 virtues, viz., wisdom, science, and understanding.  I answer that, as already 
 stated (A.1), the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the 
 speculative intellect for the consideration of truth: for this is its good work.  
 Now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration,–as known in itself, and as 
 known through another.  What is known in itself, is as a principle, and is at once 
 understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit that  perfects the intellect for the 
 consideration of such truth is called understanding, which is the habit of 
 principles.   
  On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood 
 by the  intellect, not at once, but by means of the reason's inquiry, and is as a 
 term.  This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in some 
 particular genus; secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human 
 knowledge.  And, since things that are knowable last from our standpoint, 
 are knowable first and chiefly in their nature (Phys. i., text. 2,3); hence that which 
 is last with respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and 
 chiefly in its nature.  And about these is wisdom, which considers the highest 
 causes, as stated in Metaph. i. 1, 2.  Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets 
 them in order, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that 
 is not based on the first causes.  But in regard to that which is last in this or 
 that genus of knowable matter, it is science that perfects the intellect.  
 (Aquinas, trans. 1947, I-II Q57 A2) 
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The intellectual virtue of understanding, then, concerns the starting point of the reasoning 
and the process of education because it governs the knowledge of first principles which 
are the beginning of all knowledge.  Science governs the progress and method of 
attaining further knowledge on the basis of the principles of understanding.  Wisdom is 
the virtue that governs the knowledge of causes that are most perfective of the mind 
(Berquist, 1996).  This is the greatest of intellectual virtues and the one that is perfected 
in the discipline of metaphysics, which will be considered in the next section. 
 According to Aquinas, then, all arts and sciences, which constitute the core of 
education, are ordered to happiness in the sense that they are ordered to the perfection of 
the mind according to the attainment of the intellectual virtues.  Because these virtues can 
be acquired only by a thorough study of the arts and sciences, it pertains to educational 
leaders to design curricula and implement teaching methods that are ordered to perfecting 
the mind through these disciplines so as to attain happiness (Mooney & Nowacki, 2014). 
Curriculum Design and Instructional Practice: Aristotle's Ethics 
Subject Matter 
  Cicero (trans. 1975) says at the beginning of his treatise, De Officiis (On Duties), 
that the branch of philosophy dealing with ethics or morals has the widest  practical 
application: 
  Although philosophy offers many problems, both important and useful, that have 
 been fully and carefully discussed by philosophers, those teachings which have 
 been handed down on the subject of moral duties seem to have the widest 
 practical application.  For no phase of life, whether public or private, whether in 
 business or in the home, whether one is working on what concerns oneself or 
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 dealing with another, can be without its moral duty; on the discharge of such 
 duties depends all that is morally right, and on their neglect all that is morally 
 wrong in life.  (p. 7) 
 Cicero's point here is that because moral duties enter into every phase of life, the 
examination of these duties constitutes the most widely applicable discipline in 
philosophy.  If this is true, then ethics should be part of the requirements of both general 
education and more particular fields.  In fact, this is currently the case in many programs.  
For example, medical ethics is often a requirement for those studying medicine, business 
ethics for those in MBA programs and social equity in education programs. 
  Because particular applications of ethics in medicine, business, and education, for 
example, always depend on the use of more general principles, courses in fundamental 
ethics required early on in general education would greatly aid more particular 
considerations. 
Pedagogy 
  Because Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is completely independent of any 
religious considerations and draws conclusions based on what is common to all human 
beings, the subject matter is universally applicable.  Also, the text is more accessible than 
most of Aristotle's other works.   
  Ethics in the classroom could be implemented in a variety of ways that encourage 
the active participation of students.  For advanced students, seminars on such works as 
the De Officiis of Cicero and the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle could be conducted.  
For less advanced students, manuals or textbooks using excerpts and highlighting the 
contributions of key ethical thinkers could be used. 
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  The most important consideration, however, is that the students take the role of 
being the primary agents in their education.  To this end, seminars discussing the texts of 
great thinkers, debates examining both sides of a moral issue, and papers presented and 
discussed are all instructional practices that foster respect for students as the primary 
agents of their education.   
Curriculum Design and Instructional Practice: Aristotle's Metaphysics 
  Owens begins his treatment of Aristotle's Metaphysics or "Theological Science" 
by saying,  
 The motive urged for its pursuit is the natural desire that all men have to know, as 
desire that can be satisfied only through understanding things by means of their 
highest principles and causes, and that is aroused by a wonder at things of 
which the cause is not apparent"  (Owens, 1959, pp. 322-323). 
It is difficult to overestimate the profundity and importance of this observation not only 
for the science of metaphysics but for all of education.  Owens makes two crucial points 
for the understanding of the subject matter of metaphysics.  The first is that this science 
can trace its origins to the natural desire to know which is nourished by wonder.  Second, 
the subject matter of the science can be determined from this natural desire.  This section 
of the dissertation is devoted to showing this connection between our natural desire to 
know and the subject matter of metaphysics (Ashley, 2006). 
 It is significant that the very first line of Aristotle's Metaphysics is "All men by 
nature desire to know" (Barnes, 1984, p. 980a20).  As support for this observation, he 
says, "An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their 
usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight"  
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(Barnes, p. 980a23).  The most necessary reason for the senses is self-preservation: our 
senses aid us in procuring the necessities of life.   However, in addition to their 
usefulness, we often delight in viewing such things as a sunset or a beautiful flower.  It is 
significant that when we take part in such activities, there is no end or purpose beyond 
the activity itself; it is for its own sake.  In other words, when one stops to look at a 
beautiful sunset, one does not do this in order to do something else with the experience: it 
is an activity that is enjoyed for what it is in itself.  One might say, then, that the senses 
have a practical end regarding the acquiring of what is necessary for self-preservation, 
and a speculative end regarding what is experienced simply for its own sake, such as the 
enjoyment of the beauty of a sunset.  
 The reason that Aristotle begins with this example is that it is far easier to grasp 
what we can sense and imagine than it is to grasp what we can understand, but not 
imagine. In this case, a sunset or a flower can be sensed and imagined, but the objects of 
speculative knowledge, such as what a cause is, cannot.  Because all knowledge begins 
with the senses, the natural way for us to arrive at difficult truths is from the senses to 
reason or from the particular to the universal (Taylor, 1990).  Now that he has made this 
observation regarding the senses, the more difficult truth regarding the intellect becomes 
easier to see. 
 Regarding the mind there are also two kinds of knowledge: one for the sake of 
action and another, purely for its own sake.  The desire for knowledge for its own sake 
we call wonder.  It is important to distinguish wonder, which is an intellectual virtue, 
from curiosity, which is an intellectual vice.  Curiosity in the strict sense is the desire for 
particular knowledge, which is useless or even harmful for us to have.   Gossip about 
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failures in the lives of others is an example of the kind of knowledge that springs from 
curiosity.  Such knowledge may satisfy curiosity, but it does not perfect the human mind.  
Most often, we are better off without this kind of knowledge. It should be noted, 
however, that it is common to use expressions like "epistemological curiosity" or 
"intellectual curiosity" to refer to a genuine desire for humanizing knowledge.  The word 
"curiosity," however, does have a negative connotation as well.   Wonder, on the other 
hand, is the desire for universal knowledge that of itself perfects the human mind.  It is 
this kind of desire that Aristotle is speaking of in the first line of the Metaphysics.  
Growth in knowledge can come about only when one is nourished by genuine wonder 
and guarded by the fear of error.  Without wonder, there is no wisdom (Caldecott, 2012).  
Wonder and the Subject Matter of Metaphysics 
 Because all knowledge begins with the senses, we know effects before we know 
causes.  For example, we know that the ocean is salty before we know why it is so; we 
know that the moon has phases before we know why.  When we encounter an effect, 
however, we naturally seek the knowledge of the cause of that effect.  In fact, every time 
we ask the question "Why?" we are seeking a cause.  However, when the cause we are 
seeking is itself an effect of something else, we want to know the cause of that cause.  
Our mind is never satisfied completely, then, until we arrive at a cause that is not the 
effect of anything else, but is the cause of all things.  Therefore, if human knowledge is to 
be satisfied, we must have knowledge of the first cause (Berquist, 2010). This will be 
knowledge of the highest kind because it concerns the truth of things that do not depend 
on anything else for their existence.  The highest science, then, must deal with the first 
cause.  This is what Owens means when he says that this desire for knowledge "can be 
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satisfied only through understanding things by means of their highest principles and 
causes" (Owens, 1959, pp. 322-323).   
 Aquinas supports this conclusion in his Proemium to his Commentary on the 
Metaphysics.  First, he makes the point that metaphysics deals the most intelligible 
objects, or in other words, the most perfective kind of knowledge:  "that science which is 
intellectual in the highest degree should be naturally the ruler of the others.  This science 
is the one which treats of the most intelligible objects" (Aquinas, trans. 1995, p. xix).   
Then he argues that the science which is intellectual in the highest degree must be about 
causes:  "Therefore, since the certitude of science is acquired by the intellect knowing 
causes, a knowledge of causes seems to be intellectual in the highest degree" (Aquinas, 
trans. 1995, p. xix).  A sign that the knowledge of causes is intellectual in the highest 
degree is that we are most certain of something when we can explain why it is so.  For 
example, one is really not certain of the truth that the exterior angle of a triangle is equal 
to the two opposite interior angles until one can prove the theorem.  If one just 
memorizes the formula, there is no certainty or knowledge that can be supported with 
evidence.  If one is able to prove this theorem, then one is certain of it because one knows 
why it is true.   Therefore, the most certain kind of knowledge must deal with knowing 
the cause or reason why things are the way that they are. 
 The most perfective kind of knowledge, however, will be the most universal kind 
of knowledge, for the universal is what is most characteristic of knowledge itself.   For 
example, the senses can perceive an individual triangle, but the intellect, in knowing what 
a triangle is, knows all triangles universally.  (For this reason, if one knows what a 
triangle is, one can identify any three-sided plane figure as a triangle, regardless of the 
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size and ratio of the sides.) Therefore, because universal knowledge is the highest kind of 
science, metaphysics must deal with the most universal principles that pertain to all 
things. This is why Aristotle treats the axioms in the Metaphysics, the chief one of which 
is that a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect.   This 
axiom is the most universal because nothing can be so if it is not so.  Aristotle confirms 
this when he says, "Now the reason for undertaking this investigation is that all men think 
that the science which is called wisdom deals with the primary causes and principles of 
things"  (Barnes, 1984, 981b28). In addition to being about causes and principles, 
metaphysics also concerns being as such.  The reason for this is that the highest and most 
universal kind of knowledge must be in some way about all things that exist.  But one 
discipline or kind of knowledge cannot be concerned with all aspects of the existence of 
everything.  It must cover only what is most universal or common to all existing things.  
And this is being itself (Ashley, 2006). 
 By a consideration of human nature and the natural desire that all human beings 
have to know, a determination of what constitutes the highest or most perfective kind of 
knowledge can be reached.  The highest kind of knowledge must be the most certain and 
the most universal.  Therefore, the subject matter of metaphysics, must concern the first 
cause, the first principles, and being as such. 
Principles of Education Derived from the Metaphysics 
 In the passage quoted above from Aquinas's commentary on the Metaphysics of 
Aristotle, he says that metaphysics is the discipline that is the "ruler of all the others."  
This means that it really pertains to metaphysics to divide the disciplines and to speak 
about the methods of each one.  In a very real sense, then, an educational leader who 
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designs curricula and determines the instructional practices that go along with these 
curricula across the disciplines is doing the work of a metaphysician!  Regarding this, it is 
important to teach  the most universal principles that guide the whole of an education, 
most especially to those who will be educational leaders.  In light of this, how 
educational principles and foundations apply across the disciplines is something that 
should be taught at the end of one's education, for it is only then that the subject matter of 
each discipline can be examined with the purview necessary to see the order among them.  
The following ten principles listed below, then, form the basis for the subject matter of a 
course that deals with the part of metaphysics that explains the rationale for the universal 
principles of education.  
 From a treatment of the arts and sciences according to Aristotle and Aquinas, the 
following principles, suitable for a class on metaphysics concerning the whole of 
education, can be derived. 
1) Education begins in wonder and aims at wisdom.  Wonder is the natural desire for 
knowledge that perfects the mind and wisdom is the knowledge of the reasons why things 
are the way that they are. 
2) The path to wisdom follows a natural method from things that we can experience 
with our senses that are easier to understand to more abstract concepts that are more 
difficult to understand. 
3) Logic guides the mind along the path to wisdom and ensures the direction and 
order of progress.  With the use of logic, wisdom can be attained more easily and with 
fewer mistakes along the way. 
4) Mathematics is necessary for forming the mind in a logically rigorous way.  It is 
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also necessary for understanding and the physical world. 
5) The principles of natural science govern and guide all the disciplines that concern 
the study of material things subject to change. 
6) The human person is part of the natural world.  The study of the natural activities 
of which a human being is capable, such as sensing, imagining, and understanding, are 
necessary for understanding the human person. 
7) Knowledge acquired by means of education is of two kinds: speculative and 
practical.  Speculative knowledge perfects the mind and practical knowledge perfects 
human actions.  Thus, practical knowledge is acquired through the ethical sciences. 
8) All human beings want to live well.  Happiness, which is nothing other than living 
well, is attained by perfecting the mind's ability to attain knowledge and direct human 
action.  Thus, happiness is a life in accord with perfect intellectual and moral virtue. 
9) What is now called metaphysics, also called "first philosophy" or "wisdom" or 
"theology," concerns the most universal causes that concern all existing things.  
Metaphysics directs all other disciplines and orders them to the attainment of wisdom. 
10) Because the mind is the highest human power, living well a life of the greatest 
possible happiness requires the perfection of the mind in its ability to know the truth and 
direct human action.  Therefore, all education is ordered to human perfection, which is 
happiness. 
 According to the following statement of Aquinas, then, the arts and sciences 
constitute the core of education:  "Now all the sciences and arts are ordered to a single 
thing, namely, to man's perfection, which is happiness" (Aquinas, trans. 1995, p. xxix).  
Therefore, in order to understand what education is and how its purpose is human 
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happiness, it was necessary to explain the subject matter of the arts and sciences 
according to Aquinas.  Further because Aquinas's understanding of the arts and sciences 
is derived from the corpus of Aristotle's major works, understanding these works is 
necessary for understanding the thought of Aquinas on education.   
 These ten principles come directly out of a consideration of how Aristotle and 
Aquinas understand the arts and sciences, which govern and dictate the life of the mind 
and the method and progress of all of the education.  The nature of these arts and 
sciences, which also examine how a human being arrives at knowledge and what this 
knowledge is directed to, in turn, determine the design of a curriculum as a whole and 
instructional practices and role of the teacher.  So, given that the arts and sciences have 
now been treated in this chapter, the next chapter will focus more particularly on the 
philosophical basis for the role of the teacher in this process. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE ROLE OF THE TEACHER ACCORDING TO AQUINAS 
 The purpose of this chapter is to explicate the position of Aquinas on the role of 
the teacher as expounded in the First Part of the Summa Theologiae Question 117, Article 
1.  In this article, Aquinas asks "Whether One Man Can Teach Another."  In answering 
this question, which is based on his epistemology, light is shed on the entire process of 
education, yielding far-reaching implications for teachers and educational leaders.  This 
exposition will focus on the main point that Aquinas makes in this article: that the 
student, not the teacher, is the primary agent in the growth of the student's knowledge.  
The term "primary agent" calls for further explanation.  In any activity that involves more 
than one thing that is responsible for that activity, the primary agent (or principal agent) 
the one most responsible for that activity.  For example, when a rider directs the path of a 
horse, the horse is the primary agent of the action of the rider being carried along.  
Though the rider may direct the path of the horse, and encourage it with vocal sounds and 
kicks, the motion from point A to point B is more due to the horse than to the rider.  In 
this case, the horse is the primary agent and the rider is a secondary agent of the motion.  
Similarly, when a teacher aids a student in the growth of the student's knowledge, the 
change from ignorance to knowledge takes place within the student and is more due to 
the student than to the teacher if the learning is genuine.  Because of this, the student is 
the primary agent and the teacher is the secondary agent.   Aquinas gives two other 
examples of primary agents, which will be expounded upon in this chapter.  He compares 
the teacher to both a farmer and a doctor.  In the case of the farmer, the primary agent in 
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the growth of a plant is the plant itself; the farmer aids the growth of the plant as a 
secondary agent.  Concerning the example of the doctor who prescribes medicine, the 
patient's body is the primary agent in the process of healing; the doctor acts as a 
secondary agent.   
 Applying these examples to education, the teachers should lead students in such a 
way that the motion from ignorance to knowledge is due to the primary agency of the 
student rather than the teacher.  For example, in a class on mathematics, students rather 
than teaches should be the ones demonstrating theorems in front of the class.  To cite 
another example, it is much better for a teacher to guide a discussion among the students 
of a text of literature as opposed to the teacher expounding upon it to the students. 
 To manifest and further explain the point that the student is a primary agent, it is 
necessary to expound upon on prior principles of epistemology that Aquinas develops in 
his work on logic and natural philosophy and which constitute his method of approaching 
the question of how one person teaches another.  
Aquinas's Method 
 When Aquinas explains how the teacher is a cause of knowledge in the student, 
he uses the very method of teaching that he is explaining: dialectic.  At the beginning of 
his treatise, the Topics, Aristotle defines dialectical reasoning: "it is a dialectical 
deduction, if it reasons from reputable opinions"  (Aristotle, trans. 1984, 100a30). A 
dialectical argument is distinguished from a demonstration by the nature of the premises 
and by the degree of certitude that it produces in the knower.  A demonstration yields 
certain knowledge because its premises are either first principles or derived from first 
principles. The reasons that this kind of knowledge is so certain is that it is derived from 
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those truths which are in themselves the cause of all other truth.  Yet a dialectical 
argument is only probable because its premises are not derived from undeniable first 
principles, but from reputable opinions.  Aristotle defines "reputable opinions" as 
follows: "those opinions are reputable which are accepted by everyone or by the majority 
or by the wise–i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable of 
them"  (Aristotle, trans. 1984, 100b20-22).  In dialectic, therefore, one begins with what 
others have said.  It makes sense to examine the opinions of what most individuals think 
or what the most notable or reputable think. The reason for this is that if the wisest or the 
experts in a given field assert something, they are usually, though not always, correct.  In 
other words, there is more reason to trust those who have advanced in a field of study and 
are recognized for this than there is to trust those who are not.  Also, as will be 
manifested below, even if they are not correct, they almost always supply useful 
knowledge that one can learn a great deal from.   
 Regarding the universal question of just how one person can teach another, which 
is taken up in Question 117, Article 1, Aquinas opens with a dialectical consideration of 
his predecessors.  Referring specifically to his method, which begins with opinions, he 
says, "It should be said that concerning this question there have been various opinions" 
(Aquinas, 1941, I Q 117 A1, C). At the outset, he examines what the most reputable or 
influential thinkers have said about whether one man can teach another.  In this case, the 
two opinions he treats are those of Averroes, the Arab commentator on Aristotle, and 
Plato, Aristotle's teacher.  After examining these two opinions, Aquinas considers to what 
extent each of them conveys something useful that the teacher can benefit from.  
Subsequently, he expounds upon his own consideration of the matter, appealing to what 
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he has previously established in his works on logic and the philosophy of nature, the two 
disciplines in which his epistemology is found.1  The first expert he examines, then, is 
Averroes. 
Averroes 
 Aquinas begins his answer to the question of whether, or rather, in what respect, 
one man can teach another by examining the position of Averroes.  Because Averroes 
held, based on his interpretation of Aristotle's De Anima, that all human beings share the 
same intellect, he also held as a consequence that all share the same knowledge.  If this is 
true, then the teacher communicates to the student the very same knowledge that the 
teacher has. About this opinion, Aquinas says that although it is not the case that all share 
the selfsame intellect, what Averroes says is true insofar as the thing known is the same.  
Because of the identity or sameness of the object known, the knowledge of that object is 
in some sense the same for all:  "This opinion [that of Averroes] is true insofar as the 
knowledge in the student and the teacher is the same, if the identity of the thing known is 
considered; for the student and the teacher know the same truth of the thing in reality" 
(Aquinas, 1946, I Q117, A1, C).  For example, if both a both a geometry teacher and a 
student know that the interior angles of a triangle are equal to 180 degrees, this same 
truth of mathematics is known by the teacher and the student. 
 There is, then much truth in the opinion of Averroes.  Because truth is measured 
by the existence of things in reality, the truth that we share is the same because the thing 
                                                
 
1 St. Thomas makes no reference to "epistemology" as a philosophical discipline.  What 
is usually referred to as the epistemology of St. Thomas is found in his logical works, 
most notably his commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, and in his works on 
the soul, such as his commentary on the De Anima, which he considered part of natural 
philosophy.   
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known in reality is the same.  This turns out to be especially significant for Aquinas's 
explanation because the truth that is taught by the teacher to the student regards their 
common knowledge of the selfsame reality.  Therefore, the teacher must take steps to 
bring the student to the knowledge of the reality that the teacher knows. 
Plato 
 The second of the two opinions that Aquinas examines in this article is that of 
Plato.  The Platonists held that our souls possess knowledge from the very beginning of 
our existence by means of participation in separated forms.  So, his theory goes, human 
beings possess all intelligible species, which means that they possess an understanding of 
all existing things.  Because the soul is united with the body, however, the rational part of 
the soul, which is the mind, is hindered in its act of understanding.  According to 
Aquinas, there are two difficulties with this theory.  First, it is based on the notion that it 
is unnatural for the soul to be united to the body.  All human beings in this analysis 
would be misfits or defective beings from birth.2  But if a human being with the 
capability of reasoning and understanding is not a defective being, it does not seem likely 
that there would be a natural hindrance to knowledge which is built into us. Second, it 
seems unreasonable that we should forget things that are naturally known to us.  For 
example, the first principles, such as "the whole is greater than the part" are naturally 
known. Because they are not based on any prior argument, they are impossible to forget.  
These principles are still known as soon as the terms used to state the principles are 
                                                
 
2 That the body and soul form a natural union and that the possible intellect is in pure 
potential to intelligible species will not be fully defended here.  See Summa Theologiae I 
Q79 A2 and Q84 A3 for more complete arguments. 
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known.  For example, as soon as anyone knows what a whole pie is and what part of a pie 
is, this person immediately knows that the whole pie is greater than part of the pie. 
 It follows from the opinion of Plato that one man cannot really teach another 
because all learning is really remembering.  A teacher, then, only rouses a student to 
remember: there really is no true teaching that occurs.  Plato gives an example of this in 
the Meno, when Socrates is purportedly able to draw out of the slave boy the pre-existent 
knowledge of how to geometrically construct a square, which is double the area of 
another square simply by asking him questions.   
 Though Aquinas does not mention this specifically, there is some truth even in 
Plato's notion that all learning is recollection.  Though axiomatic first principles, such as 
"a thing cannot both and not be at the same time and in the same respect," are not 
remembered, they are naturally known in a way similar to what Plato thought.  In other 
words, these first principles are not, strictly speaking, taught to one person by another.  It 
is in the definition of a proposition that is self-evident or per se notum (known through 
itself) that it is known as soon as the terms are known.  Aquinas puts it this way: "any 
proposition is self-evident (per se nota) when the predicate is included in the notion of 
the subject, such as 'man is an animal,' for animal is included in the notion of man" 
(Aquinas, 1941, I, Q2 A1, C). Following this understanding of what it means for a 
proposition to be self-evident, all self-evident statements are necessarily known to be true 
as soon as the meaning of the terms are known.  For example, if one knows what a right 
angle is and also knows what it means for two angles to be equal, one also knows 
immediately that all right angles are equal.  This truth really cannot be taught, strictly 
speaking, because it is impossible not to know once the realities signified by the terms are 
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known.  It is upon this way of understanding self-evident statements, which is seen in 
part by Plato, that Aquinas bases his understanding of teaching. 
Aquinas on How One Person Can Teach Another 
 Aquinas separates himself from Plato, however, by saying, "the teacher does 
cause knowledge in the learner by reducing the learner from potency to act (Aquinas, 
1941, Q117 A1 C).  By "reducing the learner from potency to act," Aquinas means that 
the student starts with an ability (potency) to grow in knowledge and then comes to 
actually possess and exercise this knowledge (act).  So, being in a state of potency means 
not having knowledge, but having the ability to attain it.  Being in act means actually 
possessing knowledge.  Aquinas is saying, then, that with the help of the teacher as an 
agent, the learner can, in opposition to what Plato says, acquire and grow in knowledge.  
  To make clear just how this growth in knowledge comes about, Aquinas 
distinguishes between two different ways that an effect can proceed from an exterior 
principle or cause.  In the first way, the effect always proceeds from an exterior principle.  
For example, when a carpenter builds a house, nothing of the matter of the house is 
responsible for the form (which in this case refers to the accidental form or the orderly 
arrangement of the parts to each other).  Another way of making this same point is that if 
a carpenter arranges wood in a certain configuration, as when the frame of a house is 
built, this configuration is caused by the carpenter and not by the wood itself: the wood is 
incapable on its own of putting itself into the shape of a house.  Similarly, in all such 
cases when a rational agent (in this case a human being) builds something by means of an 
art, the materials all on their own are not capable of arranging themselves in the proper 
way: another cause is required.  Perhaps the following example will help to verify this 
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principle.  No one would look at a house and think that the house built itself.  Everyone 
knows that workers were involved in the construction of every existing house.  Aquinas's 
way of saying this is that the cause of the form of the product is exterior to the product.   
 In the second way that an effect proceeds from an exterior principle or cause, it 
sometimes comes from an exterior principle, sometimes from an interior principle.  For 
example, when a sick person is healed of an infirmity, such as a bacterial infection, this 
sometimes comes about by means of an exterior principle, as when an antibiotic kills the 
bacteria.  At other times, the effect comes about by means of an interior principle, as 
when one the body restores itself to health by fighting off the infection without an 
antibiotic.   
 Aquinas considers teaching to be like this second case rather than the first: it is 
more like a doctor giving a patient an antibiotic that helps the body's natural process than 
it is like a carpenter building a house.  Thus, the teacher acts as an exterior principle in 
cooperation with an interior principle within the student.  In addition to this, there are two 
things that should be noted in this second case which are relevant to the art of teaching.  
First, when the exterior principle operates, it brings about the effect by means of imitating 
or aiding the natural process that occurs as a result of the interior principle.  For example, 
antibiotics heal the body by eliminating an infection in the same way that the body would 
on its own: by killing the bacteria.   Second, the exterior principle does not act as the 
primary or principal agent when bringing about the effect, but works along with the 
interior principle, which is the principal agent.  For example, when a doctor prescribes 
medicine to aid the body in the process of healing, the doctor works along with the 
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interior principles of the body which are the principal causes of the restoration of health: 
the doctor is not the primary cause of the health of the body. 
 Applying this analogy to the art of teaching, the teacher, as an exterior principle, 
should consider the proper relation between the teacher and the student.  In this relation, 
the teacher aids the natural process of the student who is acting as the primary agent in 
the process of education. The implications of this understanding of education are as 
follows. 
 If the student is the primary agent in the process of education, then all students 
must possess for themselves the knowledge that pertains to the subject matter.  This 
means that for learning to take place, one must attain knowledge for oneself, always 
being able to trace advanced knowledge back to self-evident first principles.  Aquinas 
puts it this way: "For in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the 
light of the agent intellect, by which certain universal principles of all the sciences are 
naturally and immediately known from the beginning" (Aquinas, 1941, Q117 A1, C). 
One example of a universal principle of knowledge that is known by the intellect without 
any prior knowledge is that any whole is greater than any one of its parts.  As soon as the 
intellect grasps what a whole is and what one of its parts is, it is immediately known that 
the whole is greater than the part.  To cite another example, the intellect immediately 
knows that a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same way.  For 
instance, if two plus two equals four, it cannot also be true that two plus two does not 
equal four if all the terms in these two statements mean exactly the same thing in both 
cases.   
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 These universal principles, which, according to Aquinas are known by all, are 
then applied to the knowledge of particular things, the memory or experience of which is 
acquired through the senses.  In this way, one can advance from the known to the 
unknown.  Thus, all teaching and learning proceed from previous knowledge of universal 
principles. Aristotle makes this point in the very first line of the Posterior Analytics:  "All 
teaching and all intellectual learning come about from already existing knowledge"  
(Aristotle, trans. 1984, 71a1). 
 This sheds light on what it really means to have knowledge.  To cite an example 
from mathematics, if one is to know the truth that the interior angles of a triangle are 
equal to two right angles, one must be able to prove not only the theorem itself, but also 
all of the theorems that it depends upon.  One who has simply memorized this theorem 
does not really know the truth of it.  This is precisely the way that Euclid proceeds in his 
Elements.  He begins with self-evident first principles and proceeds step by step, teaching 
the student all that needs to be known to have certain knowledge of the theorem from 
principle. 
 Aquinas's epistemology, then, has far-reaching implications for the role of the 
teacher.  Practically speaking, the teacher should function as an aid, a catalyst, a 
secondary agent who directs the natural process of students who arrive at knowledge for 
themselves.  The etymology of the word "educate" points to this method.  To educate, 
educare, means "to draw out."  Rather than depositing facts and information to 
memorize, the effective teacher draws out from the student an argument that resolves to 
first principles, leading students in such a way that they see for themselves the same truth 
that the teacher sees. 
  
 
125 
How the Teacher Aids the Student 
 It has been argued that according to Aquinas, it belongs to the teacher, as a 
secondary agent, to draw out (educare) the truth from students in a way that they see this 
truth for themselves.  Yet the method for accomplishing this end has not been addressed.  
It is now necessary to supply particular examples of how the teacher aids the student.  
These are presented in summary form in the latter half of the body of  Q117 A1 of Part I 
of the Summa Theologiae.   
 A key term that is important for understanding Aquinas's position on the method 
of the teacher is the Latin manuductio, which is translated "leading by the hand." This 
word occurs in verb form in Q117 A1. Aquinas says, "the intellect of the learner is led by 
the hand (manuducitur) to a knowledge of the truth [previously] unknown" (Aquinas, 
1941, I Q117 A1, C).  When explaining this term, he says that there are two ways that the 
teacher leads the student from the known to the unknown.  These two ways will now be 
explained in detail. 
The First Way a Teacher Leads a Student From the Known to the Unknown 
Regarding the first way, he supplies four instances of how the teacher leads the student 
by the hand when teaching:  
 The teacher leads the student from the known to the unknown in two ways. First, 
by proposing to him certain aids or instruments which his intellect makes use of 
acquire knowledge; for example, when he proposes to him certain less universal 
statements which nevertheless the student can judge from previous knowledge; or 
when he proposes to him certain sensible examples, or likenesses, or opposites, or 
other things of this sort (Aquinas, 1941, I  Q117 A1, C). 
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Four Aids or Instruments 
 There are, then, four examples of aids or instruments that the teacher uses to lead 
the student by the hand from the known to the unknown which will now be explained one 
by one: 1) less universal statements, 2) sensible examples, 3) likenesses, and 4) opposites.  
Less Universal Statements 
 Because all knowledge begins with the senses, there is nothing in the intellect that 
does not in some way have a foundation in the senses. Yet, because the object of all the 
senses (the external thing that is sensed) is something particular and the object of the 
intellect is the universal, it necessarily follows that the natural way of acquiring 
knowledge is by moving from the particular to the universal.  Because we all begin with 
the particular and ascend to the universal, more particular or less universal statements are 
easier to grasp than more universal ones.  For this reason, Aquinas says that a helpful tool 
at the disposal of the teacher is the use of less universal statements.   
 For example, suppose that a teacher wanted to manifest to a student that effects in 
the natural world are easier to know than their causes. This statement, "Effects are better 
known than causes," is universal and difficult to grasp.  With the use of less universal 
statements that manifest this principle, however, it becomes much easier to see. For 
example, we know that something is so before we know why it is so.  We know that the 
ocean is salty (an effect) before we know why it is salty (the cause).  We know that it is 
cold in the winter months before we know why it is so.  We know that the moon has 
different phases before we know why.  In fact, whenever we ask the question "Why?" we 
are saying that we have knowledge of an effect and we are searching for a cause.   
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 To cite another example, the observation that the knowledge of the intellect is 
superior to the perception of the senses is difficult for some to understand. To see the 
superiority of the intellect, one is aided by less universal statements.  For example, while 
the senses can perceive only a limited number of triangles at a time, the intellect can 
know all triangles at once by knowing what a triangle is.  When the mind knows what a 
triangle is, namely a three-sided rectilinear plane figure, there is no limit to the kind or 
number of triangles that are known.  All triangles can be recognized as triangles 
regardless of the size of the angles or the ratio of the sides. This kind of knowledge, 
which includes knowing something about all triangles, is greater than knowing a limited 
number of triangles that can be perceived by the external senses of sight or touch. 
 Also, the superiority of the intellect is shown by the dominance of the animal 
kingdom by human beings.  Most animals have sense powers superior to those of human 
beings.  But because human beings have an intellect, they dominate the animals with 
superior physical endowments.  Eagles can see much better than humans, yet we subdue 
eagles; they do not subdue us.  Dogs have superior hearing and smell, but humans train 
dogs, not the reverse.  So, the general truth that the intellect is superior to the senses can 
be manifested by supplying less universal statements that display more clearly particular 
elements of superiority. 
Sensible Examples 
 It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the use of examples in the art of 
teaching.  Because we always know the universal through the particular and the purely 
intelligible through the sensible, one of the best ways for a teacher to aid a student in the 
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understanding of a universal and non-sensible principle is by means of a sensible 
example. 
 Example may be defined as a particular part of a universal whole that represents 
that whole.  To manifest this definition as an aid to supplying good examples, it is helpful 
to examine the common etymology of and relationship between the words "example" and 
"sample."  Both are derived from the Old French word essample which in turn comes 
from the Latin word exemplum, which is a derivative of eximere, which means "to take 
out."  Both samples and examples, then, are parts "taken out" of wholes.  A sample is part 
of a composed whole, which is a sensible whole that is composed of and equal to the sum 
of its parts.  For example, when a vendor offers a sample of cheese from a large wheel, he 
is giving the buyer a part of the whole so that he will better know what the whole is like.  
At a wine tasting, those who taste a small amount of wine are receiving a sample 
indicative of the quality of the entire barrel from which the sample was taken.  A sample, 
then, is part of a composed whole which exists for the purpose of knowing the whole. 
 Similarly, an example is a part of a whole that exists for the sake of knowing the 
whole.  There is, however, an important difference between a sample and an example.  
An example is part of a universal whole, not a composed whole.  Whereas the composed 
whole can be sensed and is nothing other than the sum of its parts, the universal whole is 
not sensible, but only intelligible, and is not composed of its parts.3  Rather, it is more 
than the sum of its parts.  For example, the genitive case is something more than and 
different from all the words that can be in the genitive case.  Simply listing all the words 
that are in this case would not be an adequate explanation of what the case is.  The 
                                                
3 The common expression, "The whole is greater than the sum of its parts" is said in 
reference to the universal whole. 
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essence of the genitive is something beyond this mere sum.  To know what the genitive 
case is, one must make use of examples of it, namely phrases or sentences that use 
individual words that are in the genitive case.  Similarly, to make known a universal truth 
that cannot be sensed, one should make use of parts of the whole or particular instances 
of a universal truth that can be sensed and imagined.  
 Aquinas was a master at this.  His examples of very difficult philosophical 
principles were sensible and imaginable instances that allowed the student to grasp the 
universal.  In the following examples, he supplies instances of things that we have all 
sensed.   
1)  "subsequent movers move only insofar as they are put in motion by the first 
movers, as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand"  
(Aquinas, 1941, I Q2 A3, C). 
2)  "whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by 
some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as when the arrow is 
shot to the mark by its archer"  (Aquinas, 1941, I Q2 A3, C). 
3)  "Now that the past should not have been implies a contradiction.  For as it 
implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting and is not sitting, so 
does it to say that he sat and did not sit"    (Aquinas, 1941, I Q25 A4, C). 
 A good example, then, leads the student from ignorance to knowledge by 
supplying a particular part of a universal whole that can be easily sensed and imagined.  
Thus, a good teacher, like Aquinas, follows the natural road in our knowledge from the 
particular and sensible to the universal and intelligible. 
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Likenesses 
 When introducing something unfamiliar, it is helpful to draw a likeness to 
something that is closer to one's experience.  Such a comparison can go a long way in 
explaining the nature of something that is unknown.  This comparison need not, and in 
fact cannot, be alike in every respect.  It need only bear a striking similarity.  When he is 
explaining the knowledge of the beatific vision, which is his understanding of how God is 
known in heaven after death, Aquinas uses a likeness: he says that when we see God, we 
also see all created things, just as when we see a mirror, we see both the mirror and the 
objects it reflects, as by one image: 
 Through one image, a mirror and those things that appear in the mirror, are seen.  
But all things are seen in God as in a kind of intelligible mirror.Therefore, if God 
Himself is not seen through some kind of similitude, but through His very 
essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen through certain similitudes or 
images  (Aquinas, 1941, I  Q12, A9, SC). 
The vision of God is a supernatural participation in His knowledge.  God's knowledge, 
however, is different from ours in the sense that He receives nothing from outside of 
Himself.  He knows all things through the one and simple act of knowing Himself.  
Therefore, our participation in God's knowledge of Himself also includes the knowledge 
of all of creation, just as our vision of a mirror includes all things that are in the mirror.  
So, just as we see a mirror and what is in it in one image, so also, we see God and 
creation at once. 
 Because the vision of God is entirely unfamiliar to us, it belongs to the teacher to 
lead the student by a likeness that is much easier to grasp.  Everyone can understand that 
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when one looks at a mirror, one sees the mirror itself and everything in the mirror at the 
same time.  So also, when one sees God, one also sees all that He has made, for all things 
pre-exist in Him in the unity and simplicity of His essence. 
Opposites 
 Because of the weakness of the human mind, it is often difficult or impossible to 
understand things without also understanding their opposites.  By way of contrast, the 
thing in consideration becomes more clear.  For example, headlights seem brightest at 
night. Because of this, to grasp fully the intensity and power of a light, one ought to 
examine it in the darkest conditions, so that by contrast the light may be investigated 
more easily.  Aquinas puts it this way: "Now everything is known the more for being 
compared with its contrary, because when contraries are placed beside one another, they 
become more conspicuous" (Aquinas, 1941, Supplement, Q94 A2). 
 In fact, there are some things that cannot be understood without also 
understanding their opposites.  For example, what it means for the number 4 to be double 
2 cannot be understood without also understanding what it means for 2 to be half of 4.  
Darkness cannot be understood without reference to light; and blindness cannot be 
understood without reference to sight.   Also, because the natural virtues are always 
means between two extremes, a virtue cannot be known without also knowing the vices 
opposed to it.  It is impossible to understand courage without also understanding its 
deficiency, which is cowardice, and its excess, which is rashness. Temperance, which 
governs the right amount of food and drink, cannot be understood without also 
understanding how much food and drink is excessive and how much is deficient. 
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 Because of the necessity of appealing to opposites, it is often advantageous to a 
teacher to begin with one opposite as opposed to another.  Convincing someone that 
government is natural and good can be a difficult task.  Yet it is easier to see that anarchy 
is bad.  And if anarchy is bad, then some form of government must be good.  Likewise, it 
is easier to see that solitary confinement is bad than it is to see that a human being by 
nature is a social being.  But if forced solitary confinement is bad, then some kind of 
society has to be good.   
 Plutarch gives an insightful example of the importance of appealing to opposites 
in his life, Demetrius, where he justifies his inclusion of the lives of not only those pre-
eminent in virtue, but also those notorious for their vices:  "we shall be all the more 
zealous and more emulous to read, observe, and imitate the better lives, if we are not left 
in ignorance of the blameworthy and the bad"  (Plutarch, trans. 1952, p. 726).  
Elaborating on his choice to do this he says, "both in the arts and with our senses we 
examine opposites . . . Medicine, to produce health, has to examine disease, and music, to 
create harmony, must investigate discord; and the supreme arts of justice, and of wisdom, 
as they are acts of judgment and selection, [are] exercised not on good and just and 
expedient only, but also on wicked, unjust, and inexpedient objects . . ."  (Plutarch, trans. 
1952, p. 726).   Plutarch is contending here that our knowledge of one thing often 
depends on the knowledge of its opposite.   
 Perhaps the most conspicuous uses of the tool of opposites in Aquinas is that in 
the Summa Theologiae, he never fails to argue a position without first taking up 
objections contrary to it.  The reason for this is that his position comes out much more 
clearly when it is tested by the examination of contrary arguments.  One is really never in 
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complete possession of a position unless arguments on the opposite side can be answered.  
For this reason, it is essential to the role of teachers that they not only advance one side of 
an issue, but also consider the opposing side.  Aquinas puts it this way in his commentary 
on the Gospel of John:  "There are two things that pertain to the office of a teacher: to 
instruct the devout or sincere, and to repel opponents"  (Aquinas, 1980, Lectio 1, p. 9) 
The expression "repel opponents" should not be taken as an approval of violence.  It 
simply means that objections should be addressed. 
 The first of the two ways that a teacher leads a student from ignorance to 
knowledge, then, is by means of these four aids or instruments or tools of manuductio.    
Moving From Principles to Conclusions 
 The second way is that the teacher leads the student from things that he already 
knows to the truth which was previously unknown.  Aquinas explains this second way as 
follows: 
 In another way, by strengthening the intellect of the learner . . . inasmuch  as he 
proposes to the student the order of principles to conclusions, who  by his own 
strength would not have enough collative power to deduce  conclusions from the 
principles.  Hence the Philosopher says that "a demonstration is a syllogism that 
causes knowledge"  (Posterior Analytics I.2).  In this way a demonstrator causes 
his hearer to know (Aquinas, 1941, I  Q117 A1, C). 
This second way that a teacher leads a student, then, is by showing how one moves from 
a principle to the knowledge of a conclusion by means of a demonstration.  In the very 
first line of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle supplies a principle that governs how this is 
done: "All teaching and all intellectual learning come about from already existing 
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knowledge" (Aristotle, trans. 1984, 71a10).  When a teacher shows a student how a 
principle leads to a conclusion, then, it must be by using knowledge that a student already 
has.  Aristotle supplies an excellent example of how to do this in Book I of the 
Nicomachean Ethics when he argues to the definition of happiness.  Since this 
dissertation argues that education is ordered to happiness, this argument will be 
developed in detail here. 
 If Aristotle follows this method of deducing a conclusion from a principle, then he 
must begin with a principle.  Further, this principle, as well as any other premises that are 
necessary for deducing a conclusion, must be manifested by appealing to a knowledge 
that the student already has. In other words, the teacher must appeal to the knowledge of 
common experience, or common conceptions about the way things are that are accessible 
to everyone.  These common conceptions are what Aristotle calls "pre-existent 
knowledge."  They are self-evident principles which are per se nota or "known through 
themselves."   Aquinas bases his entire philosophy of education on this point:  in order to 
know something in a way that perfects the human mind, one must be able to resolve all 
knowledge to self-evident principles or pre-existent knowledge.  In this way, teachers 
proceed in such a way to act as secondary agents who bring the student to the same 
knowledge that they themselves have.  This is what Aristotle does in Book I of the Ethics.  
This method for teaching his students about the true nature of happiness will now be 
traced as an example of Aquinas's second method of teaching: showing the "order of 
principles to conclusions." 
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  Aristotle begins the Ethics with an examination of the final end or purpose of 
human life.  He argues that the final end of human beings must be the chief or highest 
good as follows: 
 If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire forits own sake 
(everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose 
everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on 
to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the 
good and the chief good (Aristotle, trans. 1984, 1094a 18-23). 
Aristotle is saying here that, if we have a final end, it has to be such that we desire 
everything else for the sake of it, yet we do not desire it for the sake of anything else. For 
if we desired it for the sake of something else, it would not be a final end.  Further, there 
must be some final end of our desire.  If there were not, then all of our desires would be 
in vain, being for the sake of other desires, which are in turn for the sake of other desires, 
and so on to infinity.  Thus, none of these desires would be satisfied and all of our natural 
desires would be in vain.  And because the good is defined as what all desire, our final 
end must be the chief good. Having established that human beings have a final end, 
which is the chief good, he goes on to argue that one ought to determine what this chief 
good is.  
 Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, 
like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what we 
should?  If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is (Aristotle, 
trans. 1984, 1094a 23-26). 
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Aristotle is saying here that if one is to attain the end that all desire, which is the chief 
good for human nature, we should determine what this good is so that we will be more 
likely to attain it.  Incidentally, this example shows that the two methods of the teacher 
enumerated by Aquinas are used in conjunction with each other.  Here he is using a 
sensible example of an archer shooting at a target to show that knowledge of the end is 
necessary for attaining it.  An archer, for example, is much more likely to hit a target by 
aiming at it than by shooting arrows at random. 
 The next question to answer is "What is the highest of all goods achievable by 
action?"  (1095a16). This is the most important question concerning human life, for the 
chief or highest good of human nature is human happiness; it is living well; it is human 
flourishing in the fullest sense.  A sign that that it is living well or flourishing in the 
fullest sense is that happiness is not desired for the sake of some other goal.  Although 
everyone desires happiness, no one desires happiness so that this happiness may be used 
for something else.  One never says, "I want to be happy so that . . ." but simply, "I want 
to be happy."  Aristotle expounds upon this point in Book I, Chapter 7 of the Ethics:   
 Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more complete than that 
which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never 
desirable for the sake of something else more complete than the things that are 
desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we 
call complete without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and 
never for the sake of something else.  Now such a thing happiness, above all else,  
 is held to be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of 
something else  (Aristotle, trans. 1984, 1097a30- 1097b1). 
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Happiness, then, appears to be the chief and highest good attainable by human beings; for 
we desire all else for the sake of happiness, but we do not desire happiness for the sake of 
anything else.  At this point, Aristotle has supplied only a nominal definition of happiness 
by equating it with our highest or chief good.  It remains to say what exactly this chief 
good or happiness is. 
 He begins by saying that there is widespread agreement that happiness, which is 
identified with living well, is our highest good.  There is no widespread agreement, 
however, about what happiness is.  He says, "Verbally there is very general agreement; 
for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, 
and identify living well and faring well with being happy; but with regard to what 
happiness is they differ" (p. 1095a20). A definition of happiness, then is needed. To 
establish this definition, Aristotle continues the method that Aquinas calls showing the 
"order of principles to conclusions."  To do so, he makes the following argument. 
 
First premise:  The highest good of each thing is excellence of in accord with its unique 
activity. 
Second premise:  The unique human activity is the use of reason. 
Conclusion:  The highest human good is excellence in accord with the activity of reason. 
 
In this argument, the first premise is the principle required to conclude that the chief or 
highest human good, which is his happiness, is excellence in accord with the activity of 
reason.  Aristotle demonstrates the order of this principle to the conclusion by showing 
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the truth of the principle through the use of examples that are obvious to everyone.  He 
proceeds as follows.   
 Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, 
and a clearer account of what it is is still desired.  This might perhaps be given, if 
we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as a for a flute-player, a 
sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or 
activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the function, so would it 
seem to be for man, if he has a function.  Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner 
certain functions or activities and man has none?  Is he naturally functionless? 
 Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, 
may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these 
(Aristotle, trans. 1984, 1097b 23-32)? 
Aristotle's argument here is that the good of artists such as flute players and sculptors 
resides in their activity or function.  For example, a good flute player is one who plays 
the flute well; a good sculptor is one who is good at making statues; a good carpenter is 
one who builds well; a good tanner is one who tans hides well.  These examples are 
things that everyone knows because they are self-evident.  In other words, as soon as one 
knows what a flute player is, he also knows that a good flute player is one who plays the 
flute well.  After citing numerous examples that no one can deny, he applies these 
examples to a more universal case.  
 If, in all the examples given, a good "such and such" is one who performs his 
activity well, it must be that a good human being is one who performs human nature's 
unique activity well.  This is seen more easily when the function of the different parts of 
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human beings are examined.  For it is clear that the highest good of an eye is to see well, 
and highest good of a hand is to grasp well. So the truth of the first premise is clear: the 
highest good of each thing is excellence in accord with its unique activity.  Yet it makes 
no sense to say that each of the parts of a whole has a function, but the whole, which is 
the nature of man, has no function or activity at all.  It remains to determine, then, what 
the function or unique activity of s human being is as a whole. 
 Thus, in the second premise Aristotle asserts that this unique activity of human 
beings is the use of reason.  He shows this as follows: 
 What then can this [i.e. an activity proper to man as man] be? Life seems to be 
common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us 
exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth.  Next there would be a life of 
perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every 
animal.  There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational 
principle (1097b32-1098a4). 
In this passage, Aristotle argues that a human being's unique activity is reason.  He shows 
this by comparing human beings to other living things: plants and animals.  A function or 
activity that is peculiarly and uniquely human cannot be a function or activity that a 
human beings share with other living things.  Human beings grow, but plants do as well; 
so this cannot be a uniquely human activity.  Human beings have sense perception, but so 
do horses and oxen; so neither can this be a uniquely human activity.  However, human 
beings have a rational principle or an ability to reason that the other living things do not 
share.  This, then, must be the uniquely human activity. 
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 Now that the two premises have been established, the conclusion can be drawn.  If 
the highest good of each thing is excellence in accord with its unique activity and if the 
unique activity of human beings is reason, it necessarily follows that the highest good of 
human beings is excellence in accord with the use of reason.  Aristotle presents the 
conclusion this way:  "Now if the function of man is an activity of soul in accordance 
with, or not without, rational principle . . . human good turns out to be activity of soul in 
conformity with excellence [virtue], and if there are more than one excellence [virtue], in 
conformity with the best and most complete"  (Aristotle, trans. 1984, 1098a7-8 and 
1098a17-18).     
 Human good, or happiness, then, is a an activity of the soul in conformity with 
excellence or virtue.  Aristotle is saying that if one is to attain human happiness, then one 
must direct one's life in accord with reason and live in conformity with excellence or 
virtue.  The highest human good, therefore, is virtuous activity.  The remainder of the 
Ethics is devoted to showing more precisely what virtue consists in. 
 The second method of teaching according to Aquinas, then, is to show students 
"the order of principles to conclusions," so that students themselves have the ability to 
deduce conclusions from the principles.  To manifest this process fully, an extended 
example from Book I of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics was supplied where he uses the 
twofold method of the teacher by using both the tools of manuductio and the manner of 
deducing conclusions from premises.  This was chosen as an example because Aquinas 
says that all the arts and sciences in education are ordered to happiness. To understand 
what this statement means, the meaning of happiness must be explained.  This 
demonstrates a practical example of applying Aquinas's principles in a universal way: 
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Aristotle draws on common experiences and appeals only to natural knowledge to reach 
his conclusion.   
  
  
 
142 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: THE RELEVANCE OF AQUINAS'S  
THEORY OF EDUCATION FOR EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
 Since education is a practical concern in the sense that it necessarily entails 
planning and executing a series of steps for the purpose of attaining an intended result,  
any discussion of Aquinas's theory of education would be incomplete without an 
examination of how this theory could be applied to the role of educational leaders who 
design curricula and shape instructional practice.  Granting, then, the necessity of 
leadership in any endeavor where many individuals are directing themselves to a 
common goal, it is important to address the significance of the findings of this 
dissertation for these educational leaders.   The reason for this is that the understanding of 
education as a whole influences the teacher-student relationship, which in turn influences 
the decisions of educational leaders concerning curriculum development and instructional 
practice. 
The Importance of Considering Philosophy When Designing a Curriculum 
 Because philosophy grounds educational leaders as significant decision-makers 
regarding educational content and process (curriculum and instruction systems), it is 
important to examine how this affects the ways that curriculum can be implemented and 
the different facets of curriculum influenced by philosophy.  In his article, Philosophy as 
a Basis for Curriculum Decisions, Ornstein (1990) says, "Philosophy provides educators, 
especially curriculum specialists with a framework for organizing schools and 
classrooms" (p. 5).   He continues, "Philosophy provides them with a framework for 
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broad issues and tasks, such as determining the goals of education, subject content and its 
organization, the process of teaching and learning, and in general, what experiences and 
activities to stress in schools and classrooms"  (p. 5).  
 Hopkins (1941), a groundbreaking specialist in the area of the relationship of 
philosophy to curriculum puts it this way:  "Philosophy has entered into every important 
decision that has ever been made about curriculum and teaching in the past and will 
continue to be the basis for of every important decision in the future. . . . There is rarely a 
moment in a school day when a teacher is not confronted with occasions where 
philosophy is a vital part of action"  (p. 198).  Philosophical principles, then, govern the 
design of curriculum regarding such things as intended outcomes and what is taught and 
why.  Without the attention to philosophy, questions about what is being done and why 
cannot be answered. 
 Another foundational thinker in curriculum design, Goodlad (1979), points out 
that philosophy is the starting point in decisions made about curriculum and guides all 
subsequent decisions.  According to Ornstein (1990), philosophy determines the "aims, 
means, and ends of curriculum" (p. 6).   
 In their book, Curriculum : Foundations, Principles, and Theory, Ornstein and 
Hunkins (1998) observe that with regard to curriculum,  educational philosophies affect 
such things as instructional objectives, theories of knowledge, the role of the teacher, 
curriculum focus, and curriculum trends (p. 56).  Without attending to the philosophy of 
education, then curriculum development and design will run the risk of proceeding on 
assumptions that have been accepted without question or critical examination.  As 
Ornstein and Hunkins point out, one cannot avoid a set of philosophical principles on the 
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basis of which to proceed.  The only question is as to whether these principles will be 
examined, supported, and defended by those who design curricula. 
 The next question that inevitably arises is how to implement a curricular policy 
based on attention to philosophical principles.  Cohen (2005) points out that the more 
collaboration there is between faculty and administration, the more likely curricular 
changes will be successful.  Also important to take into account are the systems and 
culture in place at the institution.  Whether systems afford a ready opportunity for change 
and whether there is a culture of resistance to change are questions that should be 
examined.   
 Also important is the consideration of what kind of curriculum is currently in 
place and how this compares to a curriculum that would be influenced by a conscious and 
focal commitment to philosophical principles.  Whether consciously or unconsciously, 
there are almost always philosophical convictions underlying curricula that are in place.  
Ornstein and Hunkins (1998) have categorized curricula into three philosophical bases 
that predominate: realism, idealism, and pragmatism.  Realism seeks to educate the 
rational person by cultivating the intellect.  Idealism aims at educating the person for the 
sake of competency.  Pragmatism promotes democratic social living with an emphasis on 
social reform.  If one of these three predominate, a change to another philosophical 
system would present challenges.   
 One recommendation to remedy the potential obstacles to curricular reform based 
on an attention to philosophical principles is to open a dialogue between those 
specializing in educational leadership and organizational change on the one hand and 
those specializing in philosophical principles on the other.  Bringing these two disciplines 
  
 
145 
together in a confab has the potential for making a significant change for the better.  The 
reason for this is that those specializing in philosophy concentrate on theory and those 
specializing in education concentrate on practice.   
 It is only by combining theory and practice, however, that realistic and efficacious 
changes can be made.  Organizations like the Center for Ethics and Education 
(ethicsandeducation.wceruw.org) are doing just this.  Their mission statement is "to foster 
and support work that brings the tools and perspectives of moral and political philosophy 
to bear on issues of educational policy and practice"  (ethicsandeducation.org, 2015).  
The advantage of theorists convening with practitioners affords the greatest possible 
prospect for accomplishing meaningful and significant change at the level of 
implementing curricula whose design is based on philosophical principles. 
 One suggestion for realizing this ideal is to begin with conferences that bring 
philosophers and educational leaders for the purpose of opening up communication 
between these two disciplines which historically have been bifurcated.  It is only by 
connecting the insights of these two fields that a realistic prospect for change can become 
a reality. 
Teachers as Leaders 
 An important consideration regarding the relevance of the philosophy of 
education for educational leadership is that teachers themselves can be considered 
leaders.  Aquinas seems to imply this by saying that the teacher leads the student by the 
hand: "the intellect of the learner is led by the hand (manuducitur) to a knowledge of the 
truth [previously] unknown" (Aquinas, 1941, I Q117 A1, C).  It is important to clarify, 
then, the role that the teacher has as a leader. 
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 It may seem at first that manuductio or "leading by the hand" de-emphasizes the 
active role of the student in the process of learning.  This metaphor, however, could be 
understood in the context of Aquinas's understanding of the role of students as the 
principal agents in their attainment of knowledge.  The two comparisons that Aquinas 
uses to describe the role of the teacher discussed in Chapter 5 are the doctor and the 
farmer.  In both cases, a natural process whose primary cause is outside the one being 
compared to the teacher is at work.  When the doctor heals with medicine, the primary 
cause of healing is in the patient.  So also, when the farmer cultivates crops the primary 
cause of growth is in the plants themselves.  Likewise, even when the teacher leads the 
student by the hand, the primary cause of learning is not in the teacher, but in the student.   
 This notion that the student is the primary agent of growth in knowledge is 
alluded to in the rest of the quotation in which the term manuductio or "leading by the 
hand" occurs.  For Aquinas says that the student is led by the hand "to a knowledge of the 
truth unknown."  Before explaining how this indicates that the primary agent of the 
growth in knowledge is in the student, it must first be explained what it means to gain  
knowledge of the truth unknown. 
 In the epistemology of Aristotle and Aquinas, frequent references are made to a 
learner moving from the known to the unknown.  This language is obscure and can be 
easily misunderstood because it sounds like the learner is losing knowledge: going from 
the state of knowing to the state of not knowing, or moving from knowledge to 
ignorance.  It must be explained, therefore, what it means to move from the known to the 
unknown and why Aquinas would describe learning in this way.  In the course of this 
explanation, it will be made clear how moving from the known to the unknown 
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necessitates that the primary cause of growth in knowledge be in the student and not in 
the teacher. 
 To explain what it means to move from the known to the unknown, the first step 
is to arrive at a general sense of what is meant.  Aquinas either means that the learner is 
moving from knowledge to ignorance or from ignorance to knowledge.  The first 
possibility can be eliminated fairly easily.  It would be absurd to say that to fulfill the 
duty of teaching, a teacher leads a student by causing ignorance.  There must be some 
way, then, that this passage describes the way that a teacher helps a student move from 
ignorance to knowledge.   
 When moving from ignorance to knowledge, two possibilities arise concerning 
how this process occurs.  The first possibility is that ignorance itself is a means to 
acquiring knowledge.  This certainly cannot be the case. For example, suppose that 
someone happens to be ignorant of the square footage of a room, but wants to acquire this 
knowledge.  One could never use complete ignorance area as a means to grow in the 
knowledge of area.  If this is the case, then it must be that the acquiring of new 
knowledge is brought about by means of something already known. In so doing, the 
student moves from the known to the unknown in the sense that the knowledge of what 
was previously unknown is acquired by means of what the student already knows.  In 
other words, a true growth in knowledge builds on what is already known.  To continue 
the example, a student could come to the knowledge of the square footage of a room by 
knowing the length and the width.  From the previous knowledge of the length and width 
of a room, the new knowledge of the square footage can be attained. It is the role of the 
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teacher to show how the knowledge of length and width can be used to come to a 
knowledge of area: by multiplying the length by the width.  
 Once the student sees not only that multiplying the length by the width results in 
the area, but also why this is so, new knowledge of what was previously unknown has 
been acquired.  It is precisely because the student has been led from what was previously 
known to the attainment of new knowledge that the student is an active participant and 
not a passive recipient of this knowledge.  The student now possesses the knowledge in 
the manner that the teacher does and, at least in principle, can demonstrate this 
knowledge.  This is accomplished by going through the same steps, acquired with the 
help of the teacher  that were initially used to attain the knowledge.   
Practical Examples of Applying Thomistic Principles in Core Disciplines 
 Considering educational leaders who are responsible for curriculum design and 
the instructional practice that necessarily goes along with it, these general principles will 
now be applied to four specific disciplines for the purpose of offering possibilities for 
their practical implementation: literature, history, mathematics, and science. 
Literature 
 Given that students should be taught in such a way that they take as active a part 
in their education as possible, the goal for teaching literature is that students become 
perceptive readers, accurate interpreters, and sound critics of great literary works in such 
a way that they can engage in these activities for themselves.   
 To this end, it is far preferable to read complete works from fewer authors that to 
read shorter quotations or selections from a greater number of authors.  The reason for 
this is that reading great works in their entirety fulfills the ends of growing in the 
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knowledge of literature much better than reading excerpts or selected passages.  Given 
equal amounts of time, the student of drama, for example, will profit much more from 
reading the Antigone from beginning to end that from reading selections from a grouping 
of several Greek plays.  Likewise, reading one complete epic is far better than reading 
one-fifth of five different epics.   The same goes for novels, short stories, and all other 
kinds of fiction.  The chief reasons for this are as follows. 
 A literary work, by its very nature, is a whole.  It has a beginning, a middle, and 
an end.  As such, it was written by its author with the intention that it be read from 
beginning to end. One cannot be a true student of literary works except by reading 
literary works.  When a student of fiction reads only part of a novel, this is tantamount to 
student of architecture seeing only the lower half of a facade or a student of painting 
seeing only one corner of the canvas.  In none of these cases is the student in any position 
to benefit from the piece of art in the way that the artist intended. 
  Universally, those who love and appreciate fiction insist on seeing the entire 
work.  No casual moviegoer arrives at the theater to watch part of a movie, and no lover 
of the novel is satisfied reading only select chapters.  If the amateur insists on an 
appreciation of the whole, the serious student should insist on it even more because the 
serious student aims at a much greater kind of appreciation.  
 The reason for this is that one of the main goals of studying literature in 
institutions of higher learning is that the students become better readers and critics of 
literary works.  Reading these works in their entirety is the indispensible first step in 
acquiring this ability. Two of the most fundamental questions when examining a work of 
fiction are as follows. a) What was the author's goal in writing this work?  b) Did he 
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accomplish this goal?  In order to answer these questions, the work must be read from 
start to finish.  No student can grow in his or her habits of reading and critiquing fiction 
without actually engaging in this practice on a regular basis.  For these habits require 
such things as referring to any given part of the work, quoting from it, and addressing the 
character development, the succession of events, and the resolution of the plot.  The 
student who does not read the whole work will lack this ability and be less equipped to 
enter into a principled and intelligent discussion than the casual reader who peruses the 
novel for enjoyment.   
 In addition to the ability to analyze works of literature intelligently, one should 
not discount the formative effect of reading.  Literature profits not only the intellect, but 
also the emotions and the imagination.  The emotional effect of a work in any genre can 
be realized in the reader only by reading a work from beginning to end: the cathartic 
effect of a play is designed to come about gradually throughout the experience of the 
successive events of the story. 
 In addition to specifically literary purposes that are accomplished by reading 
complete works, an array of other intellectual disciplines are nurtured by this practice.  
An important goal of the study of great works is being able to speak and write about these 
works in an intelligent and persuasive way.  In order to write an effective essay on a work 
in any discipline, one must, at the bare minimum, have read the work in question.  One 
cannot possibly assert, explain, and defend a position on a subject connected with a work 
of history or philosophy or science convincingly or effectively without having read the 
work he is writing about.  Making effective textual arguments concerning fictional works 
trains the student to do this in other disciplines. 
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History 
 Following Thomistic principles, the study of history should be approached in such 
a way that students themselves take an active a role in their learning in such a way that 
they can verify directly as much as possible.  To accomplish this goal, the focus should 
be on first-hand experiences and direct evidence for historical claims rather than on the 
kind of second-hand or third-hand accounts related in many textbooks.  Rather than using 
a re-telling of events, accounts written by those who experienced the events themselves 
should be studied as much as possible.  Just as in a criminal trial, eye-witness testimony 
is of far more value than that of someone who talked to an eye-witness, so also a 
historical account penned by someone who partook of the event in question is more 
reliable than a report which is related indirectly. 
 Granting this, engaging in culturally enriching activities such as viewing or 
handling artifacts, using tools, eating the food, and following the customs of other 
cultures separated by time or distance is a way to enhance the sensory experience that 
impresses itself uniquely on the imagination and intellect of the student. 
 Along these same lines, visiting historical sites in person affords a unique 
experience for the student of history that cannot be replaced by a written description or 
even a video presentation.  Walking a battlefield, entering a home of a historical figure, 
or laying eyes on an original document supply direct sensory experience of significant 
surroundings that shape our current experiences.  Because, according to the Aristotelian-
Thomistic schema, all knowledge begins with sensation, direct experiences are of far 
greater value in forming thoughts and lasting memories of past events.   
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 Original documents that shaped political history are preferable to summaries or 
interpretations of these documents.  The reason for this is parallel to the reason that one 
should begin with self-evident first principles in the scientific disciplines.  Founding 
documents form the basis for the subsequent formulation of laws and the development of 
customs.  Seeing these directly allows students themselves to state, support, and defend a 
position concerning whether the formulation of policy follows or departs from principles 
of rule and governance. It also allows them to trace the development of further ideas from 
their inception. 
Mathematics 
 Given the Thomistic principle that the kind of knowledge that truly perfects the 
mind can always be traced back to undeniable and self-evident principles, mathematics 
should follow the same method of beginning with axioms and then proceeding by way of 
proof to demonstrate what the human mind can know about quantity.  Excellent examples 
of these axioms are found in the common notions of the Elements of Euclid (fl. c. 300 
B.C.).  These common notions are as follows. 
 1. Things which are equal to the same thing are also equal to one   
  another. 
 2. If equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal. 
 3. If equals be subtracted from equals, the remainders are equal. 
 4. Things which coincide with one another are equal to one another. 
 5. The whole is greater than the part   (Euclid, trans. 1956,  p. 155). 
The essential notion behind these axioms is that the truth of the axiom is known as soon 
as the terms are known.  Thus, no proof or argument is needed to know them.  For 
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example, as soon as someone hears Common  Notion #5 above, namely that the whole is 
greater than the part, the truth of the statement is immediately known.  A small child, for 
example, knows that a whole cookie is larger than part of that cookie.  This principle 
arises over and over again in mathematics: it is implicit in every operation of addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, and division.  For example, to understand that 2+2=4, one 
must also understand that the whole number 4 is greater than 2, which is part of 4.   
 In the study of mathematics, then, to proceed according to Aristotelian-Thomistic 
principles, one should begin with the axioms and then build the science logically by 
proving every theorem using the axioms as a foundation.  Thus, every fact of 
mathematics one should know either because it is an axiom or because it has been argued 
from the axioms.  In this way, the science of mathematics will proceed in a way that it 
really perfects the mind.   
 To cite a familiar example, the Pythagorean theorem is paramount in most 
textbooks of geometry.  Its use is required on the SAT and GRE.  However, most 
geometry textbooks do not present a proof of the theorem.  It is merely postulated for the 
purpose of applying to solve practical problems.  In this case, the student does not really 
know that the theorem is true.  It is merely accepted and applied.  In Euclid's Elements, 
however, the theorem is demonstrated in such a way that its truth can be supported with 
rigorous arguments that resolve to clear and obvious principles.  Because of this, the truth 
of the theorem can be explained fully and defended against those who object to it.  
Without proof, however, the student of geometry is simply incapable of addressing those 
who may challenge the truth of the theorem.  Without the ability to explain and defend 
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the facts upon which calculations are based, applications become mindless exercises 
without foundation or support.  
Science 
 Following the principle that knowledge begins with what can be sensed and that it 
proceeds from what is easier to know to what is harder to know, the study of science 
should begin with what is easiest to know and verify by sense experience.  In this way, 
the student will come to a knowledge of the natural world following the order of 
discovery.  For example, in the study of astronomy, a teacher could proceed by way of 
observation experiments that follow the same methods by which original discoveries 
were made.  In this way, the truths of astronomy will be known first-hand in a way that 
can be verified and supported by experience.   
 To cite one particular case, it would be quite easy for a teacher to tell a student, or 
to induce that student to read in a textbook, that the sphere of fixed stars revolves around 
the North Star.  The student might docket this information, committing it to memory.  If 
the student has no direct experience of this phenomenon, however, there is really no 
knowledge of it.  The student merely believes what the teacher or the textbook says.  In 
contrast, if the teacher were to give the student the assignment of noting the position of 
several constellations with respect to the North Star, and then observing these same 
constellations each evening in their relative position to the same star, the student will 
shortly have made this same discovery on his or her own.  In this case, hearsay is traded 
for an eyewitness account, belief for knowledge, and passive receptivity for active 
participation (Fine, 2010).  This knowledge can be explained, supported, and defended.  
It can be verified and elaborated upon.  The student has been taught how to think, not 
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been told what to think.  Using this same process, a great many other things about the 
stars can be discovered and known first hand.  The student has acquired skills of 
observation and deduction that can be applied and developed in the science of astronomy 
and in other disciplines.  Without this exercise, the student merely has an unverified 
account to memorize and to forget.  Applying the epistemological principles of Aristotle 
and St. Thomas, then, can yield abundant fruit in the intellectual growth of the student. 
The Relevance of These Principles for Educational Leadership 
 Now that some applications of these principles have been presented regarding 
specific disciplines, it remains to discuss their relevance for leadership more generally.  
Though leadership broadly speaking falls outside the scope of the research for this 
dissertation, suggestions for possible implications can be made.  In addition to individual 
teachers being the foremost leaders who have direct contact with students and influence 
them on a day-to-day basis, the shaping of the intellectual culture of the institution as a 
whole falls to those who play a larger role in the administration.  The collegiality of the 
faculty as a whole, for instance, is fostered by the common intellectual ideals that are 
clarified and reiterated by school-wide leaders.  The current literature has much to offer 
regarding the efficacy of leaders who ensure institutional health and sustainability. 
 Elmore (2004), in School Reform from the Inside Out, states that the first principle 
of distributed leadership is the improvement of instructional practice.  Following this 
principle, the primary duty of an educational leader is to improve learning in the 
classroom.  Granting this, educational leadership thrives when those in the highest 
positions of leadership share in the duties of teaching.  In this way, contrary to the default 
culture of administrators not being part of the teaching faculty, the principal or 
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headmaster or president can be seen as a chief teacher, master teacher, or instructional 
leader.  Granting that this teaching cannot be full-time, ensuring that teaching occurs in 
the most efficacious way is greatly aided by educational leaders sharing in the process.   
 Support for this practice is found in Kouzes and Posner's (2002) The Leadership 
Challenge.  In this work the authors state that the first practice of an exemplary leader is 
to model the way.  In other words, an exemplary leader serves as a model for the way or 
means by which the principles shared by educators are put into practice.  Modeling the 
way is difficult, not to say impossible, if the practice for which the leader serves as a 
model is absent.  To strengthen this point, Elmore (2004) echoes this point, explaining 
that one of the principles of distributed leadership is that learning requires modeling.   
 The chief element of modeling the way consists in putting principles into practice.  
This consists of formulating and implementing policies that foster an environment of 
learning that is based on these principles.  Accomplishing this end also requires building 
a shared vision of the outcome or goal toward which the entire school is directed (Kouzes 
and Posner, 2002).  Given that many individuals work together in the best way possible 
when they share this common vision of purpose, it is necessary to incorporate a practice 
of systems thinking that integrates and unites the individuals working toward a common 
goal (Senge, 1990).   
 Though Aristotle and Aquinas did not develop a philosophy of educational 
leadership as such, they do state general principles that can be applied to educational 
leadership.  These principles, astoundingly, mirror the very principles that are being 
advocated today by those most prominent in the field of educational leadership.  This 
  
 
157 
implies that underlying the field of educational leadership are philosophical principles 
that govern the actions of leaders.   
 Aquinas (1993) supplies two crucial principles that apply to leaders at the 
beginning of his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle.  He opens the 
commentary by saying, "As the Philosopher says in the beginning of the Metaphysics, it 
is the business of the wise man to order.  The reason for this is that wisdom is the most 
powerful perfection of reason whose characteristic is to know order" (p. 1).  If exemplary 
leaders should model the way for others and, thus, lead by example, they should embrace 
wisdom in the sense that understanding the order that is supposed to characterize an 
institution and its human elements and the means of bringing this order about.   
 Elaborating further on the kinds of order that wisdom is concerned with, Aquinas 
(1993) makes the following distinction.  "Now a twofold order is found in things.  One is 
that of parts of a totality, that is, a group, among themselves, as the parts of a house, are 
mutually ordered to each other.  The second order is that of things to an end.  This order 
is of greater importance than the first" (p. 1).  The two kinds of order, then, refer to the 
order of the parts among themselves and the order of the parts to the whole.  In the 
example of the house supplied here, the order of the parts among themselves corresponds 
to the relative position and function of those parts. For instance, the foundation must be at 
the bottom, the walls above the foundation, and the roof above the walls. The foundation 
serves the purpose of supporting the entire structure, the walls that of enclosing the 
building, and the roof that of shielding its inhabitants from the elements.   The second 
kind of order refers to the order of all of the parts of the house to the end or purpose of 
the whole house, which is shelter.  The wise builder, then, would situate the parts of the 
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house correctly so that each performs its proper function in the overall purpose of 
providing shelter. 
 This distinction applies to the wisdom of leadership in a particular way.  The role 
of the leader is to orchestrate the parts of an organization so that the parts work together 
for the sake of the whole.  In other words, the leader engages in systems thinking (Senge, 
1990).  In this case, the parts of the organization are the individuals who support or 
engage in the process of education.  The overall purpose of the whole is human 
perfection, which is happiness, according to Aquinas.  The leader of a school then, serves 
by directing the parts to the whole in the sense that all parts operate to accomplish the 
overall purpose.  This fits very well with Elmore's (2004) point cited above that the first 
principle of distributed leadership is the improvement of instructional practice.  Further, 
the notion of distributed leadership supports the notion that each teacher is a leader.  This 
supports the position of Aquinas that a teacher's role is to lead by the hand in the process 
of aiding the student in the task of learning.   
 Using Aquinas's principles as a foundation, it follows that the duty of a leader is 
to coordinate the efforts of the individuals in order to secure the primary objective of the 
whole institution.  
Specific Examples of How Leaders Can Implement Thomistic Principles 
 Given the principle that the wisdom of a leader consists in ordering the parts 
among themselves and the parts to the goal of the entire institution, it is necessary to cite 
some specific practices that will facilitate the exercise of the office of leadership.   
 First, and perhaps most importantly, it is the task of a leader in education to 
facilitate an environment that favors a high degree of active participation on the part of 
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the students.  Considering the teacher as a leader who acts as a catalyst for the student's 
growth in knowledge, teaching styles are paramount in this consideration.  In short, 
school leaders ought to encourage methods of instruction that induce students to the 
maximum level of involvement in their growth in knowledge.   
 One method that favors this approach is what Freire (1970) calls the dialogical 
process.  In The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, he maintains that the process of dialogue 
between the teacher and the student is essential to education as a humanizing experience.  
In contrast, a "narrative" or "banking" method of education is dehumanizing.  He 
describes the narrative method of education as follows: 
 Narration (with the teacher as narrator) leads the students to memorize 
 mechanically the narrated content.  Worse yet, it turns them into "containers," into 
 "receptacles" to be "filled" by the teacher.  The more completely she fills the 
 receptacles, the better a teacher she is.  The more meekly the receptacles  permit 
 themselves to be filled, the better students they are  (p. 71-72). 
Narration (not to be confused with fictional narrative), then, consists in telling students 
what to memorize and repeat.  It avoids the humanizing thought process and favors 
memorizing and repeating.  For this reason, in the same work Freire also refers to this 
method of education as "banking": 
 Education thus becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are 
 depositories and the teacher is a depositor.  Instead of communicating, the  teacher 
 issues communiques and makes deposits, which the students patiently 
 receive, memorize, and repeat.  This is the "banking" concept of education, 
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 in which the scope of action allowed to the students  extends only so far as 
 receiving, filing, and storing the deposits (p. 72) 
The significant defect in banking education, as Freire (1970) points out, is students are 
allowed only to receive.  In other words, they become passive recipients of information 
rather than active participants in a knowledge that they can call their own.  What, then, is 
the remedy for the ills of narrative and banking education, which Freire considers to be 
dehumanizing? 
 In order to avoid the result of narrative and banking education, which, according 
to Freire (1970), constitutes the oppression of the student, he encourages the use of a 
dialogical liberates students rather than oppressing them.  In other words, it accomplishes 
the purpose of the liberal arts, which is to liberate students in their use of reason by 
means of mastering the arts of grammar, logic, and rhetoric.  These tools of thought and 
communication allow the student to engage in the dialogical process with proficiency.  
One way of implementing the dialogical process is through the use of the "Socratic 
Maieutic" (Freire, 1992, p. 46).   
 In this Socratic Maieutic, or discussion method, teaching consists in leading a 
discussion rather than presenting a lecture.  In a lecture, the teacher gives and the student 
receives.  In the discussion method, however, the student plays a more active role and is 
allowed to practice the liberal arts in a way that hearing a lecture does not permit.  This 
method also facilitates student engagement: to engage in dialogue, students must form, 
express, support, and defend their own thoughts.  The challenge of the discussion presses 
students to higher levels of achievement: they are encouraged to read more carefully 
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knowing that they will be explaining and debating their own reading of a text.  As 
Neumayr (2015) puts it,  
 If he [the student] does this on a daily basis, his heightened intensity leads to 
 intellectual habits that last a lifetime.  Lectures are less likely to produce the 
 intellectual virtues.  At best one might remember certain ideas from a lecture, 
 but they have probably not become  part of him.  But the ideas he has worked 
 out himself are likely to stay.  And not only to stay but to become a part of 
 his mental makeup" ( p. 2). 
The point being made here is that the dialogical process gives students the opportunity to 
work out ideas for themselves and to see things on their own, rather than passively 
receiving them from a professor.  When students go through the process of acquiring 
ideas for themselves, they are more likely to retain them.  As Freire (1970) says, what 
students learn from a dialogical process satisfies their "epistemological curiosity" (p. 19). 
 The objection is often raised, however, that the discussion method is less efficient 
than a lecture and that the discussion method involving students really amounts to the 
blind leading the blind.  A lecture, one may contend, presents a sustained, uninterrupted 
argument. This argument taken as a whole is likely to be far more coherent and unified 
than any dialogical process could be. 
 In answer to this objection, one may point out, first of all, that there is certainly a 
place for lectures in education.  Every method has strengths and weaknesses and it is 
perhaps the case that no single teaching method will be superior to all the others in every 
respect.  As Freire (1970) points out, however, the lecture can have a tendency to lend 
itself to a narrative or banking style of teaching.  The purpose of education is not to cover 
  
 
162 
material, but to form the faculties of students to think for themselves.  It is not to tell 
students what  to think, but to liberate them by teaching them how to think.  Though less 
material is covered in a less systematic way in the course of the dialogical process, 
because the student is more engaged in the activity of learning, the process in the end has 
the potential to yield the lasting results of perfecting skills of inquiry which will train 
students in presenting, explaining, supporting, and defending positions which they have 
not borrowed, but made their own.   
 One of the most prominent ways, then, that leaders can implement the Thomistic 
principle that the student, not the teacher, is the primary agent in education is by fostering 
an atmosphere of active participation in the classroom.  This is supported by Elmore's 
(2004) point that the first principle of distributed leadership is the improvement of 
instructional practice.  It is also a specific example of the first kind of order, which, 
according to Aquinas, it pertains to a wise person to know and implement: the order of 
the parts among themselves.  In other words, individual teachers are parts of the whole 
institution and should be encouraged to work together for the active participation of the 
students. 
 The second kind of order refers to the purpose of the whole institution.  Regarding 
this purpose, the work of Aristotle, Aquinas, Freire (1970), and Noddings (2003) coalesce 
beautifully.  For Aristotle and Aquinas, all of the arts and sciences, in which the 
substance of education consists, are ordered to perfection or happiness. This happiness is 
achieved by a perfection of one's humanity.  In the words of Freire, an educational 
method that fails the student by not developing the mental faculties is dehumanizing and 
an oppression. This understanding, according to Freire is based on an epistemological 
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anthropology.  In other words, it is based on an understanding of human nature, and on 
fundamental ways that human beings arrive at knowledge.   
 Along the same lines, Noddings (2003), following the Aristotelian notion of 
happiness, asserts that education should be directed to happiness.  In Happiness and 
education she says "Happiness should be an aim of education, and a good education 
should contribute significantly to personal and collective happiness"  (p.1).  Elaborating 
on the notion of happiness as an aim of education she says, "Happiness is not the only 
aim of either education or life, but it is a central aim and it can be used as an evaluative 
screen through which to judge everything we do.  That sort of evaluation can change the 
lives of teachers and students"  (p. 5)  The point that Noddings is making here converges 
with the Aristotelian-Thomistic purpose of education, which is happiness.  Noddings 
seems to agree with Aristotle that perfecting the mind as an activity essential to 
happiness.  Speaking of Aristotle, she says, 
 Actually, Aristotle wrote of eudamonia, which is perhaps better translated as 
 "human flourishing," but I will follow the common practice of calling it 
 "happiness." In the view that has been most widely adopted, Aristotle 
 analyzed happiness to find its components.   This "comprehensive" view allows 
 contingencies such as health, wealth, reputation, and friendship to enter the 
 picture, but the exercise of reason is the major component of happiness (p. 10). 
If the exercise of reason is the major component of happiness, then education, which 
perfects the faculty of reason, must play a central role in human happiness.  Educational 
leaders are critical agents in creating and supporting the conditions necessary to engage 
and develop individual’s reason and reasoning capacity. 
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 The more current theories of education, then, which adopt the conclusions of 
Aristotle and Aquinas, are really based on more fundamental notions of anthropology and 
epistemology bequeathed to us by these philosophers.  Further, these fundamental notions 
are accepted by nearly everyone.  For example, almost everyone accepts the tenet that it 
is dehumanizing to deprive someone of an education and therefore that it is humanizing 
to provide it.  To act in a humanizing way, however, is nothing other than to act in a way 
that fosters the perfection or good of human nature.  Exactly what constitutes an 
education that is conducive to the perfection of human nature, however, is seldom 
examined.  The goal of this dissertation has been to do just this.   
 The attempt of this dissertation has been to fill a gap that exists in current 
literature concerning how Aristotelian-Thomistic principles are and should be at work in 
educational practice and leadership.  Though the literature showing the relevance and 
applicability of these principles to current practices in educational leadership is 
practically non-existent, there are a number of Aristotelians and Thomists who address 
their implications for education more generally. 
 In his article, "Is Education Possible?" DeMarco (2015) makes the point that 
according to Aquinas the student has an "active potency" as opposed to a passive 
potency. "Potency" indicates what is not, but able to be. If this potency is passive, the 
primary cause of the change is outside the recipient.  For example, an empty bucket has 
the potency to be full of water.  This potency is passive because the bucket is not able to 
cause itself to be full of water: something else must be the primary cause.  In the case of 
education however, the potency is active.  When students learn from teachers, the 
students are the primary cause of their own learning.  Applying the principles of Aquinas, 
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DeMarco puts it this way: "If the teacher fails to respect the liberty of the student, he 
becomes an authoritarian who is not educating his students, but indoctrinating them" (P. 
14).  Respecting the liberty of the student amounts to allowing students to play an active 
role in their education.  DeMarco continues,  "The capacity to reason, to investigate the 
laws of nature, to understand more clearly the nature of the human being, is equally 
present in the student as it is in the teacher" (p. 14).  One way to recognize this reality is 
to engage the student's epistemological curiosity by means of the dialogical process 
(Freire, 1970). 
 Another Aristotelian-Thomist, George (1994), takes up the important question of 
what determines the qualities of a good teacher.  In her article, "The Protagoras: Socratic 
Guidelines for the Choice of a Teacher," she says, "Socrates indicates that knowledge of 
the proper philosophical method is to be used as a criterion.  More specifically, he points 
out that the good teacher proceeds by way questions and short answers, the purpose of 
which is to make the student reflect for himself"  (p. 125).  The substance of this point is 
that good teachers should induce students to take an active part in their education by 
reflecting for themselves.  Apropos of this point, curricula and instruction methods 
should be implemented and modeled by educational leaders to effect this practice. 
 The Aristotelian, Harry (2105), points out in the preface to her book, Chronos in 
Aristotle's Physics: On the Nature of Time that study of nature begins with the objects of 
sense experience in the natural world around us.  It is from these objects that one begins a 
study of the more universal principles in nature that lead to wisdom.  After describing her 
experience on the shores of the Bay of Kalloni, the very place where Aristotle began his 
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study of nature, she makes the point that his experience of the natural world around him 
led him to consider the more universal final cause or purpose of nature: 
 Aristotle took in nature; he took in life.  We celebrate him because he was the first 
 to systematize this taking in; he sought not just to experience nature, but to 
 know it–to categorize the "same" and the "different," to name its purpose. As 
 any biologist or naturalist will tell you, the type of dedication it took for him 
 not only to conduct the exacting and detailed studies of natural objects, but 
 to do so when biological study was considered useless, even disgusting (see the 
 invitation to biology in PA i 5), points to the  conclusion that Aristotle had taken in 
 fully the natural world.  His consequent appreciation for its being and 
 diversity resulted in the most prolific body of scientific writing penned by any 
 one person (p. 177). 
The point that Harry (2105) is making here is that Aristotle's study, which began with 
sense experience of particular objects of study, led to a more universal knowledge of 
nature.  Thus, does all of our knowledge begin with particular objects of sensation and 
ascend to the universal knowledge of their nature and purpose.  This is precisely how 
students come to know things for themselves and in such a way that they take an active, 
not a passive, part in their education – educational leaders being students themselves.   
 The articulation and implementation of the principle that the goal of education is 
excellence in accord with activity of knowing, not the passivity of receiving information, 
profoundly influences the formulation of polices by educational leaders which are 
directed to this purpose.   These policies are implemented at the level of instructional 
practice, which is the main concern of educational leaders (Elmore, 2004).  Instructional 
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practice, in turn, is based on anthropological and epistemological considerations (Freire, 
1970 & 1992).  These considerations, however, belong to the discipline of philosophy to 
investigate and determine.  It also pertains to the discipline of philosophy to establish the 
most fundamental principles in the arts and sciences that guide the methods and progress 
of all other disciplines and to direct these disciplines to human perfection or happiness.  
The specific area of educational leadership to which these principles pertain is curriculum 
design and the instructional practice that necessarily goes along with it.  Without 
establishing these philosophical principles it is impossible to design curricula, lead 
institutions, and implement policies so that they lead to wisdom that perfects the mind 
and in which happiness principally consists. 
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